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From the Editor

ΠΙΘΟΣ (PITHOS): a large earthenware jar used for storage.

I am proud to present to you the thirteenth annual volume of Pithos, the student-produced journal of the Department of Classics at San Francisco State University.

There is sometimes perceptible a certain anxiety that the Classics are withering, sinking into themselves while singing their swan song before finally passing from the world. I shall leave judgement on this sentiment, ultimately, to you, reader. However, I would suggest to you that the present volume indicates something different: not a field weak and withering, but one wise and welcoming.

This year’s volume contains the work not just of students of the Department of Classics, but has welcomed work from several students in the Departments of History and Philosophy who offer new interpretations from different methodological perspectives. And as the contents of this volume show an interdisciplinary inclination, Pithos’ other contributors, the editing readers, are equally various, coming from the Departments of Classics, History, Comparative and World Literature, and Philosophy.

In addition to having unprecedented interdisciplinary participation, the editorial team for the 2014 volume has instituted a new system for evaluating submissions in an effort to ensure that the papers Pithos publishes exhibit a standard of high quality scholarship. We have also begun to revise our style sheet and submission guidelines in preparation to have a stronger online presence and submission system next year in the hopes of securing standardization and continuity from year to year, something that often is problematic for student-run projects and institutions.

The real focus, however, of the minutia and technicalities of publication is the publication of student papers and translations, which themselves are the product of extensive though and effort. In the present volume, Christy Schirmer offers a discussion on the relationship between food and status in the Roman world. Sheri Kennedy presents a discussion, based on literary and archaeological sources, of the relationship between living and
dead in the Roman Empire. In his turn, Robert Cordell gives a metrically inspired translation of Theokritos. After this poetic interlude, Taylor Warren discusses what can be gleaned of the acoustics of the preaching of Jesus of Nazareth from an examination of the New Testament. Russell Weber too deals with questions of sound and religion, presenting a paper on morality and the voices of the Olympian gods. Seth Chabay offers a second poetic interlude, translating translations of a Sapphic love poem. The volume closes with two philosophical discussions. The first by Ryan Michael Murphy confronts what may seem like a paradox in the writings of Plato. And finally, Michael Moore presents a paper on Aristotle’s principles, examining the structure, interplay and meaning of a particular element of the Physics.

My second year editing *Pithos* has been a joy thanks to the work and wisdom of many. To the contributors I extend the sincerest congratulations and thanks for the opportunity to present the product of your research and thought in *Pithos*. To Seth Chabay, contributor and program office coordinator, I give thanks for his patience with me and the infernal copy machine. To Dr. Gillian McIntosh, our faculty advisor, I am indebted for her unfailing guidance, particularly in the face of technicalities and minutia. Finally, Nicholas Michl and Leah Schocket, *Pithos*’ assistant editors, I thank for their untiring work and insightful contributions: without you this volume would have been impossible.

And to you, reader, I leave this volume. *Quiddam utile, quiddam vivum inveniatis.*

*Gratias vobis ago.*

**Adriana Javier**  
*Editor-In-Chief*
Authors’ Biographies

Christy Schirmer is a graduate student in Classics with an emphasis in Roman archaeology. She received a B.A. in Literature from the University of Washington in 2003. Her research interests include the archaeology of the non-elite, rural and suburban populations, and food in the ancient world. She is also passionate about cultural heritage and conservation issues. She has participated in excavations in Pompeii and Capena, Italy since 2010.

Sheri Kennedy is a graduate student in History with a focus on Medieval Europe. She received a B.A. in Medieval History and English Literature from San Francisco State in 2012. She plans to continue on to a Ph.D. program and eventual employment in a professorial capacity. Her current research interests are in death rituals as a means for understanding the living and she has an unexplainable affinity for Richard II. She spends far too much of her spare time reading with a cat in her lap.

Robert Cordell is a graduate in Classics, having earned his B.A. at Reed College in Portland, OR. His academic interests include Hellenistic and Pastoral poetry, and more generally, translation and poetry, in particular epic poetry. He spends his time outside of school rock climbing.

Taylor Warren is a graduate student in History. His interests include church history, patristics, Byzantine studies, and historical theology, and more specifically theological dialogue and exchange between Jews and Christians in late antiquity, patristic commentary on the demise of Rome, and the development of the New Testament canon. When not studying, he enjoys playing the great highland bagpipes, singing, and reading classic science fiction.

Russell Weber is a graduate student in History who will be graduating with his Master of Arts in United States History in May 2014. His research interests include how the Classics influenced the formation of
the early American republic and the cultural history of American comic books.

Seth Chabay is a graduate student in Classics. His academic interests include Eschatology, Lyric and Iambic Poetry, and the influence of ancient poetry on modern Hip-Hop. He served as the president of the Classics Students Association for the 2008-2009 academic year, and currently works as the Academic Office Coordinator for the Departments of Classics and Comparative & World Literature at San Francisco State.

Ryan Michael Murphy is a graduate student in Philosophy. His interests include Ethics, Social & Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Action, Continental European Philosophy, Buddhism, Plato, and Comparative Philosophy. Ancient Greek thinkers were his initial draw into the discipline and they perennially surface in his research and teaching. He completed a B.A. in Philosophy at Fort Lewis College and intends to pursue a Ph.D. in Philosophy. As a Graduate Teaching Associate, Ryan has taught Introduction to Critical Thinking and Introduction to Philosophy. He is committed to the belief that the greatest opportunities for learning are found in teaching. Running, swimming, painting, and cooking are among his favorite recreational activities.

Michael Moore is an graduate student in Philosophy with an emphasis on the Ancient Greek philosophers. His interests lie with Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus.
The “Mediterranean triad” of grain, wine, and olive is touted as not only the foundation of the ancient diet\(^1\) but, too often, the extent of the diet of the very poor.\(^2\) Scholarship also regularly asserts that the lower classes in the Roman world, because they usually lacked in-home kitchens, consumed most of their meals outside of the home at tabernae and popinae, and that those establishments were rarely frequented by people of high status.\(^3\) This strict divide between rich and poor is not borne out by the evidence from material culture or literature.\(^4\) In this paper, I will discuss primary source material for foods associated with high-status contexts (foods that are apparently expensive, not procured by the host directly, or prepared with an eye toward display) and low-status contexts (foods eaten by rural farmers, people on a budget, or when it is otherwise clear that a meal is relatively easy to come by and does not require immense resources, either monetary or spatial). I conclude that in spite of a perceived distinction between the eating practices of rich and poor citizens, there is plenty of evidence that many ingredients were common throughout the spectrum of social strata, and the difference between their respective eating habits, as it is often stated,\(^5\) has been mischaracterized. There is a difference, but an examination of the literature suggests that it was the level of preparation and manipulation of ingredients, rather than the ingredients themselves, that pushed foods to the level of high-status.

**High-Status Food**

*De Re Coquinaria* is a collection of recipes that were originally created by Marcus Gavius Apicius, and possibly others, in the first century C.E. It provides hundreds of recipes for vegetables, sauces, meats, fish, and sweets, all of which were assembled centuries after Apicius’ death.\(^6\) A notable feature is the high frequency of expensive and apparently exotic ingredients. Boiled ostrich and flamingo, for example, are not especially common in Italy and would presumably have been imported and thus sold
at a relatively high cost. Many recipes describe a rather complicated cooking process, making many of these dishes a difficult if not impossible enterprise for poorer Romans who lacked kitchens or rooms full of cooking implements. Substantial attention is given to herb-laden sauces and gravies, and the collection lists several sausage recipes that employ parboiling and frying techniques on top of the multi-step process of chopping various vegetables, meats, eggs, and nuts, then stuffing them into sausage casings. It is difficult to know whether such a recipe would have been possible in poorer households with little space for preparation and no evidence of a fire source, such as the smaller single room dwellings in the backs of workshops. Apicius’ are not recipes to be attempted every day by modest home cooks, but they do give us a lot of information about the kinds of foods that were available for sale and the types of preparation that would be appropriate for banquets or other settings in which the host would wish to make a show of his means.

Petronius’ description of a newly-rich freedman’s over-the-top dinner party in the *cena Trimalchionis* section of *Satyrina* is often cited as a classic portrayal of a gluttonous Roman banquet. It is a lesson in what not to do if you should find yourself suddenly among the ranks of the *nouveau riche*. This is not “typical” Roman dining, and it is not even typical elite dining. But it does go into exhaustive detail about what is essentially dinner theater. A real *cena* would be limited only by budget and imagination. The *cena Trimalchionis* is what happens when someone lacks neither of those, but is wanting in good taste. At one point, Trimalchio’s guests are presented with the 12 signs of the zodiac on a tray, with a different food over each sign: chickpeas (*cicer*) for Aries; a cut of beef (*bubulae frustum*) on Taurus, testicles and kidneys (*testiculos ac rienes*) on Gemini; a wreath (*coronam*) on Cancer; African fig (*ficum Africanam*) on Leo, a virgin sow’s womb (*steriliculam*) on Virgo; scales with two types of cakes (*scriblita...placenta*) over Libra; a small sea creature (*piisciculum marinum*) on Scorpio, a crustacean (*locustam marinam*) on Capricorn; goose (*anserem*) on Aquarius; and two red mullet (*duos mullos*) over Pisces. This dinner party is more about spectacle than food, but it helps us identify a significant variety of meats, fish, vegetables, and baked goods that existed in the marketplace. One must be careful when attempting to use literature like Petronius as a source of information about Roman diets because the descriptions are there to tell a story. In this case, it is a story about a crass freedman, not an anecdote to provide objective information about realistic
eating habits. However, although the preparation and presentation of the ingredients above may not be true to everyday life, there is no reason to ignore the fact that there was a broad range of foods at a cook’s disposal, as well as a culture of culinary innovation at the time which was exaggerated for effect but certainly had roots in reality.

Macrobius, writing a fictitious symposium conversation in his *Saturnalia* in the early fifth century C.E., points us to the backlash against lavish behavior. Sumptuary laws were an attempt to curb certain kinds of luxury and ostentatious spending, including gluttonous dining practices. These *leges sumptuariae* began with the *lex Orchia* in 182 B.C.E., which capped the number of guests allowed at a dinner party.

In 161, the *lex Fannia sumptuaria* imposed constraints on the amount that could be spent on certain luxury foods (*obsonium*), limited the amount of wine that could be imported, and prohibited force-feeding of ducks and geese. Ensuing *leges* replaced previous ones, tightening restrictions at each turn. The goal seems to have been to force most Romans to use ingredients that were locally produced, or that could be produced locally, and to avoid ostentatious production and consumption practices. In his discussion of sumptuary laws, Macrobius’ interlocutor describes an elite dinner party that was held on a special occasion, when Lentulus became the *flamen* of Mars. There were three dining rooms populated by a who’s who of Roman elite, including pontiffs and Vestal virgins. The menu as described is ridiculous, with endless quantities of bivalves, urchins, murex, thrush, hens, deer loins, and wild boar, among others. The dinner is characterized by its excessive variety and quantity of foodstuffs. Such over-the-top displays of wealth and culinary extravagance, probably exaggerated, were perfect fodder for a discussion about prohibitive legislation. The episode in this section is presented as an especially egregious example of the degradation of Roman values because of its religious context (*ubi iam luxuria tunc accusaretur quando tot rebus farta fuit cena pontificum*, where then should luxury be more reprimanded than when the dinner of pontiffs is stuffed with so many things?)

In addition to abundance and variety, over-preparation and manipulation of ingredients seems to be another marker of high-status dining. We see this in Trimalchio’s dinner, and, as noted above, it was also a direct target of the *lex Fannia*, which addressed force-feeding animals. This is discussed in Macrobius as well, with the speaker quoting Varro (*hoc quoque nuper institutum ut saginarentur, cum exceptos e leporario condant in caveis et loco clauso*)
faciant pingues, this also has recently been done, that they be fattened, when, removed from the rabbit hutch, they are placed in coops and made fat in the enclosed space). The same was apparently done to snails (cochleas saginatas, snails fattened for eating). Yet another example of dinner-party fare taken too far in terms of over-preparation is the “Trojan pig,” a culinary spectacle that features a pig stuffed with other animals:

nam Titius in suasione legis Fanniae obicit saeculo suo quod porcum Troianum mensis inferant, quem illi ideo sic vocabant, quasi aliis inclusis animalibus gravidum, ut ille Troianus equus gravidus armatis fuit.

For instance Titius, in his recommendation of the law of Fannia, presents what in his age they bring to the table as a Trojan pig, which they called thus for this reason: because it was laden with other animals enclosed, just as that Trojan horse was laden with arms.

A similar phenomenon played out in a memorable scene from Petronius, during which Trimalchio mock-scolds his cook for “forgetting” to disembowel a pig before roasting it. He instructs the frightened cook to open an un-gutted pig in front of his dinner guests, at which point sausages and puddings come tumbling out (nec mora, ex plagis ponderis inclinatione crescentibus tomacula cum botulis effusa sunt, without delay, out of the gash by the forcefulness of the weight, sausages with blood puddings poured out).

Sumptuary laws attempted to enforce the use of humble and local ingredients, and the manipulation of basic ingredients is not humble, because those foods are no longer directly ex terra. That manipulation, along with the emphasis on excess and display, characterize the episodes above as high-status.

It is worth asking why the sumptuary laws were passed at all. Why try to control behavior at banquets? The backlash against conspicuous consumption was likely a symptom of social tension, and legislating morality was an attempt to control wealth and political and social behavior. Certain people wanted to spend money to promote their status, and others wanted to prevent them from doing so. Vincent Rosavich claims that the laws were expressly designed to drive a wedge between “two different economies,” that of the self-sufficient, living-off-the-land Romans and that of the wealthy who used money to buy what they needed. Of course, farming
is not free, and the difference between someone who can afford property, plants, and labor and a person who chooses to spend his money on imported or “produced” foods is almost more of a semantic argument than a practical one, not least because the laws did not dictate that one must grow his own vegetables just because he could. The political motivations for constraining elite forms of entertainment are numerous, especially in a society where business is often conducted at home, where social and professional connections are made and maintained, and where the line between public and private is so often blurred. Sumptuary legislation may have begun with the Republican notion of salt-of-the-earth self-sufficiency, after all, it was taken for granted that the Cincinnatus-style idealized Roman was a worthy model to which male citizens should aspire. However, I believe that the use of that ideal, the resurgence of characters like Cincinnatus and Lucretia as models of behavior, was an easy excuse for controlling how people spent their money and socialized. Concerns about families and lineage, and worthiness as a Roman from good stock, may have led to tension as social mobility increased. What was passed off as upholding a good moral tradition (limiting elitism and extravagance) may have been nothing more than old money attempting to cling to its special status.

In fact, some of the laws targeted public meeting spaces as well in an effort to keep people out of inns and taverns. Does this mean that “luxury” items or extravagant food were being served there? More likely, it was an attempt to maintain control over socializing and meeting-places for those who were on the periphery of the upper-crust.

Did these laws actually help Rome’s wealthy return to a humble, ideal Roman lifestyle? If the ostensible reason for their enactment was to promote humble spending and dietary practices across the board, for rich and poor, can we know whether this blending of class behaviors existed in word only but not in deed? How much compliance was there? Probably little, if one of Cicero’s letters ad familiares is any indication. Cicero, writing to his physician and friend Gallus, describes an indirect result of one of the leges, which would have governed an augur’s dinner party he attended in the winter of 45-46 B.C.E. He became so ill that he had to cancel his appointments and leave Rome in order to recuperate, he claims, because he ate too many vegetables that were dressed up with excessive fervor in an attempt to replicate the style of luxury foods normally purchased in the macellum.
Ac tamen, ne mirere, unde hoc acciderit quomodove com-
miserim, lex sumptuaria, quae videtur λιτότητα attulisse, ea
mihi fraudi fuit. Nam, dum volunt isti lauti terra nata, quae lege
excepta sunt, in honorem adducere, fungos, helvellas, herbas
omnes ita condunt, ut nihil possit esse suavius: in eas cum in-
cidissem in coena augurali apud Lentulum, tanta me διάρροια
arripuit, ut hodie primum videatur coepisse consistere. Ita ego,
qui me ostreis et muraenis facile abstinebam, a beta et a malva
deceptus sum; posthac igitur erimus cautiores.25

But, lest you wonder from what this [affliction] happened or
how I brought it on, the sumptuary law, which seems to have
encouraged simplicity, that was the agent of my deceit. For,
while those fine men want things borne of the earth, which
are exempted from the law, to bring them up in esteem, they
season mushrooms, pot-herbs, and all manner of vegetation so
that nothing could be more delightful: when I descended upon
those at the augural dinner at Lentulus’ house, such diarrhea
seized me, so that only today it appears to have begun to cease.
Thus I, who have abstained from oysters and eels, was misled
by beet and mallow; from now on I will be more careful.

On its face, this letter is ridiculous. Obviously the prohibition of
luxury items will not make someone ill, and Cicero’s assertion that his
host went to such lengths to make up for the missing extravagance may be
exaggerated. But fortunately for the modern reader, his letter offers a peek
at contemporary reception of these laws and can tell us how or whether
they may have been observed in practice. Cicero’s host substituted overly
seasoned vegetables for prohibited meats and fish, in effect making an exag-
gerated display of adhering to the law in letter but not in spirit.26 Sumptuary
laws were virtually unenforceable,27 although attempts were made to do so,
for example by Julius Caesar, who deployed inspectors to markets and even
sent lictors and soldiers to enter houses where infractions were observed.28
If that secondary team was tasked with seizing goods that slipped through
the first layer of inspection, we know the system was far from perfect
and people were breaking the law. The process of identifying extravagant
purchases after the point of sale (peering through dining room windows?)
would have been difficult logistically, and the fact that numerous new laws
were passed to essentially renew the old ones suggests that there was no
sustained culture of enforcement. Despite attempts to curb luxurious spending habits, the rich still hosted dinner parties and made a point of creating dishes that would impress their guests. It was simply a matter of the sumptuary laws trying to keep up with citizens’ adaptations as they skirted the rules. Cicero’s example shows us that even without exotic ingredients, a host could make an effort to serve a meal that was prepared with flair. The foods themselves were not exotic, but the level of preparation was the status identifier, and Cicero’s host was sure to flaunt it.

Even though so much of our literary evidence for Roman dining practices is in the context of dinner parties, we can still learn something about everyday eating habits. In Plautus’ Captivi, Ergasilus, a parasite, is hoping to get a good meal out of well-to-do Hegio and tries to convince him to arrange for a variety of fish and meats for a lavish dinner. There are clues about the atmosphere of food and commerce in the forum, and although this play is set in Greece, Plautus was writing for a Roman audience who could relate to many of the day-to-day issues enacted onstage. Part of Plautus’ appeal was that he presented familiar characters and tropes that could be easily recognizable but enjoyed from a safe, if contrived, distance. Act 4, Scene 2 mentions fishmongers selling stinking fish through the basilica, a setting clearly familiar to Romans:

Then the fishermen, who provide stinking fish to the populace,
which are carried on a galloping suffering gelding,
whose odor sends everyone away into the forum,
I'll smack their faces with their fish baskets,
so that they may know what bother they produce for a stranger's nose.  
This episode may be part of the preparations for a luxurious banquet, but Plautus describes the fishmongers as pandering to the populo, implying that fish was plentiful and its sellers were permanent fixtures in the bustling marketplace.
LOW-STATUS FOODS

How readily available to the masses were foods like fish? There is no disputing that the majority of the population was working-class and did not have the luxury of enjoying routine private banquets. We know that there were concerns about poverty and hunger, discussions of which often cite the public grain dole, although I will demonstrate that there is evidence that many foods were common across the class spectrum and the lower classes ate more than bread and wine. In the second century B.C.E., the economic climate was such that a policy of food distribution was enacted, allowing male citizens to obtain free or discounted foodstuffs during lean years. Rome began a regular distribution of grain in 58 B.C.E. to males, rich and poor alike, as a right of citizenship established by the tribune Clodius Pulcher. The tradition extended into the imperial era, when emperors continued the tradition of giving out grain and pork to the poor under the alimenta program. Ancient sources tell us that the dole was a hard-won perk for the poor, but it was not theirs exclusively throughout its history.

The city of Rome’s system of grain distribution was exceptional and was not universal among her provinces. Elsewhere in the empire, distribution of food seems to have existed on a small scale, and was either privately or municipally financed, not sweeping, and not consistent. In addition to the public dole, there were other opportunities for dispensing foodstuffs to the public at low or no cost. Publicly distributed food was given at games, public feasts, and statue dedications. Panis et vinum, wine and bread, or crustulum et mulsum, pastry and sweet wine, were given at state-sponsored dedications and other celebratory events. For example, a priest of Tiberius gave panem et vinum to the populace on the day he received his toga virilis. Sometimes even monetary gifts were included, usually no more than one or two denarii (HS12) in addition to the food. On sacrifice days, meat from the victims was either given away or sold; Martial mentions the use of pepper to season meat given to one “by lot” (sorte datur). The munerarius who sponsored gladiatorial fights occasionally provided a cena libera for the public on the night before the games. During the principate, there was a tradition of giving public meals valued at four sesterces on average, double the daily cost of living estimate at Pompeii in the first century. We know from inscriptions that two asses (less than one sesterce) was enough for bread for one person for one day, although information about wages is scarce.
It is important to note that traditions of public feasting appear to have had more to do with societal unity and, almost paradoxically, maintaining class hierarchy than providing necessary nourishment. They were not daily sources of food, and the poor could not have relied on them for regular meals.

We can conclude that people occupying the lower social strata were eating the foods mentioned in association with the dole and public giveaways (bread, wine, some meat) because they were provided by the state, and we can assume there was legitimate poverty and scarcity that introduced challenges for poorer Romans in terms of putting food on the table. But wealthy citizens would have also qualified for the dole in some cases, and there are stories of slave-owners cheating the system to obtain free grain for “pseudo-manumitted” slaves. The dole tells us that the poor ate bread, but it does not tell us that the rich did not, and in fact, raw grain must be turned into flour before becoming usable, so the poorest of the poor may have struggled to find the resources to take full advantage of the grain dole. Furthermore, the poor could hardly survive on bread alone. In the late Republic, the monthly grain ration for a male citizen would have provided about enough calories for him but would not feed his whole family, nor would it provide nutritional balance, and public gifts of meat were too irregular to sustain a population. We must look beyond the standard “Mediterranean triad” as the only food for the poor worth discussing if we wish to complete the picture.

But what did the poor eat, and what is humble or low-status food? The sumptuary laws tell us that there was a sense that foods contained some virtue, whatever that is worth (probably not much, when the concern is putting food on the table when one’s family is hungry), as did locally-produced wine. Does that mean those were the food items enjoyed by humble citizens, free of pretension and ostentatious display? Although much of Martials’ *Xenia* refers to elite dining practices, an attentive reader will notice that he also occasionally reflects this desire to get back to basics and offers some examples of humble food. For those who want a no-frills breakfast without meat, consider cheese:

\[
\text{Si sine carne voles ientacula sumere frugi,}
\]
\[
\text{haec tibi Vestino de grege massa venit.}
\]
If you will wish to obtain an honest breakfast without meat, this hunk comes to you from the herd of Vesta.\textsuperscript{51}

Dates, while imported, may have also been reasonably affordable for the non-wealthy. Martial lists them as a gift of a poor man (\textit{aurea por-rigitur Iani caryota Kalendis; sed tamen hoc munus pauperis esse solet}, the golden date may be offered for the Kalends of Janus; but nevertheless this gift is that of a poor man).\textsuperscript{52} He also tells us that lentil (\textit{lens}) was cheaper than wheat (\textit{vilitor est alica}).\textsuperscript{53} The Appendix Vergiliana provides a description of a tavern-keeper and her wares. The menu includes little cheeses (\textit{caseoli}), plums (\textit{pruna}), chestnuts (\textit{castaneae}), apples (\textit{mala}), blood-red mulberries (\textit{mora cruenta}), grapes (\textit{uva}), and cucumbers (\textit{cucumis}).\textsuperscript{54} The poem leads the description of menu items with \textit{vappa cado nuper defuse picato}, flavorless wine (\textit{vappa}) in a jug with recently poured pitch. This must not be a terribly nice tavern, if the wine is \textit{vappa}, but it also would not be a place for the poorest of the poor, because one would need some disposable income in order to visit a tavern like this, which included “entertainment” with the food and wine service. For peasants and those in the countryside, bread, cheese, and wine were common lunch staples eaten for \textit{prandium}. The farmer Symilus in the \textit{Moretum} section of the Appendix Vergiliana prepares a rustic country meal by grinding his own grain, making bread, and then, in order to make the meal more interesting, prepares a mix of cheese and herbs. He makes a simple cake by mixing flour and water by hand, which does require a hearth for cooking (although baked bread for sale was plentiful in cities like Pompeii and Rome). Symilus did not have smoked meat or bacon, but he had cheese hanging by a rope, and along with some dill he could create a paste to spread on the bread. Apuleius also shows us how bread and cheese (\textit{caseum cum pane}) could serve as an easy breakfast for a traveler (\textit{“En inquam “Paratum tibi ades ientaculum,” et cum dicto manticae meam numero exuo, caseum cum pane propere ei porrigo, et “Inxta platanum istam residamus” aio, “Hey,” I said, “breakfast is here ready for you,” and having said so I quickly took off my knapsack, and I swiftly extended to him some cheese with bread and said “Let’s sit down by this plane-tree”}).\textsuperscript{55} Here it is the setting but not the person who is humble. The character, Aristomenes, on his way to Thessaly for business, is upper-class. He is capable of affording high-status foods but here is eating something rather humble, presumably because it is portable and requires no tools or space for preparation.

In \textit{Sermones} 1.6, Horace explains the daily activities in a life free from
ambition. He contrasts his simple life with that of a person bogged down by the requirements and complications of a rich patrician lifestyle (*hoc ego commodius quam tu, praecclare senator, milibus atque aliis vivo*, here I live more comfortably than you, distinguished senator, and in thousands of other ways).\(^56\) He describes inquiring after the price of greens and grain (*percontor quanti bolus ac far*),\(^57\) then leaving the forum and returning home to a bowl of leeks, chickpeas, and a cake made of flour and oil (*inde domum me ad porri et ciceris refero laganique catinum*).\(^58\) In his Odes, Horace again extols the virtuous properties of humble foods, claiming that he wishes only to enjoy the simple things life can offer. He prays not for riches (*opimae*) nor gold or ivory (*aurum aut ebur*).\(^59\) For him olives, chicories, and smooth mallows are fit for grazing (*me pascust oliuae, me cichorea leuesque malvae*).\(^60\) The context here is clear: the things in which he indulges are not lofty; his lifestyle and the food he buys are not the choices of people aiming to have the best of the best. We should allow for the likelihood that this is a caricature of his habits, not the real thing. But if these are the kinds of foods an elite would consider obvious choices when attempting to co-opt the habits of humble residents of Rome, then perhaps this is the kind of modest meal a real poor citizen would have eaten. They are characterized by their affordability, the lack of preparation required, and are not designed to be part of an elaborate display.

Besides bread, simple vegetables, and cheese, is there evidence for low-status consumption of meat? Celsus engages in an interesting discussion of foods’ nutritional values, declaring some strong while others are weak (*deinde ex eodem sue ungulae, rostrum, aures, cerebellum, ex agno haedove cum petiolis totum caput aliquanto quam cetera membra leviora sunt, adeo ut in media materia poni possint*, then from the same pig the hoofs, snout, ears, brain, or from a lamb or kid are considerably less nutritious with their little feet and whole head than the rest of their limbs, to such a degree that they be placed in the middle category of nutritional benefit).\(^61\) If there was a common belief that some things, such as offal, were less nutritious than others, foods deemed to be of little nutritional value might have been cheaper. In fact, according to the Diocletian price edict, sow’s udder, for example, was worth half as much as pork.\(^62\) Sausages and other processed meats seem to have been cheaper than whole cuts\(^63\) and were more affordable for the lower classes. The wealthy may have attempted to adhere to these recommendations for health by eating stewed pieces of select cuts with a high fat content.\(^64\) The
lower classes likely would have used those “weaker” \((leviora)\) cuts of meat, not unlike the colloquial \textit{quinto quarto} in later Rome, which saw leavings of the food production process go to the working class. There were entire large animals to be dealt with; it is not out of the question that the less desirable cuts of meat would have made their way to consumers with less money than the Trimalchios and Lentuluses.

Likewise, there were cheaper ways to get fish into your diet than paying for mackerel. The gudgeon \((gobius)\), for example, is a small fish that may have been affordable for the average citizen. Martial describes that the humble fish was eaten by the Veneti in the north \((in\ \textit{Venetis} \textit{sint lauta licet convivia terris, principium cenae gobius esse solet, although in Venetic lands there may be elegant banquets, the gudgeon is customarily the beginning of the meal})\).\footnote{Gobius was eaten at Rome as well. Juvenal tells us that it was cheaper than mullet (his purpose is to advise a spendthrift to only buy what he can afford: \textit{ne mullum cupias, cum sit tibi gobio tantum in loculis, don’t desire mullet, when there is only enough in your wallet for gobius}).}

It seems there was plenty of opportunity for foods to cross social boundaries. Martial discusses flavoring beets, a typical food of workmen \((\textit{prandia fabrorum})\), and the use of wine and pepper:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Ut sapiant fatuae, fabrorum prandia, betae, o quam saepe petet vina piperque cocus!}
\end{quote}

So that silly beets, lunch for workmen, may have flavor, how often the cook goes for wines and pepper!\footnote{A workman is not eating the beets here, as they are probably being prepared in a rather comfortable setting if there is a \textit{cocus} involved. But the epigram tells us that beets were common to the working-class as well as those who employed cooks. Pepper and wine may also have been popular throughout the social classes. Seasoning was an important part of the Roman diet, and as noted above, pepper might have been available to those who would be seasoning meat acquired by \textit{sorte}. One of the most well-known ingredients in Roman cuisine was the condiment \textit{garum}, and a quick investigation tells us that there were tiers of \textit{garum} quality, indicating that this habit may have crossed socioeconomic boundaries. \textit{Garum} was a sauce made from fish fermented with salt. During the fermentation process, clear liquid was skimmed off the top and the thin, brown liquor was used as a condiment. Pliny claimed that \textit{garum} was made from parts of fish}
that were to be thrown out (aliud etiamnum liquoris exquisiti genus, quod garum vocavere, intestinis piscium ceterisque, quae abicienda essent, sale maceratis, ut sit illa putrescentium sanies, yet another type of liquid, which they have called garum, from intestines and the remainders of fish which were going to be thrown away, and which are broken down with salt, so it is that bloody matter from their decay). \textsuperscript{71} Liquamen was produced from small whole fish such as anchovies, as well as some of the byproducts of the garum-making process, and separated into layers over the course of the months-long fermentation process. The thick, bottommost layer of sediment was called allec\textsuperscript{72} or allex.\textsuperscript{73} Although occasionally described as rotten or putrid (e.g. corrupto...garo, \textsuperscript{74} sit illa putrescentium sanies), garum was used to season almost everything, from fish to eggs (candida si croceos circumfluit unda vitellos, Hesperius scombri temperet ova liquor). \textsuperscript{76} Apicius gives a recipe for oenogarum, a simple sauce for dressing fish, made with pepper, rue, honey, wine, and fish sauce.\textsuperscript{77} It could be very expensive; in fact, the elder Pliny acknowledges that garum could be the most expensive liquid sold besides unguents: nec liquor ullus paene praeter unguenta maiore in pretio esse coepit, nobilitatis etiam gentibus.\textsuperscript{78} On the other hand, muria, which was made from tuna, could be cheap. Martial notes the difference in value between fish sauce made from tuna and that of mackerel: Antipolitani, fateor, sum filia thynni: essem si scombri, non tibi missa forem.

I confess, I am the daughter of Antipolitan tuna:
If I were of mackerel, I would not have been sent to you.\textsuperscript{79}

Compare this with Martial 13.102:
Expirantis adhuc scombri de sanguine primo
accipe fastosum, munera cara, garum.

From the first blood of still exhaling mackerel
receive proud garum, a precious gift.\textsuperscript{80}

Pliny explains that allec, the dregs of the fermentation process, became so in-demand as to be a luxury item (transiit deinde in luxuriam, crever-\textit{unte}que genera ad infinitum, it has crossed over into luxury, and endless varieties have arisen).\textsuperscript{81} What began as a lowly by-product became a prized condiment, targeted for production because of high demand.

What other foods might have crossed over from rich to poor, and how? Among the lists of cultivated vegetables available, there are also
uncultivated wild vegetables and herbs. Martial mentions wild asparagus \((incultis...asparagis)\). Was wild asparagus a low-status food? According to Martial, nothing could be more pleasing \((non erit incultis gratior asparagis)\), yet it could be foraged for free in some areas and would have been enjoyed, quite literally, almost directly \(ex terra\). Pliny describes more than one variety, noting that “[asparagus] is milder than corruda \((mitius corruda)\)” and claims it grew wild in mountainous regions, in the fields of Germany \((refertis superioris Germaniae campis)\), and a favorite type grew naturally on the Campanian island of Nesis \((in Neside Campaniae insula sponte nascitur)\). Apicius mentions preparing a cold salad of wild herbs \((herbae rusticae)\) dressed with oil and vinegar, or cooked with spices. Those with access to countryside could hunt or trap, and even city-dwellers might have had opportunity for free foods to supplement their diets. Foraging could only supplement, not sustain, and even then it could not supplement everyone’s diet for basic reasons of supply, nor would every citizen have been equally industrious. But there is no reason to assume that ancient Romans as a group were any less resourceful than their modern Italian counterparts, many of whom still forage for foods that grow in the wild. Identifying foods as high or low-status may have as much to do with availability and scarcity as complexity of preparation; the means of acquisition trump the category of ingredient. This brief examination of asparagus suggests that “cultivation” is only better in some cases, not unlike modern consumerism. Rarity constitutes luxury; if cultivated asparagus is everywhere, then a status-conscious consumer would want imported wild asparagus from Ravenna. If he lived on that island off of Campania, his neighbors would not be impressed if he served the asparagus that grows for free all around him, even though it is perfectly good. A relatively poor person from a region that is abundant in a desirable food item might be eating well by certain standards, but his wealthy counterparts would likely distinguish themselves by selecting better or different foods.

In seaside communities, the lower classes might have supplemented their diets by fishing. Plautus, in Rudens, Act 2, Scene 1, introduces us to two fishermen who have no livelihood other than to fish for their meals. Their clothes are tattered \((nos iam de ornatu propemodum ut locupletes simus scitis, now from our dress you know just about how wealthy we are)\), and they spend their days \(ex urbe ad mare hac prodimus pabulatum, out of the city to come out here to the sea to forage\), where they collect urchins \((echinos)\), various shellfish \((lopadas, balanos)\), oysters \((ostreas)\), mussels \((conchas, musculos)\), sea nettle
or jellyfish (*marinam urticam*), and striated fish (*plagusias striatas*). These are essentially the same foods that were eaten at the lavish banquet described in Macrobius *Sat.* 3.13 above, but the quantity was limited by what they could (or could not) catch on a given day. They could not guarantee an abundance or variety of seafood, and they had to catch it themselves rather than pay someone to fetch it for them on demand. When the same seafood was presented as high-status, the hosts serving it to their guests did not exert the labor to fish it from the sea, they were geographically farther from the source, and there was an excessive quantity, not just enough to satisfy a caloric need. Perhaps most importantly, a banquet suggests planning, so those hosts knew they would be able to acquire those fish and shellfish, unlike Plautus’ fisherman, who may or may not have had a lucky catch. This depiction of poor, unemployed fishermen may be a caricature, but it reminds us that a sea full of food was on the doorstep of many people in Rome’s empire, and many probably enjoyed it, albeit in different settings than their wealthier counterparts.

In Juvenal 11, mentioned above, we learn something important about the culture of eating in Rome. This satire tells us that even a destitute gourmet (or perhaps gourmand) will bankrupt himself in order to continue buying choice foods for banquets:

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multos porro uides, quos saepe elusus ad ipsum
creditor introitum solet expectare macelli,
et quibus in solo uiuendi causa palato est.
egregius cenat meliusque miserrimus horum
et cito casurus iam perlucente ruina.
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You see many farther off, whom the creditor is accustomed to await, having been dodged often, at the market’s entrance, and for whom the only cause for living is for the palate.

The poorest of these dines as an eminent man already about to fall quickly into apparent ruin. This is intended to say something about the rich and people with imbalanced values, but it tells us that food, and how you ate it, was important in Roman society. The inhabitants of the lower-classes presumably would have felt a trickle-down effect of that attitude and desired to take advantage of some of the tasty foodstuffs available to the region, making the best of what they could acquire. The literary evidence for food challenges the
notion that the poor were limited to a bland, scarce diet while the wealthy enjoyed a rich and varied one. Foods like grains, lentils, chickpeas, leafy greens, cabbage, onion and garlic, beets, olives and olive oil, cheese, fish, pork, poultry, eggs, nuts, fruits like apple, grape, and fig, and seasonings such as pepper and garum, appear over and over in our literary sources and were probably available to most citizens. Many foods that are often omitted from discussions of lower-class food, such as fish, likely had a place on most Romans’ tables at some point and in some form. Most ingredients seem to have been shared across social boundaries, with the primary difference being in preparation, quality, and quantity of food items. It would be surprising if the lower classes were satisfied to subsist on bread, olive oil, and wine to the exclusion of the myriad foodstuffs that were literally all around them, and they probably enjoyed more variety than an initial reading of the sources would indicate.

Notes

2 e.g. Aldrete and Aldrete 2012, 2.
4 Archaeological evidence, including recent findings from ecoligists and stable isotope analysis, avails us of more information about what non-elites were actually eating.
6 It is interesting to note that it was written in Vulgar Latin – perhaps for the cooks who would have had less formal education than the elite for whom they were cooking (Cool 2006, 34)?
7 Petron. Sat. 35.
8 It is interesting that our narrator describes it as vile, or cheap, and describes their struggle to approach the meal while Trimalchio urges them to eat: nos ut tristiores ad talie vilem accessimus cibos, ‘suadeo inquit Trimalchio ‘cenemus; hoc est ius cenae’, As we, very unhappy, approached such cheap foods, Trimalchio said “I urge that we eat; this is the law of the banquet” (Petron. Sat. 35). Trimalchio has limitless funds but he gets everything wrong and is a terrible host. It is no surprise that the foods he procured were not necessarily good, although I think scholarly shorthand tends to label this cena as an example of excessive, expensive Roman dining.
9 Hillary Cool discusses the challenges of using descriptions of food that are there “for literary reasons” (Cool 2006, 34).
10 Rosavich 2005, 323.
11 The restrictions were loosened so that the acceptable amounts increased on special days, like the Kalends and during Saturnalia (Rosavich 2005, 323). The range of allowed expenditure was ten asses on most days, thirty on others, and one hundred on certain holidays (Gellius 2.24).
12 Rosavich 2005, 323.
13 Macrobi. Sat. 3.13.11.
14 Macrobi. Sat. 3.13.12.
15 Macrobi. Sat. 3.13.13; all translations are the author’s unless otherwise noted.
16 Macrobi. Sat. 3.13.14. See also Cato Agr. 89-90 for a technique for force-feeding fowl.
20 The *lex Licinia* made a special exception for purchasing foods that were *ex terra vite arboreve sit natum*, borne of the earth, vine, or tree (*Macrob. Sat. 3.17.9*).

21 Rosavich 2005, 324.

22 DeFelice 2009, 479, after Casson.

23 It could refer to the recent *lex Julia* from the year 46, with which Julius Caesar renewed previous sumptuary laws in an effort to curb expenditures by people who had grown extravagant (*Dion Cass. 43.25*). Earlier laws, starting with the *lex Fannia* and continued by the *lex Aemilia*, were concerned with types of foods specifically and contained provisions for foods that were local and humble in origin (as noted above, the *lex Licinia* allowed for food that was “ex terra vite arboreve sit natum” (*Macrob. Sat. 3.17.9*).

24 Rosavich 2005, 323.


26 Rosavich 2005, 326.

27 Rosavich 2005, 325.


29 Are they selling inferior fish (unfresh), or is this simply a case of too much, overtaxing the senses, and possibly letting what was fresh in the morning get spoiled and stinking by end of day?

30 Mattingly & Aldrete 2000, 143.

31 Citizens were “eligible regardless of means” (*Finley 1985*, 170; 201).

32 Finley 1985, 40.

33 Finley 1985, 201.

34 Finley 1985, 40; 201.

35 Money was set aside for local authorities via “interest payments, of about five per cent, made by larger landowners on loans they took from the original fund of about eight per cent of the value of the charged holdings.” (*Finley 1985*, 201). Forty-nine towns are known to have participated (*Finley 1985*, 202).

36 Finley 1985, 200.

37 Finley 1985, 200.

38 Donahue 2004, 1.


40 Donahue 2004, 8.

41 Donahue 2004, 245, n. 34.

42 Mart.13.5.

43 Donahue 2004, 9.

44 Donahue 2004, 142.

45 Donahue 2004, 142.

46 Donahue 2004, 43.

47 Donahue 2003, 468.

48 Finley 1985, 201.

49 Rickman 1980, 262; this argument is supported by evidence from human skeletal remains, which have repeatedly demonstrated a perhaps surprising lack of malnutrition in populations, many of whom were likely middle or lower-class, on both the Italian peninsula (e.g. Lazer 2009, 219) and in Roman Britain (e.g. Cool 2006, 24-5).


51 Mart.13.31.

52 Mart. 13.27.

53 Mart. 13.9.

55 Apuleius 1.18.
56 Hor. Serm. 1.6.110-1.
57 Hor. Serm. 1.6.112.
58 Hor. Serm. 1.6.114-5.
59 Hor. Carm. 1.31-3-6.
60 Hor. Carm. 1.31.14-15. Note that he is not comparing food with food, but riches with non-riches. In case there was any doubt, he has clarified that olives and greens are not delicacies and require no special privilege.
61 Celsus, de Medicina 2.18.
62 Bernardi 2006, 86.
63 MacKinnon 2004, 209: prices set by Diocletian (3rd c.) list beef sausages at 10 denarii per pound and smoked Lucanian pork sausages at 16 denarii per pound (Ed. Diocl. 4.14, 4.15), whereas suckling pig, sow’s udder, salt pork and liver of a pig fed on figs (noted in an Apicius recipe) sold for 16-24 denarii per pound (Ed. Diocl. 4.46, 4.7, 4.5, 4.6).
64 MacKinnon 2004, 211.
65 Mart. 13.88.
66 Juv.11.36-7; Juv. 4 also tells the mock-epic of procuring and preparing a highly-esteemed mullet for the emperor Domitian.
67 Mart. 13.13.
68 Mart. 13.5.
69 Garum was popular throughout the Roman empire. Even in Britain, evidence for fish sauce is more plentiful after the Roman conquest (Cool 2006, 60).
70 Grainger 2006, 27.
71 Grainger 2006, 28.
72 Plin. HN 31.43.
73 Plin. HN 31.44.
74 Mart. 6.93.
75 Plin. HN 31.43.
76 Mart. 13.40.
77 Plin. HN 31.43.
78 Plin. HN 31.43.
79 Mart. 13.103.
80 Mart. 13.102.
81 Plin. HN 31.44.
82 Plin. HN 31.44.
83 Apicius 3.16.
84 e.g. wild asparagus, capers, purslane, figs, dandelion greens.
85 Foods like truffles can be foraged in the wild but sell at high prices at market. Similarly, Hillary Cool cautions against imposing current (or even contemporary but geographically different) ideas about luxury, noting that oysters would have been readily available in Roman Britain, even though some modern scholars might be tempted to classify them as luxurious. “Availability is all” (Cool 2006, 109).
86 Plaut. Rud.2.1.4. They start this description by claiming that omnibus modis qui pauperes sunt homines miseris vivunt,praesertim quibus nec quaestus est, nec didicere artem illam, men who are paupers live miserably in every way, particularly for whom there is no profit, and you are not devoted to any skill.
87 Apicius 3.16.
88 Plaut. Rud.2.1.6.
89 Plaut. Rud.2.1.8-9.
91 Juv. 11.9-13.

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STARVING FOR REMEMBRANCE: 
THE DISCOURSE OF THE DEAD IN GRACO-ROMAN SOCIETY 
BY SHERI KENNEDY

TO UNDERSTAND A SOCIETY, LOOK TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS TO THE BODY. 
-Robert Hertz

The response of civilization to questions of the afterlife and the dispensation of the soul is prominently displayed in the archaeological records from the pyramids of Giza to the Arlington Cemetery. The dead and the living affect each other mutually. In Greco-Roman society the relationship between the two was reinforced in a variety of ritualistic practices. These practices illustrate a belief in the continuing relationship between the physical remains and the soul and offer a variety of possibilities for the afterlife, all of which betray the hopes and fears of the living over the moment of death. As Sarah Iles Johnston put it, “every detail in which a culture cloaks its ideas about the dead has the potential to reveal something about the living.”

The purpose of this paper is to explore the interactions between the living and the dead in the Greco-Roman world. Both archaeological and literary evidence are used to illustrate a variety of practices from which extrapolations on the nature of the soul and the afterlife can be determined. Given the breadth of the Roman Empire and the religious syncretism expansion created, I am limiting my focus to what we, from the vantage of modernity, consider pagan. These interactions inform the cultural understanding of the afterlife and they move well beyond the Hades/Elysian Field binary that typifies modern representation of Roman society’s perception of the afterlife. I will be exploring the influences of the Greeks, both of the Classical and Hellenistic period as well as the oriental influences distilled through Asia Minor, the Etruscans and various elements of Egyptian belief as filtered through Alexandria into a larger cultural context. I am working from the theoretic model that rituals are not purely performative; their value lies not only in the doing but in the retelling and even in the embellishment of fantasy. Literature re-signifies the cultural importance of the act, and challenges the top down perfunctory aspects that perennial rituals can take on over time, breathing
life into cultural practices and further connecting the performer to the act and its consequences. It is not my intention to dissect philosophical treatises on death and the nature of the soul, but to explore how the cultural relics of ritualistic practice and literary representation inform the discussion, exhibiting a continuity that is both simple and significant. I am looking at practices that have a persistent temporality, in keeping with the theoretical frame of the French historian Philippe Aries, “the historian of death must not be afraid to embrace the centuries until they run into a millennium. The errors he will not be able to avoid are less serious than the anachronisms to which he would be exposed by too short a chronology.”

The debate between what constitutes “religion” as opposed to “magic” has roiled on for decades, and I have no desire to enter into it. For the purposes of this paper, the terms are interchangeable. Both are desirous of affecting an outcome through the use of ritual. Any sociological or political constructs contemporaneous to these rituals that determined classification, although not inconsequential, will only be noted when indicative of greater cultural shifts that impact the ritualistic construct itself. The legitimacy of convention was fluid and should not overshadow the continuity of practice.

The supernatural becomes the depository of the objectified values of the group.

-Peter Brown

The constructs surrounding the relationship between body and soul presented throughout the Roman era are numerous. Galen believed he had mathematically determined the ratio of soul to body, dividing it into seven pieces. Plato believed that souls returned to earth as a disciplinary function, what composed the soul and how it was related to the body and memory, was a thematic he explored throughout his life, sometimes positing a single soul theorem, sometimes a multi-soul. Aristotle believed that the soul kept its knowledge, but lost its individuality, and that it required some form of bodily composition. Socrates believed in a transcendent self. Pythagoras believed in the transmigration of the soul, that it could come back as any fauna or flora. The details of belief concerning an ongoing presence after death were manifold, but the cultural practices and representations allude to a simpler understanding of these heady matters, and a more visceral response to abstruse theory. The thread that binds these practices across
millennia is quite simple: there is a tripartite relationship between the soul, the corpse and the living. However, when framed by the ritualistic practices involving the dead, be it funerary or magical, this relationship is indicative of the fear inherent in the moment of death. The process of ritual informs the event.

I will begin with an examination of funerary rituals that speak to the constitution of the soul beginning in the Hellenistic period in Italy. These funerary rites owe much to their Etruscan antecedents, displaying a continuation of the practice of elaborate tombs that indicate a belief structure predicated on a continued presence of the soul within the vicinity of the mortal remains. Over 200 cremation sites dating between the tenth and eighth century B.C.E have been discovered in Etruria and Latium that, while nearly free of what would be considered monumental art, are lavishly outfitted with household goods so that the deceased would have what they needed to continue life as if on earth. The urns themselves were often constructed to mimic real architecture. Monumental frescoes depicting banqueting with one's gens in preparation for the long and arduous journey with Charu, the underworld guide, are found beginning in the third century B.C.E in the Tomb of Orcus’ and Tomb of the Caronti in Tarquinii. Ambros Pfiffig postulated that the soul upon death takes on two aspects, a “corpse-soul” which is tied to the remains, and an “I” or “self-soul” which is free to move beyond the grave into the afterlife. Whether inhumed or cremated, the deceased was provided with goods for their afterlife.

As the Etruscans were assimilated under Rome’s power, these rites were also integrated into ritual practice, but with a different understanding of the relationship between the body and the soul. By the fourth century B.C.E, Etruscan mortuary practice was indistinguishable from the Roman; massive monumental family tombs became the norm. For the Romans, the manes, or “beneficent ones,” required feeding or the spirit would waste away, become hungry and plague the living. At the necropolis at St. Peter’s, as well as at sites throughout the Roman Empire, feeding tubes for the dead have been discovered. Regardless of cremation or inhumation, these tubes provide a way for the living to nourish the soul of the deceased through the physical remains; rather than a distinction between soul and corpse, they were conceptualized as co-substantial. Representation of the dead drinking and eating was a popular motif for
mausoleum frescoes. In addition to libations, whether offered through the elaborate feeding tube system or simply buried with the corpse, the dead were offered a wide variety of grave-goods including toys, pottery, mirrors, cooking pots and draughts to keep them comfortable and entertained in the afterlife.

Romans celebrated several festival days along with birthdays or other days of personal import, during which families would make their way to cemeteries to spend time with their ancestors and to offer them grain, salt and animal sacrifice. Some of the more elaborate mausoleums even had kitchens installed to facilitate these practices. The Parentalia, a nine day celebration in February, was a commemoration of the familial departed in which the head of the household had a legal obligation to assure sacrifices were made to his ancestors on February 21, Feralia, the last day of the public festival, although sometimes arrangements were made to assure the continuance of practice by leaving money to associations. Ovid reinforces the importance of Parentalia and the feeding of the dead in order to keep them appeased:

\[
\text{at quondam, dum longa gerunt pugnacibus armis} \\
\text{bella, Parentales deseruere dies.} \\
\text{non impune fuit; nam dicitur omine ab isto} \\
\text{Roma suburbanis incaluisse rogis.} \\
\text{vix equidem credo: bustis exisse feruntur} \\
\text{et tacitae questi tempore noctis avi,} \\
\text{perque vias Urbis latosque ululasse per agros} \\
\text{deformes animas, volgus inane, ferunt.} \\
\text{post ea praeteriti tumulis redduntur honores,} \\
\text{prodigiisque venit funeribusque modus.}
\]

But once, while waging long wars with fearsome arms, they did neglect the Parentalia. The negligence was not unpunished; it is said that from that ominous day Rome grew hot with the pyres that burned without the city. They say, though I can hardly believe, that the ancestral souls did rise from the tombs and make their moan in the still of night; and misshapen ghosts, a shadowy throng, howled about the city streets, and through wide fields. Afterwards the honors which had been neglected were again paid to the tombs, and there was an end to the portents, and the funerals.
Parentalia was not a celebration of the dead in generalized terms, but in personal, further strengthening the relationship between the living and the dead, assuring the remembrance of the dead and their continued comfort in the afterlife. It was an important component of Roman religious and public life. Fourth century C.E. rhetorician and poet Ausonius wrote a collection of thirty poems called Parentalia, expressing the belief that, “the loving respect of the living has, indeed, no more sacred office it can perform than to call to mind with due reverence those who are lost to us.”

Because they were personal, epitaphic in the way that they memorialized the individual, reading and recitation took on a performative aspect that bore resemblance to the ritual itself. The dead, although not offered libation, are remembered in personal terms, and in being commemorated in writing.

Further evidence of the relationship between the manes and the earthly remains can also be found in Asia Minor, where the Greeks of Anatolia buried their dead in grave houses, tombs built in the shape of homes, some of which went so far as to include kitchens. This practice exhibits itself throughout the empire, as far back as the fourteenth century B.C.E. with the Hittites and well into the Christian era. The ongoing need for the soul in relative proximity to the body is also writ large on a great number of grave markers inscribed with imprecations. These curses have a fairly specific formula that warns would-be violators that disturbing the remains will be both an insult to the gods and subject to a heavy fine; punishment both divine and legal will be levied, reinforcing the idea of the physical remains and their dispensation directly affecting the soul.

In Aperlae at Lycia, a tomb is engraved with a warning that anyone disturbing the current occupant in an effort to add another, “will be liable of impiety towards the gods of the underworld and he will fall under the regulations and besides he will pay 2,000 denarii to the people of Aperlae.” The wrongdoer is often referred to as unclean in these imprecations, and is to be held accountable to the wrath of gods, and often also to the town by way of fines for disturbing the dead. A seventh century B.C.E. tomb at Cymae in Italy adds specificity to expected retaliatory actions of the gods, declaring that, “the one who will steal me, will become blind.” The use of regular formula is indicative of a belief in the efficacy of words, a formalized ritual practice that goes beyond the perfunctory of custom and works to bridge supernatural with empirical justice.
Roman funerary customs were driven by two maxims, first, that death brought corruption and required purification and second, that leaving a corpse unburied had a direct, negative effect on that soul. If circumstances conspired and the dead could not be given full rites, three handfuls of dirt would suffice as a minimum requirement of proper burial. The first stage of an ideal death, defined by the advantage of elite culture and station, began with gathering around the death bed. Philippe Aries called this “the tame death”, a trope that begins with the dead understanding that their time has come, entering a state of repose, and calmly awaiting their final moments. Ovid, removed from his family and in exile in Tomos, laments that he will not leave this world in an idealized fashion:

So far away, then, on an unknown shore will I die, and the very place will make my fate unhappy. My body will not grow weak upon a familiar couch, and when I am close to death there will be no one to weep; my wife’s tears will not fall upon my face adding brief moments to my life. I will not utter final words, nor with a final lament will a loved hand close my failing eyes. Instead without funeral rites, without the honour of a tomb, this head will lie unmourned in a barbarian land.

After the lying-in period and death, the body was cleansed, and the pompa, or procession, would conduct the dead on a bier by torchlight to the gravesite outside of town, inspiring the literary representation of revenants being attracted to lamplight. The corpse would be interred, a sacrifice made, and the attendants ritually purified once they returned home. Purposeful deviation from custom was often used to dishonor those convicted of treason or those who committed suicide.

Donald G. Kyle in Spectacles of Death in Ancient Rome provides an excellent case study of funerary custom as a protracted social event in his analysis of the process of gladiatorial and arena corpse disposal. He maintains that the soul could not experience physical pain, but could be condemned to psychological torment through the refusal of proper burial. The damned were hauled through town by specially dressed contractors so that they could be easily avoided by the good citizens of the city, thrown ingloriously into an open air pit and left to the carrion and to rot. Those convicted of treason might also trigger the exhumation of their ancestors, who would also then be delegated to a state of eternal torment and
hunger.\textsuperscript{35} The Romans also conceived of four categories of restless dead, all predicated on “bad deaths.” The \textit{aōros}, untimely dead, were children, but could be expanded to include anyone who had not died of natural causes brought on by advanced age. The souls of these individuals were thought to haunt the living because they had not had the opportunity for a full life. The Bi(ai)othanatoi, from \textit{biaos} and \textit{thanatos}, or those dead by violence, include those that were murdered, committed suicide, died in battle or were executed. The \textit{agamos}, or unmarried, were primarily female, although males could sometimes fall within this category. The \textit{ataphos} were those who had been deprived of a burial. It is important to note that the lack of a body did not necessarily mean that one would be deprived of a final resting place. Cenotaphs were vessels that provided the soul of the departed a dwelling place, being called to their new resting by calling their name three times.\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Honorarium sepulcrum} or \textit{honorarius tumulus} would enable memorial across distance, something that would be comforting to those with soldier sons serving on the frontier, or those whose death made it impossible to recover the body and return it to the family.\textsuperscript{37}

A public ceremony to commemorate and soothe restless spirits was also a part of Roman society. \textit{Lemuria}, held in May on the ninth, eleventh and thirteenth when the kinless and neglected, and therefore hungry, spirits were thought to leave their graves and harass the living in their homes. The head of the household would offer black beans to the ghosts, scattering them in the home after midnight, saying nine times, \textit{haec ego mitto; his redimo meque meosque fabis}/These things I send (throw); with these beans I redeem me and mine (my family).\textsuperscript{38} The ghosts would then pick up the beans, eat, and, having been sated, move back to the grave.\textsuperscript{39} It is important to note the redemption of the family is tied to the feeding of the souls. Where \textit{Parentalia} was a ritual involving more intimate relationships with the nourishing of the dead, \textit{Lemuria} was a ritual for the public good, providing charity for all neglected souls that had become restless with hunger. Further, it is indicative of the fear associated with the bad deaths. Without the charity of others they would wander the world hungry, “if anyone has not left a friend or a kinsman behind him on earth, he goes about his business there as an unfed corpse, in a state of famine.”\textsuperscript{40}

The restless dead were not necessarily forced to wait for \textit{Lemuria} in order to receive sustenance. It was a commonly held belief that food that
fell to the floor belonged to these spirits, and as such, when it was swept up, it was often purified by burning at the domestic altar. This practice is reflected in the *asarotos*, floor mosaics or paintings depicting an upswept floor with food that has fallen to the ground. Gnawed bones and fish spines, nut and snail-shells were depicted to pacify hungry ghosts. The representation, much like that of mausoleum frescoes depicting the dead feasting or Ausonius’ poems, served as a substitution or enhancement of ritual practice.

The living were expected to assure that the memory of the dead was carried into the next generation, that remains were undisturbed and available for visitation to assure a peaceful afterlife. The dead, in so far as they were able to interact with the living either through haunting or by handing down prophetic knowledge during visitation, have played a fairly passive role in the evidence we have examined thus far. We will now take a look at the other end of the spectrum, where the relationship between the soul and the remains are predicated on bitter remembrance rather than peaceful repose, where the deceased harass the living and the living compel the dead from their repose to do their bidding.

The Tenth Declamation attributed to Quintilian, *The Case of the Enchanted Tomb*, is a case in which the mother of the deceased brings charges of cruel treatment against her husband. The night after their son has been cremated, his ghost visits its mother. She has been lying awake, weeping while her husband and the rest of the relatives sleep when her son appears to her. She is elated and her grief dissipates and she encourages him to show himself to his father. The father is terrified. He hires a sorcerer to “find some words to hold him down” so that he will no longer frighten his mother at night. He deflects his own fear to his wife and uses it to justify binding his son’s soul to the tomb. The sorcerer does as he is asked, and the mother falls back into her mourning when her son ceases his visitations. Her advocate contends that:

This is a crime greater than murdering his son, greater than if he has razed the tomb to its foundations and, after shattering the funerary urn, if he had scattered the stones, consecrated by his son’s death, and even the boy’s ashes and bones resting in conditions usually accorded holy reverence.

This, in conjunction with deliberately subjecting his wife to the grief of losing her son a second time, provides the basis for the charges of cruel
treatment against the husband.

Again we see the belief in the relationship of the soul to the remains. The mother learns from the experience that, “a person does not totally perish and she awaits that part which flames do not burn up, which is not obliterated into ashes, and is not adequately confined in urns and tombs.” The way in which the charges are framed against the father confirm this belief. The disturbing of remains is a greater crime than that of murder. The rhetorical style builds upon homicide, listing greater and greater offenses: razing the tomb, breaking the urn, disturbing the pyre stones and finally, scattering the remains. We go from a crime against an individual, to one against the family, to one against the deceased, and then to one reminiscent of the tomb curses, which is so obscene as to be punishable not only by the laws of man, but the wrath of the gods. But perhaps more damning than the charge of cruelty is the charge of forgetting the dead:

You sinful man, you do not miss your son as you should. Your spirits are high, though you lost a son. You say that he was mortal anyway, and you explain that nothing is left after the funeral pyre. Your wife weeps next to you and beats her breasts, but your eyes are dry. She keeps on uttering cries of mourning all night long: you enjoy slumber and peaceful repose. You cruel, forgetful father.

Quintilian makes concessions for those who hold more Epicurean or Stoic beliefs, that after death there is no personal existence, but even if those beliefs could be justified, the father’s dismissal of his wife’s belief that the visiting soul is her son does not discharge the living from their responsibility to remember the dead.

Additionally, within the advocates accusations against the father are the crimes of the sorcerer against the dead, which are representative of the “bad death” tradition. In keeping with the convention of the declamation, when Quintilian addresses the ritualistic practices of binding the restless dead he does so in vague terms that are housed in established tropes in order to frame a serious enquiry that addresses how the soul might be affected by the process. The fear of the father prompts his search for a sorcerer:

He summoned a man whose art it was to oppose the laws of nature, who, as soon as he thundered forth this foreign sounding babble from his foul lips, caused the gods above
to blanch, the gods below to listen and the earth to quake…
shortly after they say he threw himself prostrate over the urn
itself and shut in some words amid the bones and ashes. Yet,
repeatedly looking back, he kept admitting this: “The ghost is
resisting, and therefore I don’t have enough confidence in my
magic chants: let us obstruct all the sides of the tomb and bind
the rock with iron braces.”

The father’s intentions to bind the soul to the grave to give his wife
peace and to assuage his own fear have terrible consequences. The sorcerer
failed to bind the soul to the corpse, and in an effort to show success,
bound the tomb in such a way as to prohibit visitation. It is tragedy on
tragedy. The mother and son are unable to be together, a pain exacerbated
for the boy through the supposition that, “if any conversation exists among
ghosts (and I believe they do), there cannot fail to be one who will say to
the young man: ‘How worthless you were to your family, how willingly they
abandoned you’.” The sorcerer has barred the family from being able to
visit the grave, to make the sacrifices that would feed and ease his soul, and
trapped him with thoughts of abandonment by his family.

In the face of criticism that the subject matter of declamations
were no longer grounded in reality, Quintilian said, “it is possible to make
a sound use of anything that is naturally sound. The subjects chosen for
themes should therefore, be as true to life as possible.” The fantastic
elements of the Tenth Declamation illustrate real considerations of the
nature of belief in the immortality of the soul and the responsibility of
the living. As a subject for rhetorical study, it must be something that can
be approached and defended logically, and even if approached in the most
absurd manner imaginable, it must have a foot in the realm of the possible
not only for the rhetorician to display his skill, but for the audience to
accede the value of the argument.

The binding process in the Tenth Declamation may seem fantastic,
but there is archaeological evidence that suggests there were ritualistic
practices that could bind a restless soul to its corpse. One of the more
widely used magical objects was a nail. Its pragmatic function is easily
associable via metonymic, sympathetic, and metaphoric evocation for a
variety of ritual binding practices. Pliny suggests that driving an iron nail
into the ground at the spot where the head first hits the ground during a
seizure would cure the epileptic. The ceremony of the *clavus annalis* on
the ide of September consisted of an iron nail being driven into the wall of the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus to bind fate and avoid public calamity.\textsuperscript{50} Iron nails were used in a variety of ritualistic binding practices to fix the intangible.

Cataloged at archaeological sites throughout the Empire, non-utilitarian that have the tips twisted or shorn off, nails have never been used, as well as nails that are not of the same size or composition of any others at the gravesite, provide tangible clues to the ritual process of binding.\textsuperscript{51} Sometimes they are buried with the dead, sometimes they are buried in the dead. For example, George Berard cataloged an infant corpse in a Gallo-Roman tomb at “La Calade” in Cabasse, designated Tomb 40.\textsuperscript{52} Clusters of nails were found enclosing three jugs, a lamp and the child’s skull. The nails were bent or deliberately thrust into the earth, surrounding the corpse in a pattern that is paralleled in other Roman cemeteries.\textsuperscript{53}

Admittedly, because nails are often overlooked at grave sites, being part of the coffin, boots and grave-goods, the chronological and geographic spread represented by the archaeological surveys that have identified defunctory nails has not established a satisfactory pattern of usage. To be clear, the burials involving ritual nails are deviant, they are not the norm, but as Robert Darnton so eloquently said, “when you realise that you are not getting something – a joke, a proverb, a ceremony that is particularly meaningful to the natives, you can see where to grasp a foreign system of meaning in order to unravel it.”\textsuperscript{54} Examined in conjunction with the literary evidence and other ritualistic practices involving nails and the restless dead, which will be discussed shortly, it is not beyond the pale to theorize that “bad deaths”, with the obvious exception of those that had been denied a burial, would warrant ritually “fixing” the soul to the grave. Further, the majority of the nails found were iron, a material that has been associated within a ritual context since the founding of Rome.\textsuperscript{55} Other aberrant nails found in cemetery sites were made of silver and glass, materials that could not serve pragmatically as nails, further indicating ritual practice.\textsuperscript{56}

As nexus between the living and the dead, these nails serve dual purpose. They protect the living from the restless dead and they protect the dead from the living. We have already established the relationship between the soul and the corpse and the desire to keep the remains from being disturbed both in the Greek tombstone curses and the Quintilian declamation, but further evidence for the disturbing of remains that makes
a direct connection to the use of nails in ritual outside of the grave, is found in a funerary inscription near the Porta Latina in Rome: *Quinquumque hinc clavos exemerit in oculos sibi figat* “May anyone who extracts nails run himself through the eyes”.\(^{57}\) Coffin nails, especially those from the graves of the restless dead, were used in a variety of spells, so whether this imprecation is intended to keep individuals from stealing the coffin nails or a nail used specifically to keep the dead in place is unclear, but the desire to leave the corpse undisturbed is not.

Perhaps one of the most gruesome representations of the use of the dead comes from Lucian’s *Pharsalia*. A civil war has come to Thessaly, an area traditionally associated with witches. The witch Erichtho, who has poisoned the fields so as to keep the battlefield from moving out of the region, and to capitalize on the carnage, is looking for materials for a powerful spell. She is obsessed with finding the bones of aristocracy, crazed to snatch a piece of Pompey or Caesar for her spells. Pompey’s son approaches her and makes a request of divination, he must know if he will inherit the world or disaster. Erichtho agrees, suggests, “the obvious method, in view of the fact that there is such an abundance of fresh death around us, is to raise a single body from the Thessalian plains so that the mouth of a corpse only recently dead and still warm may make utterance with full voice.”\(^{58}\) But the denial of a timely burial is hardly the worst crime to which Erichtho subjects her chosen soldier to once she has drug him, as if he were *noxus*, by means of a hook through his jugulated neck back to her cave. Lucian goes on to describe the ritual process in great, terrifying detail, resplendent with accounts of disembowelment, and of washing the corpse inside and out with magical concoctions; imagery sure to resonate as antithetical to customary funerary rites. She then threatens several of the chthonic gods into doing her bidding, to return the shade to the corpse. When she finally raises the shade it stands there:

...in dread of the lifeless limbs and the hated bonds of its former prison. It was terrified to enter the opened breast and the guts and the organs smashed by the fatal wound. Ah pitiful man, from whom death’s final gift of immortality was unfairly snatched away...he was pallid and stiff, and in consternation at being brought back into the world...”Tell me,” said the Thessalian woman, “what I command you, and you shall be well rewarded. For if you speak truly to me, I shall render you
immune from the Thessalian crafts for as long as the world exists.\textsuperscript{59}

She has done great injustice to his corpse, assuring his place among the “restless dead”, but does, with the implicit threat of further compulsion, offer him the reward of everlasting protection from further magical abuses should he cooperate. He does so and Erichtho raises a pyre, the deceased lies down upon it and is allowed to die a second time, amidst the sounds of Stygian curses, his corpse violated and left in ashes on the Thessalian plain.

Perhaps even more terrifying than the idea of witches interfering with the burial of a soldier who has died in battle, are witches that harvest via grave robbing. They desecrate the corpse and then use the spoils for nefarious purpose. But not all representations of necromancy were intended to inspire terror. Horace’s \textit{Satires} includes a tale told from the perspective of a statue of Priapus, which stands in a park on the Esquiline that was formerly a gravesite for slaves. He must be on the watch, not for, “thieves and wild animals that are accustomed to haunting this place as for women who work on the minds of men with magic songs and potions.”\textsuperscript{60} The plot is now used for necromancy by Canidia and Sagana, who compel the dead to conversation, disturb the graves as they “gather bones and poisonous herbs” and do things so horrible as to cause the moon to blush because, “she refused to be witness to all this and hid behind some large monuments.”\textsuperscript{61} No one, other than Priapus, is there to protect the dead, which he does. He lets loose “a fart that split my figwood buttocks” sending the witches running, false teeth and wigs flying to the ground as they made their escape. Their behavior is so disgusting and abhorrent as to inspire Priapus to do what he could to put an end to their machinations.

Lucius Apuleius, a second century writer, also uses humor to explore the practice of corpse raiding. In \textit{The Golden Ass}, Thelyphron tells of the time he took a job guarding the body of a noble. There has been a rash of thievery, the witches being so bold as to steal entire bodies before they make it to the grave. A deal is struck; Thelyphron will watch a body all night for a large sum, which will only be payable if the corpse is whole in the morning. Should he fail, not only will he not be paid, but pieces of his face will be cut off to make what is missing on the deceased whole. He is escorted by the beautiful widow to the closet holding the deceased and locked in. During the night a weasel enters the room. He scares it off and in the next moment falls into a deep slumber. When he wakes, it is morning,
and in a panic he rushes to check the corpse and assure it is still whole. To his relief it is. He is paid and the pompa begins. Before it managed a few steps down the street it is interrupted by the deceased’s uncle, who charges the widow with murder. Her reaction to the charges is a denial so authentic as to divide the crowd’s opinion of her innocence. Luckily an Egyptian seer is on hand and he brings the dead man’s spirit back from the underworld to find out what happened. Two things are revealed; first, that his wife did indeed murder him for the inheritance so she could run off with her lover, and second, in effort to establish he is telling the truth by revealing a fact unknown to anyone else, that the weasel that had visited in the night was a witch:

Then they summoned me by name and didn’t stop until my frozen limbs with their numb joints made struggling, sluggish efforts to do what the skillful spells ordered.

But my guard here – who was of course alive and only sleeping like the dead – and I are designated by the same name, so he knew no better than to get up in answer to it. The witches made their will his, and he put one foot in front of the other in the manner of a ghost, without life or breath. Although the door to the room had been carefully barred, there was a chink through which first his nose and then his ears were lopped off, and in this way he suffered butchery in my place. To hide any evidence of their trick, they molded pieces of wax to look like the ears they’d cut away…

Depicted is the corpse’s awareness after death, its ability to hold memory, its ability to be compelled by an appropriately trained seer or witch, the fear of the widow that Thelyphron’s body will be harvested for necromancy, and likely tell of her poisoning him, and the practice of grave robbing itself. Thelyphron is also easily compelled to speak, requiring only that herbs be placed on his chest and in his mouth, as opposed to the gruesome account of Erichtho’s raising of the dead. Although both men were newly dead and had not had proper funerary rites, Thelyphron’s spirit is willing to come back and aid in its own vengeance so it may find peace.

In another of Horace’s works, Epodes, Canidia has kidnapped a boy, burying him to his chin and setting a plate of food just out of reach, torturing him, readying his body and spirit for use in a curse against her
enemies. The boy curses them, promising to haunt you as a terrifying appearance in the night; I shall, as a ghost, attack your faces with hooked talons, for such in the power of the divine Manes...In every quarter of the city a crowd will gather, throw stones at you, and crush you, you filthy ole hags. Your unburied limbs will then be scattered by the wolves and he vultures that live on the Esquiline.63

A premature death and an unburied corpse would surely make for a restless spirit able to carry out haunting, however the real terror in his curse lies in the promise to assure that the witches are cursed to the same existence by the scattering of their limbs in the region of the park in which they practice grave robbing and necromancy, threatening that what they inflict upon the dead will be inflicted upon them, and that the carrion will further desecrate their corpses, allowing them no peace in the afterlife.

In Book 11 of the *Odyssey*, Circe gives instruction to Odysseus so that he might speak with a deceased fortune teller. He is instructed to dig a trench and make an offering of honey, milk, wine, and two black sheep and then, “pray at length to the powerless folk of the dead, and promise them that when you have come to Ithaca you will sacrifice to them in your palace your best barren heifer, and that you will head up a pyre with offerings.”64 The offering attracts the shades of the dead and, in drinking the blood, they regain the ability to communicate for a short time. The ritual is similar to that of *Parentalia*, or any other tomb visit. No compulsion is being made, but given the isolation of the island and that the men that are trapped there, enchanted in animal form, their souls would be both restless and starving. Odysseus’ offers much needed relief for the powerless folk, as well as for his intended target.65 Here, in what is generally credited as the mythos on which all further literary representation of necromancy in the Roman world is predicated upon, the only difference between ceremony and magic is in the digging of the trench, the symbolic entrance into the underworld that gives Odysseus access to individuals beyond those that would have died on the island.66

Whether there was actual grave robbing going on to the extent described by these writers is certainly specious, and in the case of Horace it has been suggested that the fantastic elements have been exaggerated to coincide with the legislation of Augustus aimed at stamping out witchcraft by painting magical practices in the most detestable light possible.67
Regardless, the literature and archaeology once again illustrate continuity in the tripartite relationship between the living and the deceased, with a responsibility of protection and defense of the corpse, through either ritual or law, and should be thought of at least in terms of liminal practice and cultural fears, especially when paired with the *Papyri Graecae Magicae* and *defixiones* and other apotropaic measures, such as securing the corpse with nails, taken at the time of burial.

The Ancient Greeks already held the belief that the dead could affect the living, but did so at their own discretion, often harassing the living because they had not received a proper burial or required vengeance to be at peace. *Defixiones* exhibit an augmentation of this paradigm; the dead could be compelled and bribed to do the bidding of the living. 

*Defixiones* are curses, generally inscribed on lead sheets, rolled and pierced with a nail. One would hire a scribe who, being familiar with the formulae required to achieve the desired effect, would use a brass stylus to scratch the appropriate spell onto the lead. The spells, which come down to us primarily through the *Papyri Graecae Magicae* and *defixiones*, used magical traditions from a variety of religious constructs, including those of Egypt, Babylonia and Persia as well as Judaism and Christianity, exhibiting a religious syncretism reflective of the breadth of the empire and a continuity of practice from at least the first century BC through Late Antiquity.

Once inscribed, the spell would then need to be deposited into a special location before the power would take effect. *PGM VII.* 451-52 gives a typical list of such places: “have (the tablet) buried or [put in] a river or land or sea or stream or coffin or in a well.”

Further connections have been made between the types of dead residing in the graves, indicating a preference for using the graves of the “restless dead” if you wanted the dead to do more than relay your request to the gods. Additionally, requests were made to the chthonic gods to compel the dead to do the will of the living:

You take it [the *defixiones*] as the sun is setting, beside the grave of one who has died untimely or violently…(saying) I entrust this curse tablet to you, chthonic gods…and to men and women who have died untimely deaths, to youths and maidens…I adjure all *daimones* of this place to stand as assistants beside this *daimon* [all souls in the graveyard should help the one whose grave the tablet is being placed in] And arouse yourself for
me, whoever you are, whether male or female, and go to every place and every quarter and to every house…drag [the object of the curse, in this case, a love spell] by the hair, by her heart, by her soul, to me.\textsuperscript{71}

For those who were a bit queasy about disturbing a corpse, the feeding tube system offered easy access to the corpse, and many \textit{defixiones} have been found at these types of burial sites.

Fritz Graf identifies two distinct reasons for using the dead. The first is simply as a medium for conferring messages to the underworld. The second is to execute the spell, and it is \textit{defixiones} of this type that have aided in identifying sites where the “restless dead” were buried or thought to reside. The souls of the restless dead were thought of as being particularly good for compelling through \textit{defixiones}, as they held a grudge against the living.\textsuperscript{72} In some cases, these souls were promised respite from their unhappy fate once they carried out their appointed task, as outlined in the tablet, a convention used by Erichtho during the necromantic episode previously discussed.\textsuperscript{73}

Atillio Mastrocinque’s article “Late Antique Lamps in Antiquity” is an interesting case study on \textit{defixiones} found in lamps at the fountain of Anna Perrena in Rome. Seventy two lamps dated to the first half of the fourth century have been found with magical inscriptions or with \textit{defixiones} inside. With a similar function to accessing the underworld as Homer’s pit, an underground chamber with a basin of water was considered as access point to the underworld. Mastrocinque notes the use of \textit{defixiones} and lamps at Namea, a site which used to house the PanHellenic games and Athenian Agora, to establish a pattern of usage that can be substantiated by the archaeology and vetted through spells in the \textit{Papyri Graecae Magicae}. What he has found are spells that call for the \textit{defixiones} to be inserted into the lamp as if it were the wick, incantations that call forth the soul of one’s enemies, bind it to the lamp and consign it to the underworld through the cistern portal. Mastrocinque suggests that the lamps are used in place of men for sacrifice, relying on the association of the concept of light as representative of man, making the use of lamps a ritualized homicide.\textsuperscript{74}

However, when looked at as interaction between the living and the dead, additional connections can be made. The lamps become baited cenotaphs, compelling the soul from its place of rest, both through beseeching the chthonic gods and by sympathetic and metonymic magic.
Lamps and torchlights are associated through ghost stories and funerary practice with the ability to attract the dead, and their use is a symbolic reinforcement in the magical ritual. These are rituals of compulsion, binding souls, separating them from their bodies, and consigning them to the depths of the underworld, unable to receive succor from the living.

The evidence regarding the ongoing relationship between the body, the soul, and the living is scattered throughout the Empire, but all rely on the continuance of remembrance. Again, the process of ritual informs the event and through ritual we are able to see a bit of Roman mentality. The young and unmarried dead would not produce heirs. The unburied had not had someone assuring they had received the proper burial rites, nor had anyone who had set up a Cenotaph to call them home. They were left to their own devices to haunt and harass the living until they received one. Three of the four bad deaths are resultant of or impetus for the end of the familial line. With no one to remember them, to speak for them, to protect the memory of them, they become potential victims of the living, compelled through necromancy or defixiones to do the will of others. The fear of being alone and without family or friends is woven into the ritual structure of Lemuria, the mosaics and frescoes that symbolically feed and nurture the dead, and the epitaphs and imprecations that approximate memoriam when they are read by strangers. These rituals are most often predicated on how someone died rather than how decisions weighed against a societal moral norm that dictated punishment or reward in the afterlife. It was affirmed through relationships and the continuance of the family line, and the fear of not having those connections is reflected in the vulnerability and want of the soul and the responsibility of the living.

During the crisis of the third century, this stability was threatened. The idea that Rome could end was manifesting in the failing economy, constant state of rebellion in the ranks, rotating Caesars, uprisings in the provinces, and static borders instead of expanding ones. The continuity so hard wired in the Roman psyche was being threatened, and the idea of patriarchal protection of the family and the ancestors no longer a given. It is also during this time that we see an increase in Christianity. Although not a new concept in the Empire, the Cult of Isis and Mithraism offer similar routes to eternal salvation, Christianity managed to become the dominant cult in the empire, it challenged the relationship of the body to the soul, and offered an alternative route that did not require continuity of family or
Empire. As Christianity began to solidify its tenets, it continued to develop in an ideological pattern that reinforced a need for a pathway to becoming an eternal entity. God, as a singular patristic figure resonated in a culture that was constructed to benefit and venerate a single individual, and He was merciful and beneficent in a way that the pantheon was not.

As the Church solidified its hierarchical structure and dogma, it reinforced the continuity motif and wrote itself into the understanding of the relationship between the body and the soul, providing the mechanism, both in life and in death, for a peaceful afterlife, all of which also served to put the individual in more control of their own afterlife. In a society where rigid hierarchical controls dictated life and death, the autonomy that freed the individual to assure themselves peace in the afterlife must have been quite appealing.

The caesura exposes this belief through the transformation of the ideological pattern. The want to continue on beyond death is part of the human condition, but how you envision that system informs your view of society. Medieval Christianity, in that it shifts the interaction between the living and the dead to an intermediary through the purchasing of indulgences and chancery endowments, of masses and prayers to speed the soul through purgatory to heaven, exhibits a significant transition from the post-Roman era. It is a belief system with a reward and punishment afterlife, and as such exhibits fear of death not in what it leaves behind, but in what it takes with it. The ideal Greco-Roman death included not only all of the ceremonial aspects in a timely manner, but a continuance of memorial. The Medieval Christian ideal death requires a state of grace, a perfection based on sacrament and morality and, after the twelfth century introduction of purgatory, helped along by pleas for grace. One is reliant on a continuance of familial interaction for a peaceful afterlife, the other on penance to access it eternally. Personal responsibility trumps filial efforts in the Christian paradigm and the caesura elucidates the shift in mentality. Placing the dead in physical, social and spiritual terms required the negotiation of numerous factors. Through these discourses of the dead we are able to see how societies and individuals understood themselves.

Notes
5 R.J. Hankinson. “Body and Soul in Galen.” 232-258
6 Thomas Buchheim. “Plato’s *phainon skemna*: On the Multifariousness of the Human Soul.” 103-120
7 Robert Sharple. “Common to Body and Soul.” 178
14 Graeme Barker and Tom Rasmussen, *The Etruscans*. 18-23
17 This relationship is also explored in detail by Plato (469-399 B.C.E). *Phaedo* is perhaps one of the most widely read treatises on the dispensation of the soul. In this imagined dialogue between Plato and Socrates on the day the latter is to be put to death, Plato's Socrates puts forth three proofs for the continuance of belief in the continued relationship between the soul and the body, bridging the Etruscan and the Hellenistic.
19 E.R. Dodds *The Greeks and the Irrational*. 136. Per *The Law of Demetrius*, at times these funerary practices would become overly ostentatious, provoking judicial limitations. In the fourth century B.C.E. Demetrius restricted the type and size of monument, restricted the number of people that could attend a funeral and tried to legislate the décor of the tomb. Dodds makes a case for legal intervention to curb expenditures as a necessity. Families were spending themselves into debt, mourners were not showing the proper decorum, and the balance between ceremony and intent had become unbalanced and unnatural. Not enough attention was being paid to the religious aspects. These laws show up in Delphi, Sparta, Iulius and, according to E.R. Dodds, are commented upon by Plutarch, Cicero and Plato indicating a continuity of concern well into the fifth century CE. Regardless of intent, they are further indication of the extravagance of monument that was made to assure the comfort of the dead.
22 Ovid Fasti II. lines 546-556.
23 Translation is my own.
26 Ibid. 33-35.
29 Frances Hickson Hahn. “Performing the Sacred.” 235-248.
31 Philippe Aries. *The Hour of Our Death*. 5-20. Admittedly, Aries is writing about the middle ages, but
the Roman rites preceding the obsequies provide the antecedent for an ideal that still resonates.


33 D. Felton. *Haunted Greece and Rome*. 14. Felton also ties this belief to representations of Hekate, patron goddess of ghosts, with a torch and the practice of including lamps among grave goods.


35 Pliny the Elder. *Natural History*. 7.187. Pliny the Elder makes a direct correlation between the practice of digging up the bodies of fallen soldiers and powerful citizens to the introduction of cremation into the Roman world.


38 Ovid. *Fasti IV*. 443.

39 Patrick Fass. *Around the Roman Table*. 196

40 Lucian of Samosata. “On Mourning.” 9. Admittedly, Lucian is producing a satiric take on funerary customs, making jest of the efforts of the living for the dead, who have no need of food or clothing or comfort, but in doing so he reinforces the popularity of belief reinforced by the rituals of the cult of the dead.

41 Patrick Fass. *Around the Roman Table*.


43 Ibid 125

44 Ibid 126

45 Ibid. 131.

46 Ibid. 134. The word “braces” is a bit problematic, the original Latin is *in corpus et in membra descendisse mucrones*. Both Silvia Alfaya Villa and Daniel Ogden have interpreted *mucrones* as nails, extrapolating from “blade” or “sharp point” to the ritualistic use of nails in binding the dead. I will be working from their interpretation of *mucrones* in my analysis. The boy has been cremated, and nails, while less dramatic than shoving a sword through the urn, have an archaeological legacy of being placed in urns, a binding that would not require harming, and therefore violating, the resting place. Urns with chains and locks have been found and associated with the restless dead, but *mucrones* is indicative of a pointed implement.

47 Ibid. 134.

48 Ibid. v.

49 Pliny Naturalis Historia. 28.63. *clavum ferreum defigere in quo loco primum caput fixerit corruens morbo comitiali absolutorium eius mali dicitur.*

50 Livy 7.3 3-8.

51 These nails are not associated with defixiones. They are an entirely different subset of magical nails, although defixiones found in conjunction with defunctory nails have helped to establish a pattern of usage primarily for those who have experienced one of the “bad deaths.”

52 George Berard. La necropole gallo-romain de La Calade. 105-158.

53 Silvia Alfae Villa. “Nails for the Dead.” 447. George Berard. “La necropole gallo-romaine.” 107. In addition to the use of ritual nails, burial sites throughout the Roman Empire have been found where the corpse had been pinned underneath strategically placed rocks, usually on the hands and feet, and occasionally on the head, often found in conjunction with defunctory nails. There was more than one way to bind a corpse.


55 Richard Hingly. “The Deposition of Iron Objects.” Hingly’s article explores the use of iron and its significance as a symbolic material in ritualistic practice. The sorcerer in the Tenth Declamation also uses iron nails to trap the soul in the tomb and iron is required in several of the rituals described in the defixiones, which will be discussed later in this essay.


57 Ibid. 441-42.
59 Ibid. 195-196
61 Ibid.
64 Homer. *The Odyssey*. Section 503.
65 In fact, the first ghost that he interacts with, Elpenor, is a recently deceased crew member who asks Odysseus to provide him with a proper burial.
66 David Ogden. *Greek and Roman Necromancy*. xxvi. Ogden devotes several chapters to exploring the four well known “entrances” to the underworld where necromantic practices were purported to have been practiced, as well as literary evidence indicating that really, any underground or lakeside area would suffice, like Odysseus’ pit. The relationship of underground and underworld was a quite literal one in many respects. This indicates that the pit is the metaphoric component that, alongside intent, creates an intersection with the underworld.
71 PGM IV 296-466 as translated in Hans Dieter Betz, *The Greek Magical Papyri*. 44. Fritz Graf in *Magic and the Ancient World*, page 49, notes the importance of the setting sun in Egyptian ritual; the sun bridged the two worlds, setting into the world of the dead. This defixiones is indicative of the Egyptian influence on the rituals of the Greco-Roman world, earlier in this text among the chthonic gods addressed by name are the Egyptian ones associated with the underworld such as Anubis.
74 Attilio Mastrocinque. “Late Antique Lamps with Defixiones.” 91-156.
75 The fourth category, “violent death”, doesn’t really require much in the way of analysis to figure out why it would be feared.
76 Physical memorials were not all that important prior to the fourteenth century when the Black Death heightened anxiety over access to intercession that would lessen time in purgatory. It is in the latter half of the fourteenth century that we see wills requesting physical objects tied to the deceased to prompt prayers for the dead and an increase in request for specific burial places within the cemetery. Prior, the body was buried until the flesh rotted away and the bones moved to make room for the next resident. The body was unimportant until the Last Judgment, when it would be restored. Samuel Cohn’s *The Place of the Dead in Tuscany and Flanders* and *The Cult of Remembrance and the Black Death* as well as Joel T. Rosenthal’s *The Purchase of Paradise: Gift Giving and the Aristocracy*, 1307-1483 are excellent studies of changes in testimonial practice. Philippe Aries’ *The Hour of Our Death* and *Western Attitudes Towards Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present* provide a tremendous amount of information on changing burial practices in Europe from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century.

**Bibliography**


This poem was composed as a metrically symmetrical translation of Theokritos’ Sixth Idyll, which is to say that the meter of the translation is identical to the meter of the original Greek poem, spondee for spondee and dactyl for dactyl.

Damoitas and Daphnis the cowherd, Aratos, one day they gathered their flock in a locus amoenus pleasing, one with red hair, the other partially bearded. Around the spring coolly relaxing under the summer time heat at mid-day they began to sing such things: Firstly, Daphnis began, since he was the first to engage him.

[Daphnis:] She strikes you, Polyphemos the shepherd, the fair Galateia with apples, you who men call unlucky in love – and a goatherd! Do you not see her, O mis’rable, mis’rable one, as you sit back, piping so sweetly. Come now! She pelts your dog once more so coyly, your rest’ing guardian sleeping on her patrol, as she barks at the sea and looks at it. Beautiful waves make her clear to you, softly running across, aloof, on the shimmering beaches without care Oh, you beware lest she nibble at the legs of the maiden running up out of the sea, or she scratch at her skin, very lovely! She, Galatei’, tears you up even out in the sea; just as thorny leaves laying out roasting in the sun, drying up, during summer, so will she flee a lover and likewise will not seek a lover. She even moves that stone from off of the line. Polyphemos, often in love, things that aren’t fine can seem fine to you, when you’re in love.

[Damoitas:] Yes, by Pan, I see, when she strikes me, a shepherd. It escapes my notice not, not by my one sweet eye, with which I might look out until the end (however may that prophet Telemos, who spoke hatred, bear hateful things to his home, where he look over them for his children) Yet I myself – being stung by love – do not look out at her, but
rather I say I’ve some other woman. But she, hearing me then, O Paian, wants me. She wastes away, and from the sea she stinging, gazes at the cave and my flock, which I keep for her. “Bark at her!” I hissed at my dog. When I, long ago, dated her, then, my pup would lay her muzzle down on Galateia’s lap. But she, seeing me doing these things, perhaps often sent to me a messenger. I shall close, however, my doors, unless she swear an oath to me to make up my beautiful bed on this island. Surely now, indeed, I do not have an evil appearance, as they say. For indeed, I was looking out to the sea, which was calm, and my beard shown out beautiful on the one hand, and so did my one girl out on the other, as I saw it to be, and, flashing, there shined out from my teeth a gleam brighter than Parian stone. Straightaway, I lest I be bewitched or maligned, three times spat into my lap, (It might sound crazy). This the old woman Kotyttaris taught me who earlier, close by the Hippokion, played the aulos.

Singing such things, and playing, Damoitas kissing Daphnis, one gave to the other a syrinx, the other an aulos. Next, Damoitas pipes his aulos, and Daphnis the cowherd syrinxes gently. Their calves, straightaway, began to dance out in the soft grass. Victory to none; they were unconquered.
Hear, O Israel:
A Look at New Testament Soundscapes
by Taylor Warren

In the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus famously declares, “He who has ears to hear, let them hear! (Matthew 11:15)” Those who heard the Gospels preached would have not only been keen to the words of Jesus, but also the sounds of his world. The narratives present in each of the four canonical Gospels utilize sonic imagery in order to speak to their respective first century Palestinian audiences. The authors hearken to places of both extreme reverence and extreme noise. The acoustic landscapes of the synagogue in which Jesus preached, the temple in which he taught and was later scourged, the mount atop which he announced the new covenant, and the hill upon which he was crucified were all familiar to many first century Christians in terms of their acoustic properties, both in the form of optimal preaching locations as well as areas associated with biblical events of sonic significance. Such familiar soundscapes would have given additional meaning to the texts that is not at all obvious to the modern reader. In order for modern students of scripture to gain a full understanding of such passages and what they meant for their earliest listeners, it is necessary to examine acoustic elements present in each episode to gain a fuller appreciation of how early audiences would have reacted.

The focus of this paper will center largely on the first four Gospels, particularly the Gospels of Matthew, John and Luke. This is not meant as an attempt to find the historical Jesus, as the four Gospels are the only agreed-upon existing commentary on the details of the life of Jesus of Nazareth and are meant as theological documents rather than historical. Even the Gospel of Luke, which calls itself a history, is not “history” in a modern or even ancient sense. As the Jewish Commentary to the New Testament notes “the writers of the Gospels were not primarily biographers but communicators of the Good News, they wrote only what people needed to know for their own spiritual well-being.” With this in mind, this report focuses only on what the authors of the four Gospels chose to include in their narratives and the significance of various acoustic settings in the
context of first century Palestine will be talked about in length in order to gain a greater appreciation for their symbolism in the Gospels themselves.

Although most scholars support the theory that the early Jesus movement was in essence meant to be a reform movement within Judaism, the four Gospels imply a radical break from the old law in their clear message of the messiahship of Jesus, with the gravity of such a statement echoed in the entirety of the New Testament narratives, including the sonic imagery present. While many scholars have researched the physical imagery of the Gospels, few have looked into the symbolism of the various sonic environments, from the mount upon which Jesus preached the Beatitudes, to the temple which was wracked by an earthquake at his crucifixion. This paper will attempt to both identify sonic landscapes within the narratives of the Gospels and flesh out their intended messages relating to early Christian proclamations of Jesus’ divinity, thereby identifying otherwise overlooked methods that the authors of the Gospels used to enhance their story for their audiences.

The synagogue played a prominent role in the ministry of Jesus from the beginning of his life until his crucifixion. It is this location where Jesus first proclaims his messianic nature in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. In Matthew, the author speaks of how “Jesus went through Galilee, teaching in their synagogues and proclaiming the good news of the kingdom and curing every disease and every sickness among the people. (Matthew 4:23)” The synagogue of the average Jewish citizen throughout the Roman world was a central part of the community during the Second Temple and post-Temple eras. Jewish historian Hanswulf Bloedhorn mentions how the synagogue “fulfilled a multitude of functions in antiquity, of which the most important, besides those of prayer and worship, was the teaching of the Law.” By preaching in synagogues, Jesus spoke to the very heart of Jewish communities.

Nazareth itself was located in a remote region of Galilee. Despite its modern reputation as a backwater part of the antique Jewish world, Galilean cities such as Capernaum and Sepphoris were major trading and cultural centers within greater Palestine. Ongoing excavations of the ruins of Sepphoris by Carol L. Meyers and Eric M. Meyers of Duke University since 1987 have unearthed, among other things, a mosaic floor within what was likely a two-story mansion. Archaeologist Mark Chauncey speaks of how the mosaic depicted such motifs as “a procession of the [city] deity
and a symposium...between Dionysus and Heracles.”

Other major finds in Sepphoris include a “Nile mosaic, Roman roads, and lamps decorated with Hellenistic motifs,” as well as “Stone vessels and mikvah (ritual baths).” These ruins strongly support the assertion of Josephus that Sepphoris was “the ornament of Galilee,” with a heavy presence of both Jews and pagans. It is likely that Nazareth, despite its small size, played a significant part in trading and interacting with these major centers.

The seating arrangements of synagogues were of such a design that Jesus’ own preaching while in these buildings necessitated proper skill so that his voice could be heard throughout the entire sanctuary. In most synagogues, the wealthier and more prominent members sat at the front, while the poorer members were consigned to the back. Jewish archaeologist Ben-Zion Rosenfeld quotes from Tosefta, a compilation of Jewish oral law compiled around 220 C.E. which comments on the arrangements of the synagogue in Alexandria, mentioning how the congregants “did not sit in a jumble, but the goldsmiths sat by themselves, the silversmith by themselves...and the blacksmiths by themselves.” Rosenfeld also notes that the function of the synagogue was to “promote economic relations” both during and after the Second Temple period. This layout of the synagogue adds a distinct emphasis to Jesus’ criticism of the Pharisees in the twenty-third chapter of Matthew, in which he declared “The scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses’ seat; therefore do whatever they teach you and follow it; but do not do as they do, for they do not practice what they teach. (Matthew 23:2-3)” As it might be expected from the layout of ancient synagogues, the center of the buildings would have been receptive to the most light as well as being in far better earshot of whomever was chanting the Torah or preaching at that occasion. The layout of the synagogue’s interior adds a layer of meaning to Jesus’ criticism as an indictment of acoustic privilege. Bloedhorn notes that the seats of honor in synagogues “faced the rest of the congregation, [with] their backs to the ark of the Torah.” Those who listened to Jesus’ preaching would have been not only aware of the Pharisees’ prominent placement in synagogues, but also of their ability to clearly hear whomever preached. This factor was undoubtedly a familiar one among the Jewish Christian audiences of the Gospel writers.

The liturgy of the synagogue was less spectacular than that of the Temple, but was just as important in the spiritual lives of Jews. Jewish
historian Martin S. Jaffee notes that the details of pre-rabbinical synagogues is scant, and that the forms of gatherings of Jewish communities include semneions (sanctuaries), disdaskaleoin (places of instruction), or sabbateoin (Sabbath places). With the exception of the major centers throughout Palestine, there were relatively few permanent buildings in which to hold worship, especially when compared to the Egyptian and north African diaspora. Jaffee speculates that “the influential presence of the Jerusalem temple may have hindered an essentially diasporic institution from making much headway in the homeland until the Temple was destroyed.”

The presence of prominent synagogues in both Capernaum and Sepphoris support the Gospel writers’ assertion that Jesus was familiar with such locations.

Jaffee gives additional insight into what he feels is the essentially liturgical view of reality from the standpoint of Judaism. He notes in the introduction to Ritual Space and Performance in Early Judaism that “the highest reaches of the heavens were more than matters of speculation or belief, for aspects of the heavenly world could be made present in a concrete form in their own earthly communities,” achieved through the process of the ritual of the synagogue and temple. Jaffee goes on to define ritual in this context as “stereotyped, frequently, repeated combinations of action and speech that normally occur in a particular place set apart for the purpose of the performance.” The ritual of the Jewish communities was shared communally at their respective places of worship, including the temple, synagogue and household.

Jaffee further describes the symbolism present in the synagogues of Palestine. He notes that “most synagogues of this period had impressively carved doorways that incorporated temple ritual objects as symbols into the design.” Items depicted included the menorah and shofar, as well as the lulav (palm branch) and egrg (citron). These objects allowed the viewer to “draw upon the temple’s cosmic symbolism to exalt their own humble setting.”

Jaffee theorizes that public recitation of scripture in synagogues, far from being an established part of the liturgy, was often an independent event that originated in spheres of Jewish life outside the synagogue.

He justifies this theory by pointing out that the oldest literary reports of Jewish ritual do not associate it with synagogues. Rather, organized study was a more common occurrence in synagogues, and Christians of Jewish origin would likely have experienced, participated in, or at least been
familiar with such rituals. Jaffee notes that “by the late first century CE, the Gospel writers could assume that the public recitation and exposition of sacred scriptures was the essence of Jewish communal activity.” Jaffee concedes, however, that prayer gradually intertwined with Torah study to transform the synagogue, from at least the time of Joshua ben Sira in the second century B.C.E. onwards. This time of transition was present at the time of Jesus’ ministry. Services became increasingly geared towards intellectual exercise, giving many of the services in which he preached a feeling similar to a lecture hall, heavily focused on the spoken word, and giving an acoustic heft to his words as the center of a worship service.

Religious life in Nazareth proper during the early first century remains hard to unearth in detail, but it is possible to make educated guesses about its probable nature. The biblical scholar and Mennonite theologian V. George Shillington maintains the absolute irrelevance of Nazarene religious life, or the nature of contemporary ritual, or, even, its existence in the eyes of first century writers. Josephus does not even mention Nazareth when listing Galilean cities; indeed the first undisputed mention of Nazareth is in Eusebius’ *Church History*, in which he describes in passing a mention by Sextus Julius Africanus of the village of “Nazrata” in the province of Judea in 200 C.E. It is logical to conclude, therefore, that life in Nazareth was markedly simpler than in neighboring communities. Its Jewish community may not have had a building of its own (the word synagogue comes from the Greek συναγωγή, which in its literal meaning refers to a gathering of people); there is a distinct possibility the congregation gathered in private houses, seriatim, or even outdoors. Such gatherings may have included “prayers, reflections on the ancestors, storytelling, recitation of scriptures, instruction on right living, discussion of the situations in the life of the people, and singing.”

Whether Shillington’s hypothesis is true or not, Jesus would have developed a preaching style suited for speaking to crowds within atmospheres that were possibly not exactly conductive to preaching, such as outdoors or in a cramped, private home.

Biblical scholar Terrence O’Hare points out that, while there are no direct commandments in the Old Testament that support the practice of weekly Torah study itself, the act of Jesus’ participation adds an element of divine sanctification to an already revered practice. He also points out the likelihood that Jesus’ preaching in the synagogue coincided with Rosh
Hashanah, during which it was customary to compose and preach sermons daily within the synagogue, in imitation of the practices of the prophet Ezra as spelled out in the Book of Nehemiah.

That book notes how “the men returned to Ezra to hear more of the word of the Lord on the next day...and throughout the festive month, concluding in a sacred assembly on the eighth day, the day after the Sabbath”. While O’Hare rightfully points out earlier that Sabbath worship was largely based in the home during the Second Temple period, it is conceivable that the whole community of Nazareth may have gathered to hear preaching throughout this entire period, thus ensuring a large audience for Jesus. Adding to this acoustic picture is the dialectical nature of Torah study, in which Jesus was openly questioned on his sermon during the service. Further, a new element of preaching first in the city gates and eventually in meeting rooms “specifically designed for [preaching]”, necessitated a shift in preaching styles, which raises questions about Jesus’ ability and his experience in various venues.

Questions abound regarding the architectural layouts of the synagogues that Jesus preached in while outside of Nazareth. Although Shillington is correct to question the existence of a permanent Nazarene synagogue, his speculation on whether Jesus visited any developed synagogue at all is widely questioned. Professor of New Testament Studies Craig A. Evans notes that “while the Gospels say nothing of a visit to Sepphoris, Jesus may have alluded to the prominent elevated city in a well-known saying [stating that] a city set on a hill cannot be hidden.” The subsequent verse mentioning how a lamp put under a bushel will eventually set its cover aflame (Matthew 5:15), hints that, in this verse, Jesus could be referring to Sepphoris, which was lit up at night and was visible from Nazareth. If Jesus visited either this city or Capernaum, their synagogues would have provided a more powerful acoustic setting. Many of these buildings had a basilican ground-plan, which would have allowed for the center of the synagogue to be the center of attention. At a venue such as a hypothetical synagogue in Nazareth, the space would have been cramped, whatever the nature of the Nazareth synagogue compared to others in the area. Any commotion made by Jesus would have been apparent and overwhelming.

Archaeologist Yoram Tsafrir points out one additional interesting architectural note of Galilean synagogues: their congregations tended
to face the entrance of synagogues, allowing for those entering to be hit with a wall of sound during the recitation of prayer or during a sermon. The reasons for this had to do partially with the mandate in Jewish law that all synagogues face Jerusalem, and partly out of the desire to bring the attention of the congregation to the facade of the building, which was typically its most treasured and ornamented part, based largely on what Tsafir refers to as “the [classical] general world of values which encompassed world architecture and art.”\(^{21}\) Tsafir notes that the purpose of this set-up is to “make the interior space functional and...to design a building whose main impact is in its exterior.”\(^{22}\) If Jesus was preaching in a synagogue of this type, his voice may have been particularly commanding for those entering or leaving the building. Jewish Christians hearing the Gospel would be familiar with the layout of such buildings.

Overall, this festive element, with increased synagogue attendance, on top of the hypothetical design of a stand-alone synagogue in Nazareth, would have provided a powerful image to the listeners of the Gospels, especially when combined with the bold revelation of Jesus’ divinity within so sacred a space, which had such an effect that the author of Luke speaks how, after Jesus had preached, “all in the synagogue were filled with rage... got up, drove him out of the town, and led him to the brow of the hill... so that they might hurl him off the cliff. (Luke 4:28-29)” The acoustic intimacy of the synagogue combined with Jesus’ bold preaching would have been especially poignant to listeners of the Gospels, especially when the architecture of Galilean synagogues is examined.

Besides commanding an impressive acoustic nature, the nature of the synagogue in the Jewish community during the pre-rabbinic era afforded the Jewish community not just a center of Torah study and of worship, but also a place of social gathering. The *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Judaism* notes how the synagogue was where “announcements were made that concerned the community; it acted as a kind of lost property office; it was the place where legal witnesses could be found.”\(^{23}\) In other words, the synagogue fulfilled the functions of a secular as well as a religious center, and of a civil administration. Israeli archaeologist Yoram Tsafir points out in his *Architecture of Galilean Synagogues* notes that, partially out of a desire to differentiate their structures from pagan temples and partially for practical reasons, “[the Galilean builders] contented themselves with the erection of structures that could hold the community within them, but did not vary in
their form from the regular public and community buildings.” In adopting this model, the theory of synagogues as Second Temple era community centers is further bolstered. The synagogue was not just a Jewish village’s religious center, but also its social center. It represented the very heart of the Jewish community, making Jesus’ proclamation in such a space all the more bold.

Early in the Gospel of Luke, Jesus further demonstrates his speaking ability and popularity. The first recorded instance of Jesus preaching outdoors is off the sea of Galilee on a boat in Luke 5, reportedly to accommodate the multitudes that came out to hear him preach. The author of Luke speaks of how “the crowd was pressing on [Jesus] to hear the word of God, (Luke 5:3a)” and that he was forced to “get into one of the boats...and taught crowds from the boat (Luke 5:3b).” This description within the Gospel invokes a vivid scene in the mind: Jesus was already far outside of town. Such a crowd would have necessitated a formidable preaching range on the part of Jesus. The Cambridge Study Bible notes that his choice to preach in both synagogues and in the wilderness demonstrates Jesus “alternating between public proclamation (in the synagogues) and... remote private (deserted) places,” thereby implying a broad familiarity with soundscapes of all kinds and demonstrating Jesus’ mastery of preaching in each of them. This sonic imagery would have demonstrated the preaching power of Jesus to the listeners of the Gospels and provided itself an example of the far-reaching areas in which he preached.

An interesting contrast exists between the books of Matthew and Luke regarding the landscape where the beatitudes are preached. The mount setting is prominent within the Gospel of Matthew, while the plains setting was prominent within the Gospel of Luke. John Welch’s theory for Matthew’s choice of location may have had to do with his Gospel being tailored specifically for a Jewish audience (while Luke seems primarily concerned with preaching to Gentiles). John Welch notes that “The mountain setting of the Sermon is no trivial, romantic, or pastoral aside...the narrative setting of the Sermon on the Mount on a mountain invites readers to consider this text as ritual-related – perhaps even ritual laden, and to view these words of Jesus as having been delivered in a temple surrogate setting.” As noted earlier, the ritual aspects of the sermon were key to granting it authority.
Within Hebrew literature, mountains present themselves as locations which provide shelter for spiritual seekers escaping the noise and bustle of civilization and as places of extreme solitude, with the high altitude and silence of mountaintops providing for spiritual experiences that would surpass most other locations. John Walsh echoes this idea when he writes how “the whole appearance [of the mountaintop] had the aura of the familiar and sincere, the attractive and the dignified. The open sky above him, the rural surroundings, all that formed a natural temple. No synagogue, not even the temple in the capital, could make a solemn impression such as this.”

The implication in this is that by exceeding the acoustic power and majesty of even the temple itself, supersessionist elements are thus presented. The homiletic element is also key, for as with the sermon being the central portion of the synagogue service, so was the delivery in the new law, in the form of a sermon, a means of surpassing the Jewish law through its own devices.

Ritualistic aspects of Mount Sinai are noted in the Torah, and provide an interesting parallel with Temple etiquette for the priesthood during Second Temple Judaism. In the Book of Exodus, Moses instructs the Israelites to wash themselves and their garments in preparation to going to the mountain (Exodus 19:10, 14), as well as to abstain from sexual relations (Exodus 19:15). Much like the tabernacle of the Temple was seen as the most solemn and silent area of the complex, so was the top of Mount Sinai a sonic curiosity of its own, with fire, smoke, thunder, and clouds accompanying the revelation of the Jewish law to Moses. Welch further comments, “The mountain setting of the Sermon on the Mount not only provided a peaceful environment for the delivery of Jesus’ unparalleled instruction, but it also engenders a prayerful search...and calls to mind the rich symbolism of sacred mountains in Israelite...traditions.”

The majesty of the mount, comparable to the temple or synagogue, is apparent. The Sermon on the Plain in Luke suggests a notably different message when compared to Matthew. The Cambridge Study Bible notes: “Unlike Matthew’s version of Jesus’ instruction to his disciples, which (like Moses’s giving the Law to Israel) occurs on a mountain...here he speaks to a crowd gathered from all over the region on a level place. They have come not only to hear but also to be healed.” The egalitarian theme of Luke likely accounts for this. The Oxford Study Bible points out the change in tone regarding the message of both Matthew and Luke. The editor of the
Oxford bible, Michael Coogan, notes “the Sermon on the Mount presents a demand for an ethical righteousness the radical nature of which far exceeds that of the law.” The Cambridge Study Bible points out that upon ascending the mount, “he leaves the crowds and teaches his disciples, which means “learners.” His choice to preach the Beatitudes from the mountain in Matthew implies a desire on Jesus’ part to impose a more intimidating soundscape and atmosphere upon his listeners, alluding to the Old Testament and demonstrating the gravity of the New Law.

The choice of a plain in the Gospel of Luke in which sound would have carried better and which would have facilitated a larger crowd, adds tone to the different phrasing that Jesus uses in contrast to that in Matthew. Coogan notes that the demands of Luke’s version of the sermon are “equally radical but are more focused,” in that they “hone in upon the need to recognize the nature of the community that Jesus is calling”, and the “necessity for members of it to respond with mutual love, toleration, and acceptance.”

The primary center of Jewish worship all across the world during the first century lay at the Second Temple in Jerusalem. Joan Branham of the Art Bulletin speaks of the architecture of this grand edifice and its acoustic properties as reflecting sacred space using architectural devices to manipulate both sights and sounds in order to create a clear line between the sacred and the profane. She notes how “the Jerusalem Temple represents sacred space par excellence in its association with the divine realm,” She further adds that “the Temple precincts were divided into a succession of progressively more sacred zones culminating in the innermost sanctuary, the devir, or Holy of Holies, where the Divine presence... resided.” This hierarchy of sacred space reflects the incremental actions of Jesus, from the purification of the outer realms of the temple to the tearing of the very temple curtain in Matthew 27:51, Luke 23:45b, and Mark 15:38. In the minds of the audience, it helped illustrate a transformation of the old law into the new, beginning with the purification in the outside of the temple (where all could witness it) to the rending of the curtain.

The very architectural layout of the Temple itself consisted of areas that would have evoked a lasting impression on the eyes as well as ears. Martin S. Jaffee concludes in his introduction in Early Judaism that “the Temple on earth was to come as close as they ever would to heaven... because it was perceived to be an earthly version of a heavenly prototype...
power symbol of the unity of all elements of God’s cosmic design.”

To better understand the meaning of Jaffee’s declaration, a breakdown of the Temple’s architecture is necessary to illustrate its visual beauty as well as the power of its soundscape, demonstrating the power of Jesus’ own doings in the temple throughout his life.

The outermost part of the temple was the Gentile’s Court. After entering the Huldah Gates on the southern perimeter of the compound, visitors would have found themselves in a gigantic plaza. As its name suggests, Gentiles as well as Jews were welcome in this area. Nonetheless, the area was most frequently populated by Gentiles who would, in their own ways, give tribute to the God of Israel. Sacrificial lambs and goats could be purchased in this area from priests to be sacrificed on the buyer’s behalf. It was this area in which Jesus drove out the moneychangers following his entry into Jerusalem.

This occurrence is discussed in the nineteenth chapter of Luke and the twenty-first chapter of Matthew. Matthew describes how Jesus “drove out all who were selling and buying in the temple, and he overturned the tables of the money changers and the seats of those who sold doves (Matthew 21:12),” and that in response to this incidence, “the blind and lame came to him in the temple, and he cured them (Matthew 21:14).” This was done in direct response to the disdain of both the Sadducees and Pharisees to the authority of Jesus and to the crowd’s acclaim for him. The author of Matthew notes how “Jesus entered the temple and drove out all who were selling and buying in the temple, and he overturned the tables of the money changers and the seats of those who sold doves (Matthew 21:12).” The response to this action, rather than shock or outrage, was rejoicing. The author of Matthew notes how “the blind and lame came to him in the temple, and he cured them. But when the chief priests and the scribes saw the amazing things that he did, and heard the children crying out in the temple “...hosanna to the King of David. (Matthew 21:14-15)” This incident would have only added to the cacophony of praise that was already surrounding him since his entry into Jerusalem, an event which itself was marked by a noise that was indicative of Jesus’ divinity, alluding to Psalm 118:26 – a psalm proclaiming victory, exclaiming, “Blessed is he that comes in the name of the Lord.” This scene would have stood out to listeners as a disruption of the typical soundscape of the courtyard, and indicative of the new order that Jesus brought.
Beyond the plaza, access to non-Jews was strictly prohibited. Even Jewish access past this point, named the Nikanor Gate, was largely restricted. Beyond this gate was the Priest’s Court, where actual sacrifice was performed. Jaffee describes the area: “[I]n a large space 245 feet long and 340 feet wide, the actual sacrificial rituals were performed by the priests to the accompaniment of the Levite’s songs, cymbals, flutes, horns, and stringed instruments.” One can only imagine the sound of such a holy place to the ears of the average listener. On one end, cattle were slaughtered and prepared by the workers of the temple. An altar fifty-eight feet long and thirty feet high stood at the center where a large fire raged and which was constantly in the process of roasting sacrificial meat and being painted on its four corners with the blood of freshly sacrificed animals. On the east side, as well as the in sanctuary, was a fountain where fresh water for ablutions was drawn.

On the extreme western end of the sanctuary was the Holy of Holies, a cube-like room thirty six feet on all sides, and thirty-six feet high. Jaffee notes that “no one but the high priest could enter it; and even then, he could do so only on the Day of Absolution *(Yomha Kippurim)*.” The contents of the Holy of Holies were objects of acoustic significance. In the Temple of Solomon, reportedly destroyed in 587 B.C.E., the Ark of the Covenant lay on this spot. The Ark contained three model *cherubim* whose wings covered the ark and provided a symbolic throne for God. It was above the *cherubim*, notes Jaffee, that, “God’s voice had rung out to command Moses, Aaron, and generations of High Priests after them.” Unfortunately, Jaffee notes, “these holy objects had been lost by 587 B.C.E.,” following the destruction of the Temple of Solomon. Nonetheless, the Jewish people reportedly managed to replace this lost relic with other objects of acoustic significance.

According to rabbinic tradition, a flat slab named the Foundation Stone, upon which the world was supposedly created, lay in the place of the Ark. Silence was constant in the Holy of Holies, except for when the high priest came in to utter the name of God. Jaffee notes “At the center of the Temple’s rings of holiness...was nothing at all, an emptiness filled with the potential of infinite presence.” Biblical scholar Margaret Barker notes that, “the whole occasion was a time of awe; [the High Priest] did not prolong his prayers says the Mishnah, lest he put Israel in terror.” The atmosphere during the Day of Atonement, especially with knowledge beforehand
on the preparations of the vent, was likely somber and hushed. Daniel Ben Ezra notes that for a week, “the high priest was isolated (to avoid contamination), and carefully schooled so that he will be able to perform his completed task.” The actual liturgy during the Day of Atonement presents a curious acoustic spectacle. A major feast day in Judaism, the Temple was no doubt packed full during the holiday.

During the ceremony, two goats were used: one for sacrifice, and one (the scapegoat) to have scorn heaped upon it. Instead of being sacrificed, Ben Ezra describes how the high priest, after laying on his hands and whispering a collective confession, “hand[ed] the scapegoat over to an adjutant, who escort[ed] it to the desert,” and that the goat “[was] maltreated on its way out of the city.” This ritual is hinted at during the crucifixion itself, from the crowd’s chant of “Crucify him!” to the imposition of the sins of humankind upon Jesus himself according to proto-orthodox Christian theology, a similarity that was likely familiar to an early Christian audience living in the shadow of the Second Temple’s destruction in 70 C.E.

The entire Temple complex thus provided a map of the cosmos itself. Jesus’ actions reflected the changes in said cosmos, and his actions within such rooms of the Temple would have had a layer of visceral meaning for the listeners. Some debate lingers over the material evidence of certain facets of the Temple (as most of what is known about temple ritual is only available through rabbinical literature), additional insight into the holy contents of the temple is present in the seventh book of Josephus’ *The Jewish Wars*, written in 75 C.E. Classicist Honora Chapman notes that Josephus’ Flavian patrons had a vested interest in using the writings of Josephus as a means of crushing propaganda against their vanquished Jewish subjects, regardless of if some of the objects present in the description were actually seized or not. Among the objects one can find carved onto the Arch of Titus in Rome today are “a golden table weighing many talents, a golden lamp made likewise...and the law of the Judeans was carried after these as the last of the spoils.” In spite of his possible bias, Josephus presents himself as a source worth examining, and his descriptions indirectly reinforce rabbinical that proclaims the majesty of the Temple.

Even following the destruction of the Temple, it is likely that a significant number of Jews, at least in the western half of the Roman
Empire, made pilgrimages to the Temple of Peace in Rome. Honora Chapman speculates that, “any Judean visiting the Jerusalem Temple’s objects displayed in one of [the] rooms...could easily have aimed a prayer towards the southeast, the direction in which Jerusalem lay.”

This edifice was erected by the Emperor Vespasian in 75 C.E. and reportedly stocked with much of the loot taken from the Second Temple, including its large menorah, gold fittings, and even its temple curtain. Honora Chapman theorizes that the design of this temple, which faced towards Jerusalem, may have been deliberate so as to attract Jews as an alternative to the razed Temple in their ancestral homeland. Classicist Thomas Ashby reckons the temple’s length was “about 145 metres, with its width about two-thirds as much,” and that “it had an enclosing wall of peperino lined with marble and pierced by several gates.”

Familiarity with this temple and its acoustic characteristics, which were similar to that of the Jerusalem temple, would be present to the hearers of the New Testament in at least the western half of the empire, even if they themselves had never been to Jerusalem or weren’t Jewish.

Jesus’ entry into Jerusalem and cleansing of the Temple both had powerful acoustic properties that reflected religious sentiment in first century Palestine. A phenomena of religious violence and turmoil surrounding religious festivals may account for the actions of the crowd during Jesus’ procession into Jerusalem, and may also have reflected his actions in the cleansing of the Temple. Stephen Weitzman notes in the Journal of Religion that three major feast days in pre-rabbinic Judaism, Passover, Sukkot, and Shavuot, while serving primarily as “expressions of Jewish solidarity and cooperation” through the acts of pilgrimages, assemblies and collections of tithes, also had a tendency to erupt into riots and assassinations. Weitzman points to Josephus’ account of a riot during Sukkot in 100 B.C.E. in which the high priest Alexander Jannaeus was “pelted with citrons, a fruit that usually serves as a religious symbol during Sukkot.”

This incident is one of many mentioned by both Josephus and his contemporaries.

Other incidents of festival violence became so common that the Romans began “routinely ordering a company of soldiers to Jerusalem during festivals to quell any uprising that might occur.” More severe incidents according to Josephus include an occurrence at a later Passover when “twenty thousand people are said to have perished in a conflict...
that broke out after a Roman soldier exposed himself.” Early Christians were likely aware of such religious violence, which had lasted up until the destruction of the Temple. Some scholars go as far as to argue this anti-establishment trend in Jewish history helped lessen the impact of the Temple’s eventual destruction, as traumatic as the event was for the Jewish community. Jewish historian Shane J.D. Cohen in *The Temple and the Synagogue* argues that most sects of Judaism defined themselves ultimately in relation to the Temple. He notes that the Essenes “regarded the Jerusalem temple as defiled, its culture impure and its priests illegitimate.” Meanwhile, the Pharisees and early Jewish Christians “regarded their table as an altar, their meal as a sacrifice, and impose laws of priestly purity upon themselves,” even while both sects recognized the validity of the Temple cult. This diversity in Jewish identity, according to Cohen, ultimately allowed for the survival of much of Judaism after the Temple’s destruction.

Weitzman also points out the extreme strain on Jerusalem during holy days which would have both added to the soundscape as well as the antagonistic atmosphere surrounding the Temple. He notes that “archeology suggests that Jerusalem’s population swelled far beyond its normal size at these times, requiring the widening of streets and installation of additional water sources to accommodate the hordes of festive pilgrims.” These material considerations would have naturally resulted in the streets of Jerusalem being crowded with loud, harried pilgrims from all over the Jewish diaspora, each with their own set of customs as well as attitudes towards their Roman occupiers and towards the Temple authority in Jerusalem.

The writings of Philo suggest that the holiday periods were also ones of fellowship and celebrating, which would have reflected the narrative of Jesus’ joyful entry into Jerusalem. He notes how “friendships are formed between those who hitherto did not know each other, and the sacrifices and libations are all occasions of reciprocity of feeling and constitute the surest pledge that all are of one mind.” The Book of Jubilees, an apocryphal work that nonetheless hinted at the heavenly origins of much of Jewish worship, noting specifically that holidays that later came to be known as Passover, Sukkot, and others had their origins as angelic celebrations, complete with rejoicing and revelry. It was this belief that may have exhibited itself in forms of popular Judaism which were manifest during the celebrations in Jerusalem, further enabling the sort of sacred cacophony
present in Jerusalem during the high holidays.

In the Gospel of John, the author writes of Jesus’ final visit to Jerusalem during Passover. When the Pharisees ask him “How long will you keep us in suspense? If you are the messiah, tell us plainly (John 10:24-25),” Jesus gives a somewhat vague answer, saying “My sheep hear my voice. I know them, and they follow me,” (John 10:30) although still concluding that “My Father and I are one.” (John 10:30) Biblical scholar Mark Strauss notes that earlier in John 10, Jesus is depicted preaching the parable of the Good Shepherd to a crowd, implying “Jesus’ teaching of the Good Shepherd in verses 1-21...recalls Hanukkah and the events leading up to the Maccabean revolt, when false shepherds lead people astray.”56 With the attention of the congregation and the Pharisees squarely upon him, Jesus likely wished to avoid improperly manipulating the soundscape in the same way he would eventually do during his triumphal third entry into Jerusalem.

The twenty-seventh chapter of Matthew discusses the mocking of Jesus, mirrored in the fifteenth chapter of Mark, the twenty third chapter of Luke, and the nineteenth chapter of John. The HarperCollins Study Bible commentary notes how the authors of the Gospels wished to include such schemes to “fulfill his predictions and to identify him with the Servant of the Lord described in Isaiah 50:6.”57 The earthquake during the death of Jesus also represents a massive soundscape in its own right, reminiscent of past events through the Old Testament, particularly the beginning of time, when God literally speaks the world into existence. In the first chapter of Genesis, the author speaks of how action in the universe first begins in truth when God declares “Let there be light (Genesis 1:3).” Certain theological traditions within Jewish midrash also reinforce this view, and give credence to the idea of the voice of God being a mover of the universe. Biblical scholar Richard Bauckham notes that “Very frequently an earthquake is part of a cosmic quake: the whole universe, firmament, heavenly bodies, earth sea, and the foundations of the world tremble at the coming of God.”58 Jesus’ own voice when he declares all is finished on the cross is a beckoning to this early message of God, thus reinforcing Jesus’ own claim as God as well as providing the present sense of familiarity to the Jewish Christian audience.

There is some speculation that the incident was reminiscent of the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E. Biblical scholar Meindert De Jong quotes Josephus who describes, during the siege of Jerusalem, “the
eastern gate of the inner court...as observed at the sixth hour of the night to have opened of its own accord.” De Jong concludes from Josephus’ passage that “the learned understood that the security of the temple was dissolving of its own accord and that the opening of the gate meant a present to the enemy, interpreting the portent in their own minds as a indicative of coming desolation.” Such imagery was possibly not entirely negative in the ears of early Jewish Christian listeners, however.

In the first century, the temple system within Judaism had suffered major opposition, most notably since the Herodian era began. While the Sadducees would have seen the temple as the focal point of faith, wherein rested the altar which “was believed to rest on a boulder, the so called Foundation Stone (Even Stiyya), which served as a kind of cosmic plug preventing a resurgence of the Deluge, or which marked the point from which the solidification of the Earth had proceeded outward when the world was first created.” Other sects within Judaism, which grew popular alongside Christianity, especially following the destruction of the Temple, “withdrew from participating in [the Temple cult] and contented themselves with patient waiting for divine intervention.”

The decline in the popularity of Temple worship caused the imagery of the tearing of the Temple Veil and the shaking of the Temple’s foundation to be palatable, if not satisfying, to the listeners of the Gospel.

Jesus’ crucifixion is concluded with a cry, the last words varying depending on the Gospel. When in the Gospel of Matthew Jesus cries out in a loud voice, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? (Matthew 27:46b)” translated from the Aramaic “Eli, Eli lema sabachthani (Matthew 27:46a),” his followers mishear this as “Elijah” referring to the coming of the biblical figure at the end of the age, as mentioned in Matthew 17:10-13. This episode in the Gospels reveals to its readers that his followers were close enough to Jesus at the time of his crucifixion to hear him, but far enough away to not comprehend all that he said. It is only after the subsequent earthquake and opening of the tombs that his divinity and intention are made clear. The author of Mark gives a nearly identical account of the crucifixion, but the Cambridge Study Bible points out in this chapter the last cry of Jesus before his death “implies that his acceptance of death was a voluntary action.” This early interpretation also demonstrates both his humanity as well as his oneness with God. A scene of absolute abandonment and low standing fills the ears of those reading the story.
Awareness of the soundscapes of first century Palestine presents a whole new layer of meaning that adds color to the narratives of the Gospels. Many of these subtleties may well be lost on a reader of the New Testament who is unfamiliar with the cultural and spiritual landscape of Second Temple Judaism. However, a greater appreciation of the sounds and atmospheres of certain sacred places, alongside the allusion in the narratives to sacred spaces in the Old Testament, might very well help create a better understanding of the cultural and social contexts in which the authors of the Gospels wrote.

As the field of soundscapes continues to grow, the challenge of interpreting and recreating ancient soundscapes remains. The task is considerably difficult due to scant archaeological and textual evidence. Nevertheless, a foundation of scholarship based in liturgics, architecture, and religious studies has the potential to enable further discoveries of sounds in first century Palestine as well as other lands and time periods in antiquity. Literary scholars such as John Welch provide textual themes that allow historians to better understand the audience of the writings, while archaeologists like Martin Jaffee provide historians with clues regarding the structure and functions of the venues and buildings that make up the scene of various episodes in the Gospels with auditory significance. It is to be hoped that future researchers will find or utilize new, creative methods in attempting to further recreate the sonic landscape of Jesus’ life.

Notes

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
8 Ibid, 262.
9 Bloedhorn, Hanswulf, and Gil Hüttenmeister. 281.
11 Jaffee, Martin S. 173.
12 Ibid, 95.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
19 Shillington, V.G. 51.
22 Ibid.
23 Bloodhorn, Hanswulf, and Gil Hüttenmeister, 267.
24 Urman, Dan, Paul M Flesher, and Yoram Tsafrir. 82.
27 Ibid, 16.
28 Welch, John W, 16.
29 Kee, Howard Clark, 3.
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32 Kee, Howard Clark. 4.
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36 Jaffee, Martin S. 172.
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38 Ibid, 179.
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44 Ben Ezra, Daniel Stokl. 31.
46 Ibid, 117.
49 Weitzman, Stephen. 546.
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54 Ibid, 548.
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62 Ibid, 194.
63 Kee, Howard Clark. 51.

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Pisistratus, an archon of Athens and the “son of the dictator Hippias,” dedicated the first “altar [to] the twelve gods” in approximately 522 B.C.E.. Thucydides provides the first historical reference for the formal offering of religious rites and sacrifices to the Dodekatheon in ancient Greek society. Thucydides’ retelling of the creation of the Dodekatheon in History of the Peloponnesian War, which he completed prior to his death in 404 B.C.E., does not contain any references to the role that the ancient Greek poets, Hesiod and Homer, had in forging the mythological origins of the Greek gods. Yet Herodotus, who is often referred to as the “father of history,” and completed his own historical writings approximately twenty years before Thucydides, acknowledges both poets as the originators of the Greek pantheon. In book two of his Histories, Herodotus states that Hesiod and Homer were “the ones who created the gods’ family trees for the Greek world, gave them their names [and] assigned them their honors and expertise.” Herodotus even argues that “[a]ny poets” who “lived before Homer and Hesiod actually came after them,” solidifying both men as the undeniable creators of the Greek pantheon.

While Thucydides’ decision to depart from Herodotus’ rhetorical precedence and not mention Hesiod and Homer as the originators of the Dodekatheon may be explained through a difference of narrative style, a minor detail mentioned in Herodotus’ Histories must be examined individually. When listing all of the attributes that Hesiod and Homer bestowed upon the Greek pantheon, Herodotus mentions that these two poets also described “what [the gods] looked like.” Interestingly, Herodotus makes no mention of either Hesiod or Homer providing any information regarding how the Greek gods sounded. While one cannot determine why Herodotus decided not to credit Hesiod and Homer with establishing the aural characteristics of the Greek pantheon, this lack of recognition should not compel historians to infer that these poets did not
describe the soundscape of the Greek gods. In fact, an in-depth analysis of
the literature of Hesiod and Homer not only reveals how both men’s works
were essential in establishing the aural attributes of the Greek pantheon,
but also how their use of the gods’ voices within their texts was essential
to educating Greek society about the power and morality of the Greek
pantheon.

Ancient Greek soundscapes, specifically the soundscapes of the
Greek pantheon, is a fledgling field of historical study. In fact, many
historians who analyze the soundscape of ancient Greek mythology
often provide tangential analysis while examining another field of Greek
history. Armand D’Angour, in “The Sound of Mousikē: Reflections on
Aural Change in Ancient Greece,” argues that the revolutionary musical
developments that occurred in Athens during the 5th century B.C.E.
contributed to the new representation of music within the plays of
Euripides and Aristophanes. M.L. West in The East Face of Helicon: West
Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth, examines how the tradition
of the Greek epic evolved “under the influence of Near Eastern poetry.”
Through his examination of the influences of Near Eastern culture on
the works of Hesiod and Homer, West provides a few intriguing insights
regarding the power of divine sounds in ancient Greek mythology.
According to West an Indo-European god named Iskur, who “roars from
on high like some large animal,” inspired Zeus’ authority over Heaven,
specifically his command over thunder and lightning. Through this
analysis, West implies that Zeus’ power to control thunder, the primary
sound emitted from the sky, contributed to his designation as “the supreme
god [who] reigns from on high.”

While Zeus’s ability to control the sounds of Heaven is essential to
understanding his supremacy over the Greek pantheon, West also explores
how Zeus uses his control over thunder to defeat the cacophonous monster
Typhoeus. Chronicled in Hesiod’s Theogony, Typhoeus is a “monstrous
creature...born from Earth and Tartarus” who, because of his control over
the sounds of the universe, “threaten[s] Zeus’ power.” West explains that
Zeus defeats Typhoeus and eternally exiles him to Tartarus through the use
of “his storm weapons, which include[d] not only the usual thunder and
lightning[,] but also tornados.” West, by considering thunder a weapon of
Zeus, illustrates how one’s ability to control his or her soundscape signified
supreme authority and control in ancient societies.
This physical battle between Zeus and Typhoeus is a common area of scholarly analysis. In *Hesiod's Cosmos* Jenny Straus Clay provides an in-depth analysis of the influence of Hesiod's *Theogony* on ancient Greek culture, including an examination of Zeus' defeat over Typhoeus, Zeus' “last threat and last adversary.” According to Clay, “Typhoeus’ defeat signals the triumph of order and the permanence of Zeus’ reign.” While Clay agrees with West regarding the importance of Zeus’ defeat of Typhoeus, she does not provide any insights regarding the role of sound in this penultimate battle for divine supremacy.

Even though Clay’s analysis primarily examines the practical ramifications of Zeus’ triumph over Typhoeus, Owen Goslin, in “Hesiod’s Typhonomachy and the Ordering of Sound” explores how the aural battle between Zeus and Typhoeus was essential to providing an accurate description of the Greek pantheon’s soundscape. One of the first scholars to provide an in-depth analysis regarding the symbolic power of divine sounds and voices in Greek mythology, Goslin argues that Zeus’ defeat of Typhoeus not only “results in a reordering of the sonic world of the *Theogony,*” but also allows the “birth of the Muses,” which “enables communication between gods and men.”

Goslin explains that Typhoeus produces an unimaginable “range and hybridity of sounds,” encompassing “nearly every type of voice…including the ‘divine voice.’” Furthermore, Goslin acknowledges that Typhoeus is the “only immortal described in [the works of] Homer and Hesiod as possessing a tongue,” which symbolizes “his anomalous nature between god and beast” at a “communicative level.” Typhoeus’ multiplicity of sounds and voices threatens Zeus’ reign because, if unchecked, it would allow Typhoeus to “establish a different ordering of sound,” which would drastically affect how the gods, specifically Zeus, communicated with men.

After explaining Zeus’ rationale for defeating Typhoeus, Goslin examines the aural ramifications of their sonic battle. According to Goslin, “sound plays a prominent role in mapping out the cosmic terrain of Zeus’ realm” during his battle with Typhoeus. Goslin contrasts the primary aural weapon of Typhoeus, his horrid voices, which only is able “to terrify [its] enemies” with Zeus’ thunderclap, which “penetrates all corners of the cosmos” and signifies the “terrain under Zeus’ sovereignty.” Through this contrast, Goslin illustrates how Zeus, by “silencing” Typhoeus’ “boundless’ voices,” provides sonic order to the universe and gains the aural authority to
create the Muses, who not only mediate communication between gods and men, but also can “transform [a] voice into a song” which will “celebrat[e] Zeus’ rule” and reemphasize his divine supremacy. Even though the fledgling status of soundscape studies explains the lack of historical analyses regarding ancient Greek mythological soundscapes, this deficiency of scholarly work may also be the result of a much larger shift within the historiography of ancient Greek culture and religion. In “What is a Greek God?” Albert Henrichs explores the criteria necessary to classify an immortal as a god in ancient Greek society. However, Henrichs also provides a crucial insight regarding the evolution of the historiography of ancient Greek society’s culture and religion, acknowledging the “general neglect of the Greek gods in the modern scholarship of Greek religion” due to a shift in analytical focus towards religious “cult and rituals.” Through this critical observation regarding the scholarship of ancient Greek religion for “over [the past] hundred years,” Henrichs illustrates how this shift in scholarship not only caused many Greek gods to lose their “distinct identities” but also prevented an in-depth examination of Greek polytheism, since scholars are only critically studying gods associated with religious cults, such as “Zeus, Athena, and Dionysos.” This absence of the Greek pantheon in the scholarship of ancient Greek culture, combined with the newness of soundscape studies, provides a concrete rationale for the overall lack of analysis of ancient Greece’s mythological soundscapes.

Due to the overall lack of scholarship regarding ancient Greek soundscapes, the theoretical framework for this paper will derive from the works of R. Murray Schafer and Jacques Attali, two founding scholars of soundscape studies. In *The Soundscape: Our Sonic Environment and the Tuning of the World*, Schafer defines a soundscape as a “sonic environment.” While this definition may seem problematic for examining mythological soundscapes, Schafer expands this definition to include “abstract environments,” which for this paper will refer to the abstract nature of the gods in Hesiod and Homer’s texts. Even though Schafer’s definition of “soundscape” provides a theoretical plane on which the voices of the Greek pantheon can be analyzed, the structure of this paper will also rely upon Attali’s argument that individuals in power can use sound, specifically music, as a “ritual sacrifice.” However, this paper will apply a more liberal use of “sacrifice” than Attali’s proscribes, arguing that the ability to sacrifice
or silence the voice of another symbolizes aural authority and morality within the constructs of divine power that Hesiod and Homer establish within their mythological texts.

Although the Greek gods often demonstrate their aural authority through their elemental powers, such as Zeus’ thunder or the noise emitted from Poseidon’s earthquakes, the power of the gods’ voices is an essential component of the moral soundscape that Hesiod and Homer created within the ancient poems. Zeus, as the established sovereign of Mount Olympus and the deity whose voice Hesiod and Homer depict most frequently in their texts, provides an excellent entry point for examining divine vocal authority and morality within Greek mythology. Zeus speaks for the first time in Hesiod’s *Theogony* when he “call[s]/[t]o great Olympus all the deathless gods” to convince them to join his battle against the Titans. Hesiod goes on to narrate how Zeus, utilizing his vocal authority, proclaimed that if any of his fellow gods “should fight/[w]ith him against the Titans” they would be “promoted” with “rank and honours.”

While Zeus’ speech coincides with the literary *topos* of a military general invigorating his troops with the promises of glory and spoils prior to war, Hesiod uses Zeus’ call to arms as the event that not only solidifies his supremacy in the Greek pantheon, but also establishes the precedence of permitting moral and righteous gods a voice within mythological texts. Zeus, as the only member of the *Dodekatheon* who is given a voice in the *Theogony*, receives supreme aural authority from Hesiod. Additionally, by choosing not to summarize Zeus’ speech, but rather report it in its entirety, Hesiod demonstrates the divine and unquestionable authority of Zeus’ words.

Furthermore, it is important to note that Hesiod uses this single speech to illustrate the inevitable occurrence of events that Zeus proclaims. For example, Styx is the first goddess to ally herself with Zeus in his war against the Titans. After this alliance is formed, Hesiod acknowledges that Zeus “fulfilled his vows” of bestowing glory and honors not only to Styx, but “[t]o all” who joined his divine army. Through the manifestation of Zeus’ promises, Hesiod begins to develop an intertwined relationship between the power Zeus’ voice and the morality of his words and promises. Hesiod allows Zeus to vocalize his promises in the *Theogony*, and then ensures that the thunder god’s decrees are fulfilled, because they are moral and righteous actions.
Homer also utilizes the interdependent relationship between the authority and morality of Zeus’ words within his epic poems. In the first book of *The Iliad*, Thetis, a lesser water goddess, visits Zeus begging him to “honor [her] son Achilles” and rectify the unjust crimes the Achaeans had committed against him. Thetis begs Zeus for his divine assistance because she knows that the god of thunder’s “urgings rule the world.” Interestingly, Homer explicitly states that Zeus, after hearing Thetis’ initial appeal, “answered nothing” and remained “silent,” implying that Zeus was uncertain as to whether he wanted to commit himself to elevating Achilles’ honor; a commitment which, once vocalized, would become irreversible and would spawn hostilities with Hera, Zeus’ wife.

Only when Thetis demands that Zeus either “bow [his] head in consent” or “deny [her] outright” does the storm god finally vocalize his response. Homer details how Zeus, “[f]illed with anger,” verbally agrees to honor Achilles and explains to Thetis that “[n]o word or work” of his “can be revoked” once he “bow[s] his head to say it shall be done.” Zeus, through his divine words, which both Hesiod and Homer have established as irrevocable, declares that the physical act of bowing his head is equal in authority and power to any of his verbal decrees. However, while Zeus bows his head to affirm the honors Achilles will receive, Homer does not allow Zeus’ judgment to remain silent. Although Zeus does not verbalize his response, the thunder god’s silent bow sends “giant shock waves… through all Olympus,” sonically confirming Zeus’ authority.

Additionally, Homer illustrates in *The Iliad* how Zeus’ commands towards his fellow Olympians regarding warfare are undisputable. In the eighth book of *The Iliad*, Zeus “proclaim[s]” that no god should “try to fight” in the war between the Achaeans and Trojans “against [his] strict decree” and, if any god should do so, that god would be “eternally disgraced.” While Hera and Athena both overtly attempt to intervene in the war, Zeus catches both of these goddesses and, through the moral infallibility of his words, dishonors and punishes them, reaffirming the authority of his commands and the divine punishment for those who attempt to violate them. Interestingly, Homer also illustrates how Zeus, because of this vocal authority, can amend any of his previous commands. For example, in *The Iliad*’s twentieth book Zeus summons the gods of Mount Olympus and declares that they should now “go to [the] Trojans, go to [the] Acheans, and h]elp either side” as each deity sees fit.
Zeus’ revocation of his own decree may seem contradictory to the parameters Hesiod and Homer established regarding the thunder god’s aural authority. However, this act allows Homer to confirm that Zeus, through his ability to amend his sonic commands, either due to personal desire or moral obligation, holds supreme authority over the Olympians’ actions.44

While the authority of Zeus’ voice is clearly present within The Iliad, Homer acknowledges Zeus’ aural authority in The Odyssey as well. In the fifth book of The Odyssey Athena, paralleling Thetis’ plea to Zeus in The Iliad, implores Zeus to save Odysseus’ life and grant the mortal permission to return home.45 Zeus takes pity on Odysseus and orders Hermes to fly to Calypso, the nymph holding Odysseus captive, and inform her that the supreme god of Mount Olympus decrees that “the exile must return” to his home.46 Calypso, because she is a lesser god and not one of the Dodekatheon, does not even attempt to resist the command of Zeus. In fact, Calypso is only able to bemoan to Hermes the “[h]ard-hearted” nature of the “lords of jealousy” on Mount Olympus.47 However, while Calypso is allowed to vocalize her displeasure with Zeus’ orders, she begrudgingly allows Odysseus to leave her island since “the Almighty insists” and “commands” that he be released.48 Again, Zeus’ orders to release Odysseus contain an implicit morality, especially since Zeus vocalizes that “destiny ordain[ed]” that Odysseus, as a hero of the Trojan War, deserves to return home.49 Through this episode, Homer demonstrates not only Zeus’ aural authority over all of the gods, but also that, regardless of the discontent that lesser gods are allowed to vocalize, they are unable to defy Zeus’ divine commands.

Homer, unlike Hesiod, illustrates varying degrees of aural authority in members of the Dodekatheon besides Zeus. As mentioned above, Athena begs Zeus to order Calypso to release Odysseus from her captivity. However, Homer emphasizes that Athena implored Zeus for aid because she was “deeply moved by [Odysseus’] long ordeal.”50 In fact, Homer implies that the sincerity of Athena’s request is what compels Zeus to give Athena the “power” to ensure Odysseus arrived “home to his native country all unharmed.”51 While Zeus, yet again, demonstrates his aural authority, this event also acknowledges the moral power that resonates within Athena’s speech to Zeus because of her genuine concern for Odysseus’ fate.
In *The Iliad* Homer grants Poseidon an authoritative and moral voice when speaking to Aeneas during the penultimate battle of the epic. Observing that Aeneas’ decision to fight an enraged and divinely empowered Achilles would force the Trojan to “go down to the House of Death” prematurely, Poseidon “call[s] the gods” to council to discuss Aeneas’ fate. Poseidon’s fellow Olympians provide little advice or support, and only Hera verbalizes a response, informing the god of earthquakes that he must “decide in [his] own mind” whether to “save Aeneas now or let him die.” Hearing the sincerity of Hera’s apathy, Poseidon boldly rushes into battle to save the Trojan who “is destined to survive.” Poseidon asserts his own authority by saving Aeneas, which is a moral act because it satisfies the will of Fate. After Poseidon saves Aeneas from Achilles, he explains to Aeneas that he must avoid death at the hands of Achilles, which would be “against the will of fate.” Homer, by giving the storm god a voice through actions as a messenger of Fate, allows Poseidon to speak with moral certainty regarding Aeneas’ destiny to survive the Trojan War, which in turn solidifies the god’s sonic authority during this episode of *The Iliad*.

Homer further complicates the implied morality of divine voices by demonstrating that when a member of the Greek Dodekatheon speaks to a human while maintaining a godly form he or she may speak only truth. Poseidon’s conversation with Aeneas illustrates this causality, since Poseidon spoke truthfully to Aeneas regarding the Trojans’ fate after saving him from Achilles’ sword. Homer, however, also illustrates the inverse aspect of this relationship, specifically demonstrating how Poseidon, Apollo, and Athena must assume a mortal form and use a human voice to provide false testimonies to mortals. During the Trojans’ attempt to capture the Achaeans’ ships, Poseidon visits the Greater and Little Ajax to rouse their courage and ensure their participation in the battle. While Poseidon sincerely desires to provide the Ajaxes with the strength necessary to defend their ships, aspects of his speech were dishonest, thus compelling him to assume “the build and tireless voice of Calchas.” After assuming a human form, Poseidon uses Calchas’ voice to inform the Ajaxes that he “dread[s] a breakthrough” in the Achaeans’ defenses and wishes that “a god could make [the two] stand fast…tense with all [their] power” so that they could repel the Trojans’ attack. Poseidon, who sincerely wants the Achaeans to win this battle, taps the shoulders of the Ajaxes with his staff, empowering them
to battle the Trojans without revealing his true identity. Poseidon’s deception, by passively implying that another god gave the Ajaxes the strength to lead the Achaeans into battle, allows the god to covertly assist the Achaeans. Neither humility nor modesty, but rather a fear of opposing Zeus’ divine orders, motivates Poseidon’s secrecy. Zeus, in the eighth book of *The Iliad*, decreed that the gods could not interfere in the war between the Achaeans and Trojans. Additionally, Poseidon knows the immorality of providing aid to the Ajaxes since “Zeus himself impels the madman” Hector against the Achaeans ships. Aware that he does not have the moral or aural authority to defy directly the wishes of Zeus, Poseidon, by assuming a human voice, creates a sonic loophole which allows him to indirectly support the Achaeans without tainting his godly voice. Homer, through Poseidon’s deception, demonstrates Zeus’ supreme sonic authority as well as the inability of gods to use their own divine voices to deceive humans.

Apollo, in a similar fashion, uses a human voice to motivate and to deceive Aeneas in *The Iliad’s* twentieth book. During the penultimate battle between the Achaeans and the Trojans, an enraged Achilles rampaged through the battlefield, brutally slaughtering any Trojan who prevented him from reaching Hector. Even though Achilles’ violent frenzy was unstoppable, Phoebus Apollo, the “urer of armies,” convinced Aeneas to confront Achilles on the battlefield. After “masking his voice like Priam’s son Lycaon,” Apollo encourages Aeneas to fulfill his boast that, if given the opportunity, he would “face Achilles man-to-man in battle.” Aeneas, however, questions the god’s advice, wondering why his friend, Lycaon, urged him “against [his] will” to battle Achilles.

However, Apollo’s persuasive urgings begin to corrode Aeneas’ logic and convince him that Zeus would protect him from Achilles’ sword. Finally, by invoking Aeneas’ divine heritage as the son of Aphrodite, Apollo is able to convince the Trojan that he could easily kill the rampaging Achilles. After speaking these falsehoods, Apollo “breathed enormous strength” into Aeneas, who then foolishly attacked the enraged Achilles. While Apollo, through his actions, did not defy Zeus’ commands, he did defy the will of fate by placing Aeneas’ life in peril. Additionally, Homer does not explain whether Apollo, who allied himself with the Trojans, knew that his actions could lead to the death of Aeneas. Regardless of his personal motivations, Apollo’s use of a human voice when speaking to
Aeneas allows Homer to demonstrate that it is unjust for a god to use his divine voice to defy, either intentionally or through ignorance, the will of Fate.

Perhaps one of the most intriguing examples of an Olympian deceiving a mortal with a human voice is Athena’s deception of Odysseus in *The Odyssey*. When Athena first meets Odysseus after he is freed from Calypso’s island, she appears and speaks to him as a “young man…a shepherd boy” in order to test Odysseus’ wit. Since Homer previously demonstrated Athena’s desire to assist Odysseus in reclaiming his household, malicious intent does not fuel the goddess’ deception of Odysseus. When Odysseus inquires as to which land he has shipwrecked, Athena truthfully informs him that they stand upon Ithaca. Athena, however, playfully teases Odysseus’ geographical ignorance, stating that he “must be a fool, stranger, or come from nowhere” to not realize he landed upon Ithaca. According to the mythological parameters that Homer establishes, Athena, who knows that Odysseus is none of these things, would be unable to speak such falsehoods to her favorite mortal. Odysseus responds with a long, elaborate, and falsified tale, recounting his fictional travels for the disguised Athena. Odysseus, through this deception, passes Athena’s test. In fact, after hearing this fabricated story, Athena assumes her godly form and, speaking with her divine voice, praises Odysseus for his “all-round craft and guile” but again mocks him, this time for not recognizing her, “daughter of Zeus – who always [stood] beside [Odysseus].” Athena’s restoration of her godly appearance when speaking honestly to Odysseus allows Homer to reemphasize both the inherently moral nature of divine voices and the inherently deceptive nature of mortal voices.

Homer and Hesiod both present the mortal voice as an immoral tool not only for gods to use to deceive humans, but also for humans to deceive their fellow humans. For example, in *The Iliad*, both Achilles and Aeneas taunt one another with lengthy speeches detailing their ancestry and prowess in war prior to engaging in battle. After this tense conversation, which encompasses approximately eighty lines of Homer’s epic, Aeneas implores Achilles to end this aural battle and to begin the physical one. Homer, speaking through Aeneas, states that a “man’s tongue is a glib and twisty thing,” thus rationalizing the deceptive nature of the human voice. Homer reinforces the untrustworthy nature of the human voice through
Aeneas’ explanation that human emotions, such as anger, compel one’s voice to speak “with slander” and “stirs up lies.”

Hesiod echoes this distrust of the human’s tongue, and in turn the mortal voice, in his *Works and Days*. During one of his proverbial passages, Hesiod argues that a “man’s best treasure is his thrifty tongue.” However, Hesiod goes on to explain that the “most appealing gift” of a man is “a tongue that moves in moderation.” Although in this passage Hesiod began by praising a man who can moderate the ingenuity of his tongue, it transforms into a cautionary tale, in which Hesiod warns against “speak[ing slander],” which always leads to one “soon hear[ing] worse about [himself].”

Hesiod elaborates on the perils of an unchecked tongue through his narration of the fifth race of men, the “race of iron,” which has the ability to produce great immorality through their voices. According to Hesiod, the immorality of the race of iron is prevalent in their readiness to “blame and criticize/with cruel words” their aging parents. Furthermore, Hesiod explains that their ability to vocalize “crooked words” and “lying oaths” grants the race of iron the ability to “do injury/to better men” and to promote both injustice and corruption. These descriptions of the mortal voice found in both *The Iliad* and *Works and Days* accentuates Homer and Hesiod’s belief that the human tongue and voice, with its capability for deception, trickery, and evil, morally opposes the divine voice, which must speak with honesty and sincerity.

Hesiod, however, in both *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, elaborates upon the necessity for aural morality by illustrating that both gods and humans may lose their voice as punishment for immoral actions. For example, after describing Zeus’ victory over the Titans in *Theogony*, Hesiod details the moral code that Zeus establishes upon “snowy Mount Olympus.” Hesiod specifically defines the consequences for any god who commits an act of aural disloyalty, dishonesty, or immorality. Under Zeus’ reign it is decreed that any god who “swears an oath/and makes libation falsely” will receive a ten year punishment, during which the offender will be made to “lie/unbreathing, for the period of a year” while living without “nectar or ambrosia” and then will be exiled from Mount Olympus for another nine years. Hesiod, through this passage, conveys the moral severity of an Olympian violating a verbalized oath. However, Hesiod also underscores a specific and exceedingly cruel aural aspect of
this divine punishment: that during the first year of the punishment the god must lay both “without a breath” and “without a voice.” Through this aural punishment, Hesiod not only exhibits how those gods who use their divine voices for treachery will be punished by losing their voice, but also illustrates the powerlessness of any gods who choose, of their own desires, to use their divine voices for immoral actions.

This abstract punishment of an immortal losing his or her voice is tangibly applied in Hesiod’s *Theogony* when Zeus defeats Typhoeus. As argued above, Zeus not only orders the universe, but also secures divine aural authority through his victory over the sonic monster. After Zeus exiles Typhoeus to Tartarus, the monstrous god is able to keep some of his divine powers, controlling the “fierce, rain blowing winds” that bring “[c]alamity to men.” However, an important transition occurs during this sonic dethroning. Hesiod explains that, prior to Typhoeus defeat at the hands of the god of thunder, Typhoeus embodied not only incomprehensible sounds, but also “all kinds of voices,” including those that “gods/[w]ould understand.” However, after Typhoeus’ defeat, Zeus allows him only the power to fill the world with “dreadful noise.” Hesiod illustrates how Zeus, by stripping Typhoeus of his ability to speak in a manner that the gods understand, not only punishes the monster for his sonic defiance of the thunder god’s supreme authority, but also permanently castrates the monster of his own aural power.

Interestingly, the divine punishment of voicelessness is not limited to those who live upon Mount Olympus. Hesiod, in *Works and Days*, explores how Zeus uses voicelessness as a punishment for mortal crimes. Early in *Works and Days*, Hesiod tells the story of Pandora, who, by opening the gift of a divinely cursed box, unleashed the evils of the world upon humanity. Hesiod explains that the men who lived during the time of Pandora were “[a]part from sorrow and from painful work.” In fact, these men were so fortunate and blessed that they were even free “from disease.” However, once Pandora opened her vile gift, which allowed “[t]housands of troubles” to wander “the earth,” the race of men was plagued with a multitude of suffering and diseases. Interestingly, Hesiod notes that the race of men living during Pandora’s time had to endure these diseases “in silence” because they were “[d]eprived of speech by Zeus the wise.” Through this divine punishment Hesiod exhibits how humanity, just as the gods of Mount Olympus, are subject to the punishment of voicelessness if they
commit an action that is either immoral or offends the divine authority of Zeus.

Unlike Hesiod, Homer does not implore the divine punishment of voicelessness in his epic poems. Homer, however, does examine how members of the Dodekatheon, through a sacrifice of a divine voice by voluntary silence, exhibit not only a powerlessness to defy the moral authority of another god, but also a self-awareness of the immortality of their silent, voiceless actions. For example, after Zeus decrees that no god may interfere in the battle between the Trojans and the Achaeans, Poseidon decides to defy Zeus’ authority and aid the Achaeans. Homer explains that even though Zeus and Poseidon were “gods of the same line” Zeus held supreme authority because he was “the elder born” and “knew more.” Poseidon, operating within the aural rules of Greek mythology that Hesiod and Homer already established, determines that it would be best to assist the Achaeans “in secret.” Poseidon, aware of the potential punishment for defying Zeus, “shrank away from defending allies/out in the open” and only “kept urging” the Achaeans to fight in secret. Homer uses Poseidon’s secretive actions to illustrate that although the god of earthquakes whole-heartedly disagreed with his brother’s commandment, he was unable to defy the decree openly because of both the immorality of his own actions and his unwillingness to be aurally punished for blatant rebellion against Zeus.

Silence of the gods is also a tool for Homer to demonstrate a character flaw within a deity, as illustrated through the silence of Apollo during the penultimate battle of The Iliad. Apollo, who is supposed to be defending and assisting the Trojans in battle, chooses to retreat rather than face Poseidon. Vocally, Apollo states that his fellow gods would consider him “hardly sane” if he fought Poseidon “for the sake of wretched mortals” and, in a show of false bravado, requests that Poseidon “[c]all off this skirmish.” While Homer informs his reader that Apollo was “filled with shame/to grapple his own father’s brother hand-to-hand,” Artemis, the sister of Apollo, does not let the sun god leave the battle with his honor intact. Embarrassed at her brother’s cowardice, Artemis slings insults at Apollo, mocking him for “turning over victory to Poseidon” and “giving [Poseidon] all the glory without a fight.” An enraged Artemis even questions whether Apollo is a “spineless fool,” informing him that she never wants to hear her brother “boasting” that he “would fight Poseidon
strength for strength.”\textsuperscript{105} By illustrating how Apollo did not fulfill the claims and boasts he made in the safety of Mount Olympus, Artemis strips away Apollo’s aural power. According to Homer, Artemis’ honest words and valid accusations not only hurt Apollo’s pride, but also shame him into silence, with “[n]ot a word in reply [uttered] from the Archer-god.”\textsuperscript{106} Apollo, already shamed for not following through with his previous declarations, is unable to verbalize a response because Artemis’ words are undeniably true. Thus, Apollo’s voluntary silence allows Homer to illustrate yet again how divine powerlessness is associated with a god’s inability to speak.

Hesiod, in the opening of \textit{Theogony}, states that the Muses “breathed a sacred voice into [his] mouth” which granted him the ability to recite the exploits of the Greek pantheon.\textsuperscript{107} Similarly, in \textit{Works and Days}, Hesiod explains that when Hephaestus created the first woman Zeus ordered him to “put in [her] a voice.”\textsuperscript{108} It is no coincidence that Hesiod, in both of these mythological tales, includes the importance of a human’s capability to produce a voice, which allows him or her to communicate with both the divine gods of Mount Olympus and with others. Through this in-depth examination of the moral soundscape of the ancient Greek gods, one can perceive how crucial and prominent the relationship between the gods, the voice, the soul, and morality were to ancient Greek society.

While Herodotus may have been correct that Hesiod and Homer were responsible for creating the names, powers, and physical descriptions of the ancient Greek gods of Mount Olympus, it cannot be overlooked that these poets also educated ancient Greek society of the divine soundscape of the immortal gods. Through the \textit{Theogony}, \textit{Works and Days}, \textit{The Iliad}, and \textit{The Odyssey}, both Hesiod and Homer not only provide a detailed account of how the gods sounded, but also explicitly demonstrate the authority and moral importance present whenever a god spoke. While these poets could never accurately convey the exact sounds of the voices of the gods they worshiped, the aural soundscape of the Greek pantheon that Hesiod and Homer created was an essential tool for explaining the implicit moral power in every word that a soul, divine or mortal, chose to vocalize.
NOTES


2 The *Dodekatheon* refers to the primary twelve gods of ancient Greek religion who resided upon Mount Olympus. Ian Rutherford argues that the members of the *Dodekatheon* varied depending upon the region of Greece where one lived. However, Rutherford argues that the most common configuration of the *Dodekatheon* is “Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, Demeter, Apollo, Artemis, Ares, Aphrodite, Hermes, Athena, Hephaistos, and Hestia” with “Hestia and Ares” occasionally replaced with “Dionysos, Herakles, or Hades.” Ian Rutherford, “Canonizing the Pantheon: The Dodekatheon in Greek Religion and Its Origins” in *The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations*, edited by Jan N. Bremmer and Andrew Erskine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 46-47.

3 Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* trans. Rex Warner, 11-12. Additionally, it is important to note that scholars agree that both Hesiod and Homer lived in the early eighth century B.C.E., approximately three hundred fifty years before Thucydides’ death. Scholars often use Herodotus’ *Histories*, in which he states that “Hesiod and Homer lived no more than four hundred years before [his] time” as literary evidence for this chronological estimation; see Herodotus, *The Histories* trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2.53.


6 Herodotus, *The Histories* 2.53-54.


10 West, 114.

11 West, 114.

12 West, 300.

13 West, 300.


15 Clay, 127.


17 Goslin, 351.

18 Goslin, 354.

19 Goslin, 359.

20 Goslin, 354.

21 Goslin, 357.

22 Goslin, 362, 365.

23 Goslin, 366, 370.


26 Henrich, 26-27.


28 Schafer, 274. Schafer also provides some analysis regarding the music associated with the cults for
ancient Greek gods, such as Apollo, as well as Zeus’ attack on the Titans; see 5-6, 24-25.
33 Hesiod, *Th.*, 399.
40 Homer, *Il.*, 1.635.
42 Zeus, after discovering that Hera and Athena both defied his orders and intervened in the battle between the Achaeans and the Trojans, shames them without having to physically harm either one of them. Zeus orders Iris to fly to Hera and Athena and inform them that if they do not return to Mount Olympus he will “hurl them from their chariot.” Since both goddesses heed the warning of Iris and return to Olympus, Zeus does not physically harm them. However, the storm god does “mock” them, reiterating that if they had not returned when he ordered he would have “blasted [them] in [their] chariot” with his lightning bolts, ensuring that they “could never have returned to Mount Olympus.” Homer, *Il.*, 8.460-462; 8.525-526; 8.528.
44 In the twentieth book of *The Iliad* Homer further illustrates that both personal desire and moral responsibility compels Zeus to command the gods to intervene in the Trojan War. On the one, hand Zeus states that he will not interfere in the Trojan War but will “stay on Olympus throned aloft” so that he may “feast [his] eyes and delight [his] heart” with the battle below. However, Zeus also informs the immortal gods that they must participate in the Trojan War to prevent Achilles from “razing the walls of Troy] against the will of fate.” See Homer, *Il.*, 20.27-29; 20.36.
46 Homer, *Ody.*, 5.35.
48 Homer, *Ody.*, 5.154.
49 Homer, *Ody.*, 1.45.
50 Homer, *Ody.*, 5.6.
51 Homer, *Ody.*, 5.5.28-30.
56 Henrichs argues that “‘seeing the gods’ is one of the most ubiquitously attested forms of divine-human interaction in antiquity,” inferring that many Greeks would have claimed they would “know a [god] when [they saw] one.” Interestingly, Henrichs chooses to focus on the visual attributes of divine authenticity, arguing that one of the three essential characteristics of a Greek god is its anthropomorphic ability, which allows “male and female gods [to] sometimes deceive mortals by assuming anthropo-
...morphic identities not their own.” However, because of this primary focus on the visual, Henrichs does not provide any analysis of the aural deception that occurs when the gods choose to deceive humans through an anthropomorphic transformation; see Henrichs, 19; 32-33.
57 Homer, II, 13.54-58.
58 Homer, II, 13.56.
59 Homer, II, 13.65; 13.68-69
60 Homer, II, 13.73-76.
61 Homer, II, 8.7-14.
62 Homer, II, 13.72-73.
63 Homer, II, 20.90-92.
64 Homer, II, 20.95.
66 Homer, II, 20.104.
68 Homer, II, 20.125-126. Apollo specifically states that Achilles, who “sprang from a lesser goddess’ loins,” referring to Thetis, would be no match for the grandson of Zeus.
69 Homer, II, 20.132. As mentioned above, Aeneas is “destined to survive” the Trojan War and Poseidon saves him from the treachery of Apollo, thus preventing him from entering the House of Death before fate wishes; see above, 11-12.
70 Homer, II, 20.349.
71 Homer, Ody., 13.253.
72 Homer, Ody., 13.280-282.
73 Homer, Ody., 13.268.
74 Homer, Ody., 13.331; 13.341-342.
75 Homer, II, 20.207-287.
76 Homer, II, 20.294-295. West argues that mythological or religious texts from the ancient Greeks, Babylonians, and Israelites agree that man has the ability to use his words as a tool of persuasion. Through this analysis, West examines how the gods of these different cultural groups gave humanity the ability for “flattering, seductive, [and] deceptive speech,” which can be both a tool and a liability to the individual who uses his tongue and voice in this deceitful manner. West, 229-231.
78 Hesiod, WD, 724.
79 Hesiod, WD, 725-726.
80 Hesiod, WD, 726-727.
81 Hesiod, WD, 177-178. Hesiod states that he belongs to the fifth race of men which, according to Works and Days, is the most recent race of mortals.
82 Hesiod, WD, 183-184.
83 Hesiod, WD, 192-194.
84 Hesiod, Th., 795.
85 Hesiod, Th., 795-797; 801-806.
86 Hesiod, Th., 798.
87 For the entire account of Zeus’ battle with Typhoeus see Hesiod, Th. 820-880. For prior analyses regarding the Typhonomachy, see above, 4-5
88 Hesiod, Th., 869;874.
89 Hesiod, Th., 832-833.
90 Hesiod, Th. 880.
91 Goslin, through his in-depth analysis of Hesiod’s Typhonomachy, explores the long term ramifications of Zeus stripping Typhoeus of his voice and, in turn, his aural authority. Specifically, Goslin argues that “while Typhoeus lingers into the present day [mythology], he is voiceless no longer threatens to destabilize the communications between the Muses and mortal poets, such as Hesiod.” Through this analysis, Goslin illustrates the important role of this punishment of voicelessness not only for Zeus.
securing dominance over his divine soundscape, but also for the aural stability of the human world, which allows poets such as Hesiod to communicate with the divine Muses and learn of the exploits of the gods. Goslin, 369.

92 Hesiod, WD, 79-88. Zeus indirectly punished Prometheus, who gave fire to humanity against Zeus’ orders, by ensuring that Pandora opened this cursed box and damned humanity to live in a world filled with evil. For an account of Prometheus’ defiance of Zeus and his gift of fire to humanity, as well as Zeus’ rage filled reaction to Prometheus’ actions, see Hesiod, WD, 41-59.

93 Hesiod, WD, 91
94 Hesiod, WD, 92.
95 Hesiod, WD, 98-100.
96 Hesiod, WD, 103-104.

97 For Zeus’ complete speech that forbids the divine gods from interfering with the war between the Trojans and Achaeans, see Homer, Il, 8:1-31.

98 Homer, Il, 13.412-413.
99 Homer, Il, 13.408.
100 Homer, Il, 13.414-416.
101 Homer, Il, 21.526-532.
102 Homer, Il, 21.527-528; 531.
103 Homer, Il, 21.533-534.
104 Homer, Il, 21.538-539
105 Homer, Il, 21.540; 543.
106 Homer, Il, 21.545.
107 Hesiod, Th, 33
108 Hesiod, WD, 61.

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A SAPPHIC TRIPTYCH
BY SETH CHABAY

This translation was produced for the Department of Creative Writing’s “Craft of Translation” course. It contains translations of a poem by Sappho in Ancient Greek, a translation of that poem into Latin by Catullus, and Pierre de Ronsard’s translation from Catullus into Old French. Thus, this translation contains a translation, a translation of a translation, and a translation of a translation of a translation.

SAPPHO 31
C. 600 B.C.E

φαίνεται μοι κήνος ἱσος θεόσιν
ἔμμεν’ ὡνηρ, ὅττις ἐνάντιος τοι
ἰσδάνει καὶ πλάσιον ἀδυ φωνεί-
σας ὑπακούει

καὶ γελαίσας ἰμέρεν, τό μ’ ὑ μᾶν
καρδίαν ἐν στήθειν ἐπτόαισεν.
ὡς γὰρ ἐς σ’ ἦδω βρόχε’, ὡς με φώναι-
σ’ οὐδ’ ἐν ἔτ’ εἴκει,

ἀλλ’ ἂκαν μὲν γλώσσα τέαγετ, λέπτον
δ’ αὐτίκα χρῷ πῦρ ὑπαδεδρόμηκεν,
ὅππάτεσσι δ’ οὐδ’ ἐν ὅρημ’ ἐν ὅρημ’, ἐπιρρόμ-
βεισι δ’ ἂκουαι,

κάδ δὲ μ’ ἰδρῶς ψῦχρος ἔχει, τρόμος δὲ
παῖσαν ἄγρει, χλωροτέρα δὲ ποίας
ἐμι, τεθνάκην δ’ ὀλίγω ’πιδεύης
φαίνου’ ἔμ’ αὕτια.

ἀλλὰ πᾶν τόλματον, ἐπεὶ τκαὶ πένητα!
He seems to me equal to the gods,  
that man sitting across from you,  
listening close, speaking  
sweetly  
and laughing charmingly. This terrifies  
the heart in my breast; for when I look  
briefly at you, no longer  
can I speak.

My tongue breaks in silence. At once,  
a delicate fire runs under my skin.  
With my eyes, I see nothing.  
My ears hum.

A cold sweat covers me. A tremor overtakes  
my whole body. I am greener than grass.  
I seem to myself just short  
of dying.

But everything can be endured, since even…
Catullus 51
C. 60 B.C.E

Ille mi par esse deo uidetur, 
ille, si fas est, superare diuos, 
qui sedens aduersus identidem te 
spectat et audit

dulce ridentem, misero quod omnis 
eripit sensus mihi: nam simul te, 
Lesbia, aspexi, nihil est super mi 
<uocis in ore;>

lingua sed torpet, tenuis sub artus 
flamma demanat, sonitu suopte 
tintinant aures, gemina teguntur 
lumina nocte.

otium, Catulle, tibi molestum est: 
otio exsultas nimiumque gestis: 
otium et reges prius et beatas 
perdidit urbes.
That man seems to me equal to a god. He even, if it is safe to say, surpasses the gods, he who constantly watches and listens, sitting across from you while you laugh sweetly. This steals every sensation from me, wretched. For, when I see you, Lesbia, nothing of my voice remains in my mouth, but my tongue goes numb. A small flame flows down under my limbs. My ears ring with your sound. Twin lights are covered by the night.

Free time is harmful to you, Catullus. You rejoice and exalt excessively in free time: Free time has previously destroyed both kings and fortunate cities.
Je suis un demi-dieu quand assis vis-à-vis
De toy mon cher souci j’escoute les devis,
Devis entre-rompus d’un gracieux sou-rire,
Sou-ris qui me retienne le cœur emprisonné:
En contemplant tes yeux je me pasme estonné,
Et de mes pauvres flancs un seul vent je ne tire.

Ma langue s’engourdis, un petit feu me court
Fretillant sous la peau: je suis muet et sourd,
Un voile sommeillant dessus mes yeux demeure:
Mon sang devient glacé, le courage me faut,
Mon esprit s’évapore, et alors peu s’en faut,
Que sans ame à tes pieds estendu je ne meure.

I am a demigod, when seated face-to-face
with you, my dear care. I listen to your sayings,
sayings interrupted by a graceful laugh.
You laugh at me, you who keep my heart imprisoned.
In contemplating your eyes, I am struck astonished,
and from my poor sides, I draw not a single breath.

My tongue swells. A small fire runs
squirming under my skin; I am deaf and dumb.
A veil sleeps, remaining over my eyes.
My blood becomes ice; I lack courage.
My spirit evaporates. And so, it is not far off
that without a soul, stretched at your feet, I die.
These written words sit motionless, side by side in stillness and silence. They neither speak nor hold any secrets. But standing in sequence, they invite the eyes to begin moving across the page. They welcome the mind into conversation. Written words, although static, are a means by which ideas move across time and space and from writer to reader. They are part of an ever-unfolding process and writers have been writing about their craft for millennia. Somewhat cryptically, Plato delineates criteria for philosophical writing as he distinguishes it from other forms of rhetoric. Relying upon insights from process philosophy, I seek to defend an account of Plato’s view through a new lens.

Near the end of Plato’s Phaedrus and within the discourse on rhetoric, Socrates and Phaedrus discuss and analyze the nature of writing. Socrates tells a fabricated story in which a king is presented with the new invention of writing. After hearing about the benefits of writing, the king makes a compelling case that writing would weaken memory by creating a dependence on written words. The power of writing becomes the turning point for the discussion as Socrates renders most forms of rhetoric useless once they’ve been written. Despite his harsh criticism of rhetoric and rigorous analysis of writing, Socrates believes in a form of good writing. Socrates contends that a writer must first know the truth about the subject of writing and secondly must understand the nature of the soul in order to artfully write a speech, but writing will, at best, only serve as a reminder to those who already know what content it conveys. *Via negativa*, Socrates arrives at a final type of writing that offers substance in an ironically non-substantive way. Speaking of the author of such a work, Socrates claims that, “If any one of you has composed these things with a knowledge of the truth, if you can defend your writing when you are challenged, and if you yourself make the argument that your writing is of little worth, then you must be called by a name not derived by these writings, but rather by those things which you are seriously pursuing.” Socrates names authors with such a love of wisdom, “philosophers.”
Philosophical writing is presented and defended on unusual terms. While the writing itself must be of little worth, philosophical writing gains its strength through the defense that its author (or another advocate) offers. As Plato presents it, philosophical writing in itself is little more than a meaningless artifact. It is only when the written words are invoked by a philosopher that the words have meaning. This is the point of departure from which I seek to interpret Plato’s account of philosophical writing as an example of process philosophy.

In a nutshell, process philosophy includes a variety of philosophical perspectives that focus on the primacy of activity instead of identifying a permanent and unchanging aspect of objects. Cast in this light, Plato’s notion of philosophical writing is less production of eternal written artifacts and more participation in ongoing processes which are honest attempts to explain and understand truth. The lens of process philosophy provides more than a new interpretation of Plato’s conception of philosophical writing; the perspective of process philosophy offers a novel and compelling defense for Plato.

After situating Plato’s consideration of writing within his broader discourse on rhetoric, I will provide a detailed account of his take on philosophical writing from the perspective of process philosophy. Once I have made process philosophy and its link with Plato clearer, I will describe how my process philosophy account interacts with some existing interpretations before I consider several objections. Following this systematic application of process philosophy to Plato’s account of philosophical writing, I will position my account within broader contexts that can also be understood processually. Plato’s notion, I will argue, accords with Foucault’s concept of author function, which can be understood processually as well. To the extent that my processual account of Plato’s notion of writing is successful, I offer it as an innovative defense for Plato’s criteria for philosophical writing.

**Writing as Rhetoric; Philosophical Writing as Good Rhetoric**

John Fischer examines some features of the *Phaedrus* that illuminate the nature of philosophical activity. While the distinction between rhetoric and philosophy is a well-researched topic in Plato’s work, Fischer notes that “in spite of this denigration of rhetoric…there is a good rhetoric:
that which has *good* for its object and which is technically without flaw.”

Remembering that writing is a form of rhetoric, writing that fundamentally aims for the truth can be called ‘good rhetoric’. Because of its propensity for misuse, rhetoric must be entrusted only to those that can recognize its power and be trusted to use it appropriately. Unsurprisingly, Plato thinks the philosophers are uniquely suited for this task.

The problem with the stipulation that truth be engrained in rhetoric is that “somehow the written word never gets through to the soul in any way adequate for knowledge or truth.”

This is the key concern that Socrates has with writing in the *Phaedrus*, but he also sheds light on a possibility for written words to partake in knowledge and truth, namely through the interpretive defense of a philosopher. In the section that follows, Fischer describes an account of the symbol of wings and winged words in philosophy. Good rhetoric must be coupled with *eros*, or love, for it is rhetoric without *eros* that poses a threat. Fischer tells us that “although written words have no wings, the words of philosophy, the ultimate activity of the completely erotic man, do. The true lover is the philosopher, that *daimonic* man whose understanding of the important things precludes the possibility that a speech or a book could communicate his knowledge to another.”

The wisdom possessed by a philosopher is so profound that it cannot be adequately captured on any particular rhetorical occasion. However, in their pursuit and love of wisdom, philosophers still attempt to explain themselves. Once written, their words initiate the process of transferring ideas, but the words of a philosopher always beg to be explained further.

Rhetoric can be motivated by the good or aim for it in more ways than one. Fischer’s conception of good rhetoric derives its goodness from the motivation it has in describing the Form of the Good. Because of the shortcomings of writing described by Plato, philosophical rhetoric, which includes writing but also relies on spoken discourse, is best suited to describe knowledge of the truth and hence is the best candidate for good rhetoric. On this view, good rhetoric takes describing the Form of the Good as its *telos* while simultaneously being motivating by that goal. Goodness is both the objective of proper rhetoric and the means by which it is obtained. This describes how good is produced and what it seeks to explain, but a fuller account would also justify it in terms of why it is important for humans specifically. In *Gorgias*, Plato suggests a prudential
value of good rhetoric for humans.

When we refer to good rhetoric, we might mean that it seeks to explain the Form of Good, but we may also mean that it seeks to promote goodness or wellbeing as its purpose. In the first sense, good is essentially epistemic and in the second sense it is primarily prudential. In *Gorgias*, Plato offers a general criticism of rhetoric. In part, he argues that rhetoric is dangerous because it does not usually take the wellbeing of its audience into account in the way the arts do. To illustrate this point he draws several analogies, “what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and what pastry baking is to medicine, oratory is to justice.” Cosmetics and gymnastics both seek to make the subject more beautiful but cosmetics offer a superficial cover-up whereas gymnastics actually transforms the body of the athlete. Similarly, eating delicious pastries and taking medicine make one feel good but whereas medicine restores one’s health, eating pastries may actually make one unhealthy. Sophistry and oratory are likened to cosmetics and pastry baking in the sense that they yearn for admirable goals but in achieving them they neglect to account for the wellbeing of their subjects. By criticizing these forms of rhetoric for failing to take the wellbeing of their subjects into consideration, it can be inferred that Plato believes that if any form of good rhetoric is possible, it must take the welfare of its readers or audience members into account.

When properly aimed and guided by philosophy, Plato grants the possibility of good rhetoric. Guided by knowledge of the truth, good rhetoric promotes goodness in thinking while also taking concern for the wellbeing of its audience. Placing these parameters around good rhetoric ensures that philosophy seeks to account for the truth without causing harm. In its endless pursuit of wisdom, philosophy is unique because its subject matter cuts across all disciplines. A complete exposition of the philosopher’s apprehension of wisdom, in Plato’s terms, is impossible because the greatness of the Form of the Good far exceeds the limitations of any written rhetoric. Any claim to such completeness would either diminish the scope of philosophy to the point of irrelevance or be an act of hubris tantamount to writing doctrine or dogma. Between these extremes lies the space for philosophical writing, which I argue is best understood as a process.
THE PERPETUAL DIALOGUE: PHILOSOPHICAL WRITING AS PROCESS
PHILOSOPHY

Most Platonic texts, including the *Phaedrus*, take the form of a
dialogue. Philosophy presents itself as rhetoric predicated on exchange
of ideas in conversation. Even the solitary philosopher must assume
some state of hypothetical dialectic as Fischer notes, “it would seem quite
consistent with Plato’s view that philosophy, in spite of its essentially social
nature, could be done in isolation; but this would demand a dialogue-
with-one’s-self.” The conception of philosophy as dialogue has greater
ramifications than explaining the manner in which Plato constructs his
writing; it suggests that philosophy is essentially a dialectical process, unlike
other forms of rhetoric. Even an individual engaging in philosophy in
isolation must still be able to assume a vantage point of another person in
order to have any semblance of affirmation or external comprehensibility
of the philosophical ideas in play.

Composing philosophical ideas, or engaging in philosophical
rhetoric, includes two important components that are described succinctly
by Christopher Rowe in *Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing*. As in
other forms of rhetoric, Plato “composed with one eye on his perspective
readers,” so as to explain the ideas in a way that is appropriate and
compelling to the anticipated audience. Beyond composing in order to
persuade, philosophical rhetoric is designed to make readers think and
this differentiates it from other kinds of rhetoric. The difference here is
crucial: to be persuaded is a passive acceptance whereas understanding a
philosophical idea through thinking is fundamentally an active event in
which the reader participates as fully as the writer.

Returning to the *Phaedrus*, Socrates identifies an important
shortcoming of most written discourse in that “when it has once
been written down, every discourse roams about everywhere, reaching
indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have
no business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to
whom it should not.” In this sense, writing itself, does not know to whom
it should speak. Rather it depends on its author (or another advocate) as
“when it’s faulted, it always needs its father’s support; alone, it can neither
defend itself nor come to its own support.” The fact that objects of
writing need this support is critical to the notion of philosophical writing
because if philosophical writing must make a reader think, then it attempts to be self-supporting.

Nonetheless, Socrates seems to rebuke this notion near the end of the dialogue as he refers to a philosopher as one who has “composed these things with knowledge of the truth and can defend the writing when challenged and can make the argument that the writing is of little worth.” Plato leaves us with no choice but to think that there is a necessary dependence between the philosopher as author and the written philosophical rhetoric s/he creates. Beyond merely generating written texts, a philosopher must always be able to defend them while at the same time conceding that the texts essentially lack the capacity for self-defense. Stemming from this interplay between philosophical writer and reader, mediated by the written text, I suggest the vantage point of process philosophy as a new perspective for understanding Plato’s account of philosophical writing.

Process philosophy generally describes philosophical perspectives which emphasize the primacy of activity and its associated factors. Concepts such as time, change, creativity, innovation, relation, space, situation and social context are often components of analysis in process philosophy. If there is anything constant about processes, it seems to center on its situation in time, as Nicholas Rescher explains that “it is the very essence of an ongoing process that it combines existence in the present with tentacles reaching into the past and the future.” Philosophical exposition, in the dialectical paradigm, situates itself similarly. Philosophical writing makes its point by referencing others who have written or spoken on the subject before and positing a claim that remains open to future discourse. Accepting Plato’s definitions for good and bad writing, I will develop an account that justifies the distinction he makes using the perspective of process philosophy.

Making any further advancement in this argument would, however, be imprudent without first explaining the interplay between process philosophy and Plato’s broader philosophical framework. Plato holds credit for numerous philosophical concepts as well as his methodological approach of *elenchus*, but he is most well-known for his theory of The Forms. In postulating the eternality and universality of The Forms and devising the divided line between the realms of Being and Becoming, Plato holds a permanent-substance view of metaphysics. Such a view might
seem at odds with the notion of process philosophy as I’ve described it, but process philosophers have been careful to point out that focusing analysis on processes does not preclude the possibility of substance.

Process philosophers regularly look to Plato as a starting point in investigation, as Alfred North Whitehead mentions in *Process and Reality*, the seminal text on process philosophy: “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists in a series of footnotes to Plato.”15 In the following lines, Whitehead contends that the “train of thought” in his lectures is Platonic and, further, he believes that Plato’s view gives us the framework for a “philosophy of organism.”16 While many works in process philosophy make reference to Plato and a few have focused on Platonic themes, there seems to be no process account of Plato’s *Phaedrus* or of his description of rhetoric and philosophical writing. This project seeks to provide that perspective.

**Plato’s Paradox of Writing**

Much scholarship surrounding writing in Plato’s *Phaedrus* centers on what some claim is a paradox. Plato asserts that the medium of writing is an insufficient means for communicating truth while concurrently using writing as his medium of communication. Either the reader takes Plato’s assertion seriously and must then question the viability of the dialogue as a means for successfully communicating truth or the reader assumes that the dialogue is capable of communicating truth, thus rendering Socrates’ proposition false. As both possible options are problematic, it seems we must either conclude Plato was seriously confused and incoherent on this issue or that his writing holds a deeper meaning. Given these options, I prefer the latter; after all it seems highly unlikely that Plato would have committed such a novice mistake.

Several scholars have made attempts to reconcile Plato’s paradox of writing. Lucas A. Swaine does not think the paradox is as problematic as it seems. He contends that the purpose of Plato’s paradox is to draw our attention to an obvious but often overlooked truth, namely, that “writing helps to stave off the very problems that it can otherwise cause.”17 Manipulative rhetoric and unwarranted knowledge claims are widespread problems propagated through poor writing. Plato’s paradox, Swain holds, is designed to draw attention to this problem in a unique way. Whereas
faulty writing makes claims it cannot support, Plato’s philosophical writing starts with the assertion that it does not adequately convey the truth. In both cases, writing fails to achieve what it claims it will do; bad writing says it holds the truth (and apparently does not) while good writing makes no claim to truth (but seems to get things right). To clarify this point, a more precise conception of good and bad writing may prove helpful.

Shifting discussion from the artfulness or artlessness in spoken rhetoric, Socrates and Phaedrus begin discussing the features that make writing either “good or inept.” An alternate translation of the dialogue calls this the “propriety and impropriety of writing.” To explain the inadequacies of writing as it relates to the people who use it, Plato devises a fictitious Egyptian myth. While Thueth claims writing will make people wiser by improving their memories, King Thamus responds by pointing out three weaknesses of writing. Thamus contends writing “will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it” because they will become dependent on written words to remember things so the source of their memory is no longer in their own minds. Writing will also enable students to “hear many things without being properly taught, and they will imagine that they have come to know much while for the most part they will know nothing.” Finally, the false sense of knowledge imparted by writing will make people “difficult to get along with since they will merely appear to be wise instead of really being so.” To summarize the problems writing may cause proposed in the mythical Egyptian story, Socrates claims that writing will increase forgetfulness and enable people to have the false belief that they have knowledge, which will result in greater difficulties in finding social harmony as people will be more apt to falsely think they are wise. While these concerns are important in themselves, they all center on the challenges bad writing poses for readers and society. In the following section, Socrates explains that there are also inherent problems in bad writing itself.

Comparing writing to a painting, Socrates notes that they both “stand there as if they were alive, but if anyone asks them anything, they remain silent.” Although readers and viewers may have different interpretations of the pieces, once completed, writings and paintings simply say the same thing forever. Unlike the concerns mentioned in the Egyptian myth, the problems of writing raised in the comparison with painting are internal to the structure and nature of writing itself. Two such concerns
are that writings appear to be stagnant objects that do not know the proper audience and that cannot defend themselves against criticism. Plato’s criterion that philosophical writing be defensible addresses this challenge. Furthermore defensibility is a property which requires the ongoing capacity for activity.

**Process Philosophy and the Standard Interpretation of Plato**

Plato’s general metaphysical conception of the cosmos, especially his notion of Forms, clearly establishes him as a substantialist. It would not be an overstatement to say that Plato is indeed the progenitor of substance metaphysics in the Western philosophical tradition. Despite this, Reck credits Plato with penning the phrase that is the “hallmark of process philosophy.” Near the end of *Cratylus*, Socrates invokes the image that “all things flow;” however, he does so by claiming that, “if there are such things as the beautiful, the good and each one of the things that are, it doesn’t appear to me that these things can be at all like flowings or motions.” Thus while Plato was aware of process metaphysics as way of explaining the cosmos, he clearly denies its plausibility here. Stability and permanence are defining characteristics of the objects of knowledge in Plato’s Divided Line, but writing can be both stable and fluid. Words written on a page never change but defenses and interpretations do. Several scholars deviate from orthodox interpretations of Plato’s metaphysics and argue that his philosophy is not at odds with process philosophy in the way that it is usually thought.

One avenue process philosophers have taken shifts the focus from what Plato says to how he says it. The dialogical format of his writings carries the conversational nature of Socrates’ philosophical practice into a written space that is usually dominated by essays and treatises. Whereas a philosophical essay or thesis is a unilateral flowing of information from author to reader, Plato’s dialogue involves an interchange of speakers that situates the reader more as a potential participant and less as a passive bystander. Travis Foster alludes to a “heuristic dimension” in Plato’s writings in which the literal content of discussion is intended to convey a different concept. Rather than looking to the dialogues for literal truth, Foster thinks they “serve as an example of how philosophy should proceed, namely, as interplay of question and answer by a community.
of inquisitors.” The most important implication of approaching the dialogues in this way is that “they are not primarily the vehicles of a Platonic ‘doctrine.’” Understood as tools for education instead of literal explanations of the universe, Plato’s dialogues take on processual characteristics.

Fundamentally, teaching and learning are both processes. While knowledge acquisition may occur in a split second, learning generally occurs as a gradual process over a sustained period of time. Insofar as Plato’s dialogues are intended to be pedagogical tools that initiate thought in the reader, they function as part of and in order to facilitate a process. When Plato’s written dialogues serve as tools for teaching, the key objective of the readings is usually to understand and explain Plato’s message. To clarify this distinction, Foster identifies two forms of logos in Plato’s work.

The first and more basic form of logos is what Foster calls “trivial logos.” Trivial logos is a sort of singular and absolute account; it is one interpretation of a key concept or passage in the dialogues that may or may not be consistent with the rest of Plato’s corpus. Trivial logos is essentially a description that seeks to be a “single univocal account,” but such an account misses something crucial. Things (including ideas) change over time especially as they relate to different audiences in different contexts. To account for “how a thing changes and grows over time under the constant application and interpretation of it in new contexts, the purified logos must be enacted.” Purified logos differs from trivial logos in the key sense that it is “enacted” rather than “realized.” It is a more epistemically humble account of things as “the process of purifying the logos is ongoing and without end.” Purified logos is a sort of truth claim that manages to both avoid unwarranted conceptual accounts while not holding that meaning might be “endlessly deferred.” In short, purified logos allows meaning to have an “organic dimension that permits growth.”

Not to be distracted from the focus of the present task, Foster’s notion of purified logos is highly relevant to Plato’s notion of philosophical writing in the Phaedrus. Recall that Plato’s three conditions for philosophical writing are 1.) that the words composed are done so “with a knowledge of the truth,” 2.) that the author can defend the writing when it is challenged, and 3.) that the author can “make the argument that the writing is of little worth.” I will now explain how each condition can be interpreted through the lens of process philosophy, particularly through Foster’s notion of
purified logos.

It might seem obvious to mention that philosophical writing must be done with knowledge of the truth, but in light of process philosophy this stipulation carries a heavy charge. On most epistemic views, truth is stable through time. Even though process philosophy accommodates the capacity for growth over time, it does not necessarily deny the stability of truth. Because writing transcends both time and space, philosophical writing must be aware of the organic, yet stable nature of truth. In various contexts and at different times, philosophical writing must be able to convey the same truth even if it means communicating the same truth by different means. The openness in interpreting philosophical writing is both its greatest strength and most problematic weakness as the author seeks to convey a truth in a concrete way that can adapt to different contexts.

One component to the adaptable nature of philosophical writing is that it must be defendable when challenged. Many academic writers anticipate objections to their arguments and incorporate these along with their responses into their writing. While this maneuver is rhetorically beneficial because it is a preemptive acknowledgement of the reader’s intelligence, philosophical writing must always permit itself to be subjected to further criticism. This open-endedness is paradigmatic of process philosophy. When writing closes itself to the possibility of objection it seeks to establish itself as unquestionable. Written philosophy is not so narrow sighted; even the best arguments open themselves to criticism and participate in the dialectical process both as response to prior arguments and as starting grounds for future ones.

Plato’s final condition for philosophical writing is the most unusual of the three. That authors must be able to argue that their philosophical writing is of little worth seems queer, but philosophical writing is unlike any other. This stipulation is likely the genesis of the paradox of writing in the Phaedrus. Plato argues that the best writing is of little worth but uses writing to make this point. To situate this requirement in the purview of process philosophy one can look to either of two places. First, the requirement might be understood in light of the concerns about writing that Socrates raises in his Egyptian myth. Namely, writing is simply a tool that is used to remind the reader of what s/he already knows. In this sense, philosophical writing is employed as a mnemonic device to help readers in the process of remembering what the soul already knows—while it is
helpful, philosophical writing is here rendered unnecessary. Secondly, this requirement may be Plato’s way of stating that philosophical writings are a singular iteration of a philosopher’s thought. Taken out of context, the writing might be misunderstood or some readers may think that it fails to mention important ideas of which the philosopher is actually aware. In either case, the approach of process philosophy helps to explain Plato’s requirement that philosophers must be able to argue their writing is really of little worth.

Bearing in mind the requirements of philosophical writing outlined above, it seems appropriate to consider the potential results that such writing may induce. Successfully transmitting some knowledge of truth is the goal of philosophical writing. However, Foster’s notions of trivial and purified logos account for the difficult complexities usually involved in such communication. Practically speaking, philosophical discourse, especially in Plato’s dialogues, induces a sense of perplexity or aporia. Although states of aporia lack the sense of certainty associated with complete and absolute answers, this is not to say that such states are without meaning. While the questions addressed in Plato’s Theaetetus and Meno do not offer explicit accounts of knowledge and virtue, they still help us to better understand what we believe when we speak about those subjects. By critically examining various accounts of knowledge and virtue, Socrates/Plato does not tell us what these things are. By interrogating the prevailing definitions used to describe these concepts, the reader gains a better sense of the various common meanings of the idea while accepting none of them, thus being left in a perplexed state. It is possible for one to ascribe meaning and yet still be perplexed about something. When description is sought via negativa, perplexity itself becomes the manner for arriving at meaning.

**CONSIDERING OBJECTIONS TO PROCESS PHILOSOPHY APPLIED TO PHILOSOPHICAL WRITING**

Some may have concerns about the approach that I have used to understand Plato’s stance on philosophical writing. At one level, readers may deny the reasonableness of process philosophy as I have used it to interpret Plato. On a larger scale, readers may object to the systematic assumptions inherent in the paradigm of process philosophy. Before proceeding to the final facet of this analysis, I will acknowledge these
The most direct objection to the project of process philosophy comes from Peter F. Strawson who articulates an argument for the necessity of “basic particulars” within a spatio-temporal framework in order to account for the possibility of knowing any identifiable concrete entities. While Strawson’s argument is convincing, it leaves room for the possibility of the epistemic account that it seeks to discredit—process. Like basic particulars, processes can be located in space and time and they can have distinct parameters. The description, “Julius Caesar died on 15 March 44 B.C.E in Rome,” is in the form of a basic spatio-temporal particular description. What Strawson fails to recognize is that the same information can be described as a less particular process: “following an impressive career as a military and political leader, Julius Caesar was assassinated on the ides of March creating a power vacuum that eventually resulted in the fall of the Roman Empire.” Both descriptions describe the same event; however, Strawson’s objection seeks to deny that the knowledge claim made in the second is identical with the first. While a process philosophy account of Caesar may look more like the second description, it would certainly grant the veracity of the first spatio-temporal particular description. Process philosophy, being more adaptable and holistic than some of its alternatives is not in any grave danger from Strawson’s objection, but there is another concern that process philosophers must address.

If the primary focus of process philosophy is the dynamic nature of being and the analysis of processes is seen as more important than understanding substance, then it stands to reason that individual processes can be described in many ways. From a phenomenological standpoint, the same event may be described through a series of processes that may not seem to be consistent with one another. Consider a labor strike; from the workers’ perspective, the strike is an act of resisting exploitative business practices and reclaiming personal integrity, but from the business owner’s perspective, the strike is an unwarranted halt in business production that results in the loss of potential earnings. Both descriptions describe the same process and both are factually correct, but there seems to be underlying tension in granting legitimacy to both perspectives simultaneously. The developing objection pictures process philosophy as a form of relativism; however, this objection can be overcome with a more nuanced understanding of the components of descriptions.
Some descriptions of processes lend themselves well to normative analysis but these normative components must be discussed separately from the fundamental epistemic claims made by the descriptions. Conflicting normative accounts of the same process do not imply that the accounts conflict epistemically as well. Further, it is crucial to understand that epistemic claims made by descriptions of processes do not make absolute knowledge claims. Process philosophy grants the possibility of multiple conditional accounts of knowledge but does not give each account absolute truth status. Ascribing this form of conditionalized and contextualized claims to knowledge, process philosophy avoids becoming either relativistic or skeptical.

Applied to Plato’s conception of philosophical writing, process philosophy could be challenged in at least two ways. First, one might argue that the methodological suppositions of process philosophy are fundamentally at odds with Plato’s general metaphysical and epistemic assumptions. Even if this is the case, a charitable reading of Plato’s conception of philosophical writing stands to benefit from a processual account and even if process philosophy may not cohere with Plato’s general philosophical viewpoint, there is no reason to think that Plato’s substance-centered philosophy cannot be explained by process philosophy. Secondly, one might object that my process interpretation of Plato’s second criterion prohibits philosophical writing from making absolute truth claims. While the process interpretation would generally avoid such claims, it would not prohibit them. Rather, the process approach would stipulate that any absolute truth claims must be written in such a way that they could always be defensible. In other words, they are always subject to criticism.

Having now discussed Plato’s conditions for philosophical writing in light of process philosophy, my final move shifts focus to two notions closely related to the one at hand. If philosophical writing is a process, it must be facilitated by an author and insofar as this foray might seem to depart from the focus at hand, it better situates the scope of this process analysis of Plato’s account of philosophical writing.

**Plato/Socrates as Exemplar of Author Function and Philosophical Writing**

As an author, Plato distances himself from his written work in a few
ways. First, Plato frequently speaks through the mouthpiece of another, usually Socrates but sometimes the stranger from Elea. When referencing the dialogues, one could just as reasonably say “Plato writes x” or “Socrates says x.” Both statements convey the same truth but their corollaries display the manner in which Plato’s writing constitutes philosophical writing. One way to interpret “Plato writes x” is to assume that Plato simply made a written record of a conversation he heard but this does not necessarily imply that Plato believes x. To say that “Socrates says x” could likewise be understood to mean that Socrates believes x but that does not necessarily imply that Plato believes x. In either case, the specifics of Plato’s beliefs cannot be inferred from his writing about the words and beliefs of others.

The distance Plato creates between himself and his writing exemplifies the conditions for philosophical writing he establishes in the Phaedrus. First, philosophical writing must be composed “with knowledge of the truth,” and it does not seem to be an overstatement to hold that Plato’s dialogues meet this first criterion with ease. Though their systematic inquiry into concepts such as virtue, knowledge, love, etc. fall short of proclaiming knowledge, they identify pitfalls in commonly held beliefs about those concepts. The second criterion is that the author must be able to defend the writing when challenged. Surely Plato could have defended his writing (we can also do so on his behalf); but if questioned, Plato could defend what he wrote without ever being cornered into identifying his own beliefs. This point leads to the third criterion that the author can “make the argument that the writing is of little worth.” If his writings ever came under scrutiny, Plato could have easily rejected the views within them as his own and discounted the dialogues as mere reports of conversations he overheard.

Given that Plato saw his mentor, Socrates, sentenced to death for holding controversial beliefs, the personal and pragmatic reasons for Plato upholding the criteria for philosophical writing are obvious. But beyond the desire to avoid meeting a fate similar to Socrates, Plato likely upheld the criteria for additional theoretical reasons. Plato speaks not just through Socrates, but through Socrates in dialogue with others and with the reader. Based on his unrelenting criticism of rhetoric and other technical forms of writing (political speeches and laws), it is reasonable to imply that Plato conceived of his writings differently. Whereas rhetoric seeks to persuade readers to accept certain beliefs, using whatever means are necessary, the
philosophical writing of Plato’s dialogues is aimed at spurning thought and systematically opening new discourses. In the foregoing analysis, I have centered on the implications that Plato’s criteria for philosophical writing have for written texts. However these conditions also bear on what it means to be an author, or rather what it is to possess a proper author-function.

Literary critics have much to say on the topic of authorship and the task of writing; nonetheless, cross-disciplinary discourse between philosophy and literary criticism could be much improved. While maintaining a philosophical orientation, I recognize that this analysis stands to benefit from the insight offered by literary critics, but the scope of my project prohibits a comprehensive consideration of all the relevant voices. Rather than excluding them all, I’ll consider one that is particularly relevant to Plato’s conception of philosophical writing as understood through process philosophy.

The notion of author function, developed by Michel Foucault in “What is an Author?,” explains the function of an author as creating the possibility for new modes of discourse. Being a necessary condition for the existence of philosophical texts, “the author function is therefore characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society.” Plato does not claim to have answers to the questions he raises, but in raising such important questions he created a space for the systematized discourses of metaphysics, epistemology and axiology that did not exist before. As I understand it, this is what Whitehead refers to when he characterizes the European philosophical tradition as “series of footnotes to Plato.” In this sense, Foucault’s author function explains the space Plato’s writing creates, yet it also elucidates the critical nature of processes in the discourses that Plato’s writing makes possible.

New modes of discourse are greater than just new topics of discussion. Using Freud and Marx as paradigm cases of founders of discursivity, Foucault explains that “they made possible not only a certain number of analogies but also (and equally important) a certain number of differences…they made possible a certain number of divergences.” Without the founders of discursivity (who instantiate the author function), some distinctions would be impossible. In the same way that we could not discuss the ability or inability to be aware of the subconscious before
Freud, equally so was the debate over the possibility of intermediates in the realms of Becoming and Being impossible before Plato. The author function does more than create a unified realm for discussion; it establishes a space for difference and divergence that was previously unacknowledged. Accommodating discursive spaces that permit furthering dialectics accords with the dynamic nature of process philosophy, but authors don’t operate in empty space.

The author function is always linked to social and institutional systems that determine, in part, what is capable of being articulated. Foucault notes, “texts, books, and discourses really began to have authors (other than mythical…) to the extent that the authors became subject to punishment, that is to the extent that discourses could be transgressive.”

Writing always arises within ongoing processes in society and Foucault contends that the purpose of identifying an author is not so credit can be bestowed for great works but rather that blame and punishment can be properly ascribed to those whose writings break boundaries. Again, Plato’s bearing witness to Socrates’ punishment instilled in him an awareness of this component of the author function. For this reason, Plato distances himself far enough from his writing so as to avoid too close of an association with its content while still deploying the content in the format of a written discourse. In embodying aspects of the author function, Plato had an impeccable understanding of social limits.

In light of the examples of Marx, Freud and Plato, one might think that the author function is always attributable to a specific author but Foucault denies this. Near the end of his lecture, Foucault points out that “the author does not precede his works; he is a certain functional principle;” in fact he does not even assert that the author function is permanent, “as our society changes, at the very moment when it is in the process of changing, the author function will disappear.” Foucault is not regarded as a process philosopher but his final modifications to his analysis make it much more palpable to those who favor the process view. Without the possibility of the disappearance of the author function, there would seem to always be the authority of the author and this would be a concern to process philosophers. The eventual disappearance of the author function also sits well with Plato’s view that although the author must be able to defend her writing, s/he must be able to make the argument that the writing itself is of little worth.
CONCLUSION

Writing in any form is a process itself, but the genre of philosophical writing also manifests as a component within the greater process of philosophy—a process within a process. Among the many important distinctions Plato makes, the criteria he establishes for philosophical writing continue to shape the form of philosophical writing. If we think of philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom and conceive of coming to know wisdom as a process then philosophy itself is best explained as a process. Philosophy is not something one becomes good at; rather one becomes a good participant in the exercise of philosophy as way of life.

Plato’s criticism of writing is historically situated in an era when political speechwriters, professional sophists and literary masters were the primary contenders in using words to articulate truth. In drawing attention to general concerns about writing that strike most people as intuitive, Plato creates a perfect setting in which to describe the standards for philosophical writing—a form of good rhetoric.

Situated within discussions on the author function and rhetoric, I have argued for the plausibility of Plato’s conception of philosophical writing in the Phaedrus. Neither seeking to establish an ultimate account of Plato’s consideration of philosophical writing, nor aiming to rebut any of the standing interpretations, my inquiry should be understood as a proposed defense of Plato’s account through the perspective of process philosophy. If my writing has been successful, then it should lend itself to being easily adjudicated on the terms it sought to explain. I do not see it fit to make any claim as to whether or not my writing was done with knowledge of the truth; but if challenged, I would happily defend what I have written to the point that I must argue that it is of little worth.

Notes

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4 Ibid., 164.
5 Ibid., 168.
7 Fischer, “Plato on Writing and Doing Philosophy,” 171.
8 Christopher Rowe, *Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing*, (New York: Cambridge UP, 2007).
9 Plato, *Phaedrus*, 275e.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 278d.

14 The Theory of Forms is referenced in Plato’s *Phaedo, Republic* and *Phaedrus*. The divided line comes from *Republic, Book VI*.
16 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 275b.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 275d.
27 Ibid., 39.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 45.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid. 46.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
36 The most common exception to this view is epistemic relativism which I will only mention in passing. A relativist rejects the idea that truth remains constant over time. Instead, s/he would argue that truth is relative to the context and that it is even possible for two contradictory facts to be true at the same time. Arguments against this view are numerous and I will not recount them here. The key understanding for the matter at hand is that the process view of truth is not the same as relativism. While the relativist does not think truth is stable across time, the process philosopher simultaneously holds that truth appears organically while also remaining stable. The challenge of normative relativism is addressed later in this paper.
38 Plato, Phaedrus, Trans. Nehamas and Woodruff, 278d.
39 Ibid.
41 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 39.
42 Foucault, “What is an Author.”
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. (italicized emphasis added).

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Aristotle’s *Physics* I.6 presents a number of challenges in how it is situated philosophically amidst the rest of the first book. The chief of these is deciding how Aristotle’s principles, presumably those things which account for change in nature, are said to be “opposites,” as well as how many principles there are, and what the nature of these principles are.

In this paper, in addition to engaging an interpretation the aforementioned difficulties presented in *Physics* I.6, I wish to propose the following innovative complex of claims: 1) Aristotle, from the previous chapter, is presuming the principles work oppositionally throughout the chapter 2) Aristotle says and assumes that there has to be one genus for every contrariety, a realization that necessitates the inclusion of a substrate because of the aforementioned oppositional principles (3) The final puzzle concerning whether there are two or three principles revolves around whether the principles are (a) active and passive or (b) a contrary, another contrary, and a substrate. Before discussing the complexities involved with these issues however, I would first like to introduce *Physics* I.6, as well as briefly preface my analysis with some pertinent takeaways from I.5.

As *Physics* I.6 begins Aristotle has finished introducing the concept of opposites in the preceding chapter. Chapter five, whatever else it may be about, primarily wrestles with the relationship between opposites and principles. As an entry point into solving the role of chapter six within the first book of the Physics, however, the philosophical function of five is puzzling. A common difficulty between the two chapters involves what way we are to understand Aristotle’s proposed relationship between opposites and principles.

I propose that chapter six presupposes the conclusions of chapter five, namely that the principles are opposites, and works within the confines of this commitment. Chapter five concludes with the idea that the principles are opposites at a very high level of abstraction. Thus the commitment to “opposites” should be construed broadly, neither going so far as to identify which particular opposites are the principles, nor even setting out the requirements of any candidate set of *specific* opposites. We
can conclude, then, that the commitment goes only so far as to require the presence of contraries, without informing us of any identifying details of their kind or qualities. More importantly and additionally, as far as unraveling some of the difficulty involved in chapter six is involved, this understanding of the opposites as principles does not require a stance as to the number of contraries. Aristotle’s insistence on postulating the principles as existing “oppositionally” in chapter five will mean that there is much more work to be done, for he must additionally set out the limitations, possibilities and necessities entailed once the principles are granted to be oppositional.

Before passing through a discussion of chapter six, I would first like to briefly go over the language Aristotle uses in chapter five in order to lay the framework for my interpretation of that chapter.

The first line of chapter five states, “Everyone makes the opposites principles...”, while a few lines later, after drafting Parmenides and Democritus as examples of everyone, he affirms that, “It is obvious that everyone makes the opposites the principles in some way.” Given the prerequisites of principles which opposites are uniquely suited to fulfill and which are introduced next, it seems natural to take Aristotle’s meaning of “opposites” as “the concept of opposites,” rather than as any particular set of opposites. There are two additional declarations in this chapter which Aristotle makes about the relationship between the opposites and principles. At 188b Aristotle says, “For they all say that the elements and those things which they call the principles (as though compelled by truth) are the opposites.” The chapter ends in a similar manner as it began, with Aristotle again insisting on an association between opposites and principles. There are two key differences, however. Whereas it was initially said that the opposites are principles, now it is affirmed that the principles are opposed. Moreover, whereas it was the opinion of all in the first sentence of the chapter, in the last sentence, the affirmation is attended by the clarity of the typical Aristotelian formula, “It is therefore clear that it is necessary that the principles are opposed.” Additionally, as my translation makes clear, it should be noted that the principles are described as being opposed, not as oppositions. Although, of course, the chapter divisions are most likely post-Aristotelian, we can see that in this section of the text the complexity of the oppositional-cum-principle idea bookends and guides the discussion of the inquiry.
Having shown how the opposites as principles theme forms the architecture of chapter five, I would like to move on to chapter six, where it will continue to circumscribe the thoughts and arguments Aristotle considers.

Ἐχόμενον δ’ ἂν εἴη λέγειν πότερον δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους εἰσίν. μίαν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε, ὅτι οὐχ ἓν τὰ ἐναντία, ἀπείρους δ’, ὅτι οὐκ ἔπιστητόν τὸ ὅν ἐσται, μία τε ἐναντίωσις ἐν παντὶ γένει ἑνί, ἥ δ’ οὐσία ἐν τι γένος, καὶ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἐκ πεπερασμένων, βέλτιον δ’ ἐκ πεπερασμένων, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ἢ ἐξ ἀπείρων, πάντα γὰρ ἀποδιδόναι οἴεται ὅσα περὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ἐκ τῶν ἀπείρων. ἔτι δὲ ἔστιν ἄλλα ἄλλων πρότερα ἐναντία, καὶ γίγνεται ἕτερα ἐξ ἀλλήλων, οἷον γλυκύ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ δεῖ μένειν (189a11-20).

Next up would be to say whether there are two or three or more. For they are not able to be one, since opposites are not one, and they are not able to be unlimited, since what-is will then be unknowable. Also there is one contrariety\textsuperscript{12} in every one genus, and substance is one single kind, and since it is possible [for things to be] from a finite number, and it is a better [account] that can suffice from a finite number, like Empedocles, rather than from an unlimited number. For Empedocles thinks he can account for all the things which Anaxagoras accounts for from an unlimited number of principles. Furthermore some opposites are before other opposites, and others come from others, such as sweet and bitter or white and black, but it is necessary for principles to persist.

Aristotle picks up chapter six directly from chapter five: the principles are opposed in some way. It is important to realize this transition because it appears that Aristotle begins the inquiry anew, asking whether the principles are two or three or more. Yet a new approach would be somewhat perplexing, because we have presumably in Chapter five already narrowed down the possibilities to opposites, which are of course two. But Aristotle is working within the understanding that the principles are broadly oppositional, without advocating specifically for anything more at this
point. What this means is that, very minimally speaking, there is at least one pair of opposites, though there may be more, and the existence of this pair (or more) may or may not concomitantly necessitate other “entities.” Thus the fundamental restrictions that Aristotle first imposes on the principles are given with an eye toward their compatibility with “oppositionality.” The first option is that the principles are one. This is dispensed with because “opposites are not one.” This is one of the few clues in the chapter that all avenues in the inquiry will in some way presuppose the oppositional nature of the principles. On the other pole of possibility, the principles cannot be unlimited (even if unlimited as an even number, which opposites must be), for to admit of this possibility is to say that they are unknowable. As Aristotle has mentioned at least twice before, for something to be knowable is a precondition for scientific inquiry, most forcibly advancing this axiom in the opening lines of the treatise. But there may, additionally, be another consideration which gives this objection even more weight than it would normally have. Philoponus points out that Aristotle may be thinking that the very fact the principles are opposites i.e. are twofold, means that in making the principles unlimited unwittingly commits someone to the absurdity that there are doubling infinity.

Aristotle, explicitly returning to the concept of “oppositionality,” says cryptically, “there is one opposition in every genus, and substance (ἡ οὐσία) is one genus” (189a13-14). He will return to elaborate on this idea at 189b22 ff., so it would be best to incorporate that additional material here as well, and then, with the passages combined, see what it tells us about the contraries. In 189b Aristotle expands on the idea that there is “one opposition in every genus” by qualifying the nature of the opposition. The qualification is that there is one ultimate (τὰς πρώτας) opposition in every genus. Thus, while there may be many oppositions, in any given genus each set of non-primary contraries fundamentally “is lead back” to a single super-ordinating set of contraries, as he makes clear in 189b25-27. I assume that what Aristotle means by genus here are his famous categories, one of course, being substance. I will return to this passage when I begin to discuss 189b16, for there it will illuminate a different problem than the discussion here about all opposites of a genus being resolved into a single set of opposites.

δότι μὲν οὖν οὐ̣ν οὕτε μία οὕτε ἄπτειροι, δήλου ἐκ τούτων•
(20) ἐπεὶ δὲ πεπερασμέναι, τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν δύο μόνον ἔχει
τινὰ λόγον• ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις πῶς ἢ ἡ πυκνότης
tήν μανότητα ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν ἢ αὐτὴ τήν πυκνότητα.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὁποιαοῦν ἐναντιότητης• οὐ γὰρ ἡ φιλία
tὸ νεῖκος συνάγει καὶ ποιεῖ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ νεῖκος
ex ἐκείνης, ἀλλ’ ἀμφοῦ (25) ἔτερὸν τι τρίτον. ἐνίοι δὲ καὶ
πλεῖω λαμβάνουσιν ἐξ ὧν κατασκευάζουσι τὴν τῶν
ουτων φύσιν. (189a20-25)

From these considerations, it is clear that the principles are
neither one nor unlimited. And since they are finite, not
making them only two has a certain argument [in its favor].
For someone would be at a loss how either by nature density
is able to make rarity something or likewise how rarity can
make density something. And this likewise holds for any other
opposition whatsoever. For love does not reconcile strife and
make something from it, and neither does strife do the same
likewise, but both make another third thing into something.
And some others construe even more principles [than three]
and out of these they furnish the nature of the things that are.

At this point, Aristotle has dispensed with the two extremes: there
is only one principle or that the principles are of an unlimited number.
But there remains the difficulty of sifting through the finite candidates.
Aristotle begins with the most theoretically modest proposal, given
his guiding assumption that the nature of principles are opposites, and
begins counting by twos. He offers two principles, a set of opposites, as
the mathematically minimum set of candidates. He is not, as another
interpretation would have it, brooking different candidates for principles,
and musing on whether such alternatives could, as faceless nominees,
possibly do duty as dual principles. He is rather consistently applying
his recent and foredetermined conclusion that the opposites are the
principles, a position that allows him to use “principle” or “opposite” rather
synonymously, depending on the contextual utility of the term.

As Aristotle is starting with the minimal number of two as the
number of principle-opposites, there is a problem involved in that a
commitment to two might necessarily implicate a third thing. For two
opposites cannot work upon each other; presumably not a small part of
their definitional “opposition” is that they are fundamentally incapable
of interaction.\textsuperscript{17} Thus there arises a third thing, on which the first two
principles must “work.” The recognition of this relationship, that the
principles need something upon which they can work, is what allows for
the possibility, in fact, that there are more “third things” upon which the
principles act. The existence of the role of a third thing is also perceived as
the motivation behind the proliferation of “third things” (in the plural), at
least in Aristotle’s assessment of his predecessor’s thinking\textsuperscript{18}.

To offer an analogy, the opposites are inert ingredients in the recipe,
which require an activating ingredient to make all the ingredients act and
react, generate and decay. Aristotle’s next section picks up on the concern
for a third thing, fleshing out what it means for something to be a substrate.

As for this, someone would be at a loss because of this: we see the opposites are not a substance of anything
of the things that are and it is necessary for a principle not to be predicated of something. For there will be a principle of
the principle. For the underlying thing is a principle, and it appears prior to the thing being predicated. Still, we deny that
substance is opposed to substance. For how would substance come from non-substance? Or how would not-substance be
prior to substance?

Peculiar to this section is Aristotle’s introduction of the term \textit{φύσις}
as a proxy for substratum, the reason for which will become more apparent
when he directs us toward the explanatory utility of the substratum. The
two reasons in this section which compel us to admit this third thing,
this substratum, are (1) the opposites themselves do not and cannot fill
the role of the substance (read physical stuff) of the universe and (2) a
principle is theoretically precluded from being predicated of something
else. Given the first reason, literally that we do not see (\textit{ὀρῶμεν}) the
opposites as physical stuff, the introduction of the term φύσις becomes clear. Whatever opposites are, although different in that they are opposite, they are similar in that they are the same kind of explanation; they are of a different “nature” entirely from anything which we could offer as their physical “canvas.” Regarding the second concern, that principles cannot be predicated of something, it is clear that opposites, are, in fact, predicated of something. Combining these objections to the opposites as principles with an example, we could say that it is obvious that, for instance, density nor rarity is the substance of the universe, nor on the other hand, is it philosophically satisfying to say of the putative principles of rarity or density, that a substance is rare (or dense). For in the later objection, it seems necessary that the substance, qua substratum, is anterior to any denseness or rarefaction that it undergoes. Aristotle goes into more detail with the second objection, making explicit that something which underlies must be a principle.

Simplicius, citing Alexander of Aphrodisias, offers a different take on this section, though one still compatible with the notion that Aristotle is here assuming and being guided by the opposites-as-principles paradigm. The interpretation he offers is that the opposites as principles falls to a contradiction. “The contraries do not underlie anything; the principles do underlie [things]; therefore the contraries are not principles. The second is as follows; the principles are not [said] of an underlying thing; the contraries are said of an underlying thing; therefore the contraries are not principles” (Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics, 40).

One unanswered question is how (even taking the eventual schema of principles as Aristotle advocates, that is, as two opposites and a substrate) the contraries would not similarly fall prey to the second objection and turn out, by the same analysis, to be non-principles. The philosophical leverage which Aristotle was hoping to gain from this section was to press his advantage on the idea that the contraries alone are insufficient so that a third “nature” must be posited. As we see with the second objection though, in fleeing from the inadequacy of two lone principles, when we add a third, its very inclusion undermines the grounds of establishing those initial two principles. The emergence of this unintended consequence lay in the fact that whatever underlies a thing is the principle. Therefore, if a substrate underlies the two contraries, ipso facto, the contraries are and never were themselves principles²⁰ ²¹.
Aristotle ends this section by offering an apparently unrelated adjunct to his discussion: “Still, we deny that substance is opposed to being. For how would substance come from non-substance? Or how would non-substance be prior to substance?” Aristotle is still trying to motivate us toward the adoption of a third principle. He is focusing on the inadequacies of the two principles, opposites, whose contribution is necessary but not sufficient to explain the nature of the things that are. Aristotle’s line of reasoning goes thus: we know there are real things of change (a presupposition of physics qua physics); we know that these things undergoing change are substances (the idea of change presupposes a subject); we know that opposites are necessarily involved. Taking these three things into consideration, as Aristotle hopes we will, he nevertheless does not want us to adopt a possible solution that has some kind of portmanteau principle which is able to do simultaneous duty as contrary and as substrate. An option such as this is immediately ruled out by the idea, alluded to here and explicit in the Categories, that substance has no contrary. There is furthermore another consideration which Aristotle possibly has an eye on eliminating. Since he has already convinced us that the principles are oppositional type things from chapter five, he may think that we would be overzealous in our application of this discovery. Thus, we would be mistakenly thinking that “oppositionality” also applies to both sides of the substrate/contrariety divide as well as the two contraries within the contrariety. This former option is ruled out in principle from consideration of the Categories (see note 21).

It is equally important to note from this section that, as is his prerogative, Aristotle is discussing opposites at a very generic level. We know opposites exist and yet we also know opposites are the kinds of things that cannot exist on their own, apart from a substance. It is with this consideration in mind that we ought to turn to the next section.

διόστοι εἰ τίς τόν τε πρότερον ἀλήθῃ νομίσειεν εἶναι λόγον καὶ τούτου, ἀναγκαῖον, (35) (189b.) εἰ μέλλει διασώσειν ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς, ὑποτιθέναι τι τρίτον, ὡστε φαίνειν οἱ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν εἶναι λέγοντες τὸ πᾶν, οἶον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μεταξὺ μᾶλλον πῦρ γὰρ ἡδὴ καὶ γῆ καὶ ἄηρ καὶ ὕδωρ μετ’ ἐναντιοτήτων συμπεπλεγμένα ἐστίν (189a34-b5).
Therefore if someone would think this argument and the prior one were true, it is necessary, if he is to preserve them both, to posit some third thing, just as those do who say the universe is one kind of nature, such as water or fire or something intermediate between these two. And an intermediate seems rather better: for fire and earth and air and water are still bound up with contrarieties.

At this juncture, Aristotle wishes to refocus and recommit us to two arguments (λόγοι), which he does not specify. The most reasonable candidates for the two arguments are (1) the principles are opposed and (2) there is a need for a third thing because of (1). As I just mentioned above, and as can be inferred from the way Aristotle has made his case, we ought to read him as saying that to retain the opposites as principles, one must necessarily have a substrate. They are a package deal. This is well evidenced when we plug in any particular example set of opposites, black and white, density and rarity, etc. We cannot have a real universe without these contraries being instantiated in some real subject. It will not do well to have mere contraries, nor does the concept of contrariety itself make sense divorced from a substratum. In light of Aristotle’s distinction of the perspicuous difference of substrate from contrariety, the term φύσις parallels this fact. Aristotle notes that monists of different stripes have offered as their φύσις water or fire, so it clear that he is advancing a physical stuff, a medium, on which the contraries can do their work.

Because he is appealing to a “something” different from opposites, to offer a substrate such as one of the four customary elements is to entangle oneself in either heat or wetness, etc, which would necessarily involve its contrary. What we are looking for though, is something that is of a different nature than the opposites. Implicit in this line of reasoning seems to be the assumption that opposites just are the types of explanations which are not material explanations. Furthermore, if one of our candidate (but mistakenly so-called) substrates is bound up with opposites, then it is probably in the category of opposites, not that of substrate. With that in mind, we will now turn to the candidates which are, in fact, best suited to serve as subjects or substrates.
δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ. ἀλλὰ πάντες γε τὸ ἐν τοῦτο τοῖς ἑναντίοις οὐρανικοῖς σχηματίζουσιν, πυκνότητι καὶ μανότητι καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον. ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ὅλως ὑπεροχὴ δηλονότι (10) καὶ ἐλλειψις, ὥστερ εἰρηται πρότερον. καὶ ἐδεικε παλαιὰ εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ δόξα, ὅτι τὸ ἐν καὶ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἐλλειψις ἁρχαὶ τῶν ὑπόνων εἰσὶν, πλὴν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἁρχαῖο τὰ δύο μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ ἐν πάσχειν, τῶν δ’ ὑστέρων τινὲς τοῦναντίον τὸ μὲν ἐν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δύο πάσχειν (15) φασὶ μᾶλλον (189b5-16).

Therefore also some, not unreasonably, make the underlying thing different from these, while some make the underlying thing air. For air possesses the least perceptible differences of the other candidates, while water has next least perceptible qualities. Everyone fashions this one thing by means of opposites, density and rarity, that is, by means of more and less. These things are generally and clearly excess and defect, just as was said before. And it seems this was the opinion in former times as well, that the one and the excess and defect are the principles of the things that are, only not in the same way, but some of our predecessors made the two the active part and the one the passive, while some of the later thinkers say the opposite, that the one is the active part and the two are passive.

As Aristotle presses on with analysis of his predecessors’ thinking, he ambiguously states that some made the underlying subject different from “these.”²⁹ Given my previous interpretation, I take the “these” here to mean the contraries. Aristotle is thus summing up the philosophical utility of making the subject different from the contraries.

The consideration does present itself, however, as to why Aristotle thinks that the most suitable candidate for a substrate should have perceptible differences to the least degree.³⁰ The idea seems to be that the substrate should be something nondescript and in some sense, malleable. If the substrate were itself capable of differentiating itself, perhaps through some intrinsic faculty or the possession of a multitude of alternative properties, there would be no need for principles. But principles are in fact the “difference makers.” This is best seen in any pair of contraries themselves, which, among themselves, are quintessential examples of difference. Thus, when Aristotle says that everyone fashions³¹ the one thing
by means of opposites, what he really means is that the opposites fashion the one thing. That is to say, the contraries are the kinds of principles which actualize perceptible and differentiating features onto the substrate.

Aristotle also harkens back to chapter four where he first introduced to us the idea that his predecessors used the concepts of excess and defect. However, the reintroduction of this point is problematic. When Aristotle first introduced the concept of excess and deficiency, he gave two examples, one was density and rarity, while the other was Plato’s Great and Small. As the principles of excess and deficiency clearly involve quantity (or at least trades on a metaphor grounded in it), quantitative examples certainly fit the model. Thus, for example, density is too much of something, and the Small is too little of another thing. These can both easily be understood and grouped under the concept of excess or deficiency. On the other hand, here in chapter six Aristotle merely alludes to the former discussion, and makes the sweeping statement that the opposites of everyone can be fitted into excess or deficiency. It is clear, however, that he must mean the primary principles of any given philosopher. For other principles which have been brought up, such as white and black, do not in any clear manner fit into the excess and deficiency categories. This can also be read as confirmation of the idea that we are consistently discussing opposites as principles in their operative genus, the genus of substance, which indeed involves quantity.

At 189b Aristotle changes his presentation of the discussion from one about opposites and substrate to that of active and passive (μὲν ποιεῖν…δὲ πάσχειν). He is perhaps anticipating a viewpoint that his sought-after principles are not the opposites and a substrate, but are rather an active and passive set of principles. While not ruling out this possibility, however, he is more likely simply representing the opposites and the substrate in a different terminological light. He points out that different predecessors laid out their theories in different ways, with some making the opposites active, while others made the substrate active, with the remaining part being passive. It is easiest to understand the phrase “some more recent thinkers” as being a superfluous adjunct to impugn Plato, for we know of no other “recent” philosopher who made his “one” the active principle. Furthermore, Aristotle has made his endoxic case by appealing to the unanimous opinion of his predecessors in taking the opposites as the formative principles.
Aristotle, on one take, might be introducing the language of active and passive elements in order to contrast Plato’s novel and controversial (to Aristotle at least) perspective on the issue. This seems unlikely, though, since in the next section certain objections are levied against maintaining a set of three principles alone, in which Aristotle trades on the notion of activity and passivity. Thus these two notions of activity and passivity appear to do theoretical work within the framework of Aristotle’s thinking about the principles. Furthermore, at 189b13, Aristotle, after admitting the long-established tradition of a one [substrate], excess and defect as the principles of being, qualifies his statement with, “only not in the same manner.” It appears on a first reading that Aristotle wishes to differentiate the views of two groups of people with differing views on which constituents of reality are passive and which are active. There is an alternative way of reading this section, though, which does not fixate on the sectarian differences between what parts should be considered active and what passive. This other interpretation would understand that the contrast is between (1) those who considered the constituents of reality to be the one, excess and defect or (2) those who thought that the constituents of reality are passive and active elements. The justification for this reading is twofold. The first is that the setup for Aristotle’s introduction of this “new manner” involves the older thinkers exclusively — in fact he wishes to utilize their unanimity to make his point. So the distinction that Aristotle is drawing is not between the old and the new, because he is taking for granted that his discussion is firmly in the context of discussing the ancient views. The distinction, rather, is one of characterization, one way involving three elements, and another way of characterization, involving two elements; the latter characterization also having two variants, depending on whether the adherent endorses the “one” as active or passive. I take it that these ways of understanding refer to the same process, yet are at least terminological differences. The second reason I prefer this interpretation is that it is able to explain the language at the end of this chapter concerning how many elements there are.

Since we are at the next section, I will continue on with my discussion about a two versus three part distinction with the contraries and substrate, incorporating the new information gleaned from what we find there as well.
Saying that the elements are three both from these [considerations] and others like them would seem to make sense in a certain way to those who are investigating them, just as we were saying, while saying that the elements are more than three no longer makes sense. For one is sufficient in regard to being acted upon, but if there are four things, there will be two sets of contraries and there will be a need for some other separate intermediate nature to belong to each set of contraries. But if, although being two, they are able to generate from each other, one of the sets of contraries would be superfluous. And at the same time it is impossible for the primary opposites to be more. For substance is one kind of genus of being, so that the principles only differ in being before and after each other, but they do not differ in kind. For there is always one opposition in every kind, and every opposition seems to be lead back into one. It is clear therefore, that the elements are neither one nor more than two or three. But deciding between two or three, just as we were saying, contains much difficulty.

Persisting with the interpretative thread from the last section, Aristotle continues on, conscious of at least two characterizations of the principles of reality. In light of this, Aristotle says that calling the elements
three makes sense in a certain way to those who investigate the elements (ἐπισκοποῦσι δόξειν ᾃν ἐχειν τινὰ λόγον). The unspoken, but acknowledged, corollary is that calling the elements two also makes sense in a certain (i.e. different) way. An implicit acknowledgement on Aristotle’s part of these two alternatives, neither of which is foreclosed on, is that he draws attention to the point that we cannot say the elements are more than three. The framework of the objections Aristotle is answering in this last area of the chapter can be understood in the following way. Aristotle has been and is talking about the active and passive elements of the things that are. But he is grouping them in this way so that he can see if the passive element, the substrate, can be increased in number, and whether this same process of addition can be applied to the active side, the opposites. The reason Aristotle returns to the active/passive terminology again, is because by doing so he is able to refute a possible objection to there being only one set of contraries. The fact that Aristotle so unhesitatingly partakes of this distinction reinforces the understanding that he has merely introduced two different ways of characterization, but not two alternative and exclusive accounts. Because he is about to reject a particular possibility, he uses the characterization which is most conducive to doing so. In this instance, it happens to be the active/passive distinction.

Aristotle uses the active/passive distinction to consider some other possibilities for the number of principles. As I emphasized at the beginning of this paper, I believe Aristotle is assuming that the principles operate oppositionally throughout this chapter. Thus there is discussion about what is necessarily entailed in committing oneself to opposites as principles. The necessary entailment happens to be a substrate. A new problem arises in that one may legitimately ask, “Why aren’t there more sets of contraries?” If we are forced, by our considerations thus far, to count by twos (or, as it were, by threes) because we are committed to the opposites and a substrate, why is it that we cannot have two of these “sets” or even more? Aristotle addresses this concern by first pointing out that we only need one substrate to be worked upon. He does not offer his reasons for thinking that one substrate is sufficient, but they perhaps have to do with the nature of a substrate. A substrate is featureless in some sense, so to have two substrates would be indistinguishable from having one substrate. That is, only in quantity would the two scenarios differ in any manner. This is a different situation from opposites, which by definition differ from each
other or from another set of opposites. One aspect of Aristotle’s thinking that this sheds light on is his theorizing about physics in general. Because Aristotle is positing the bare minimum of circumstances in which what-is would obtain, he is not concerned with the rather more troublesome question of what makes this world. That is, presumably certain substances (say, living things) might need one kind of substrate, while inanimate matter needs another kind. But this consideration does not enter into the equation for Aristotle.

When Aristotle begins to address the concern that the pairs of opposites might be more than one, he tellingly phrases it in such a way as to focus on the opposites themselves, “if there are four things, then there will be two sets of opposites.” But he adds, “there will be a need for some other intermediate nature [i.e. a substrate] to belong separately to each [of the sets of opposites].” It is understandable then, that Aristotle was conceiving of a scenario in which there were six total elements, although he chose to depict the situation as consisting of “four” parts. Thus, even in this later section of the chapter, where he ostensibly has different aims and concerns than in the beginning, he is construing the elements as two or three, depending on the usage he needs for his argument.

Aristotle next pursues the possibility that there is more than one set of opposites. He reasons that if there are two sets of contraries, one set of contraries would be superfluous. Aristotle does not stipulate what conditions render one contrariety expendable. One option is that what renders one contrariety superfluous is the very fact that it can be generated from something else. If, in fact, one thing is predicated of another, this disqualifies that thing from consideration as a principle. For to be a principle, a thing must underlie, it cannot be predicated, as we have already heard from Aristotle. Granting such an interpretation though, we still may be giving short shrift to Aristotle’s objection. Aristotle could be raising one of two concerns. The first is that if there could somewhere be a contrariety and a substrate which gave rise (in whatever ways a contrariety and substrate “generate”) to another contrariety and substrate, then this would nullify the status of these second entities as principles: a principle cannot be generated. Aristotle may be making a more forceful objection, however. On this stronger reading, Aristotle is saying that if a contrariety and substrate are the kinds of things that can generate another contrariety and substrate, then that means contrarieties and substrates are not the
types of things that can serve as principles. Presumably, this secondary contrariety and substrate can generate things just as can the first. Thus, the secondary contrariety is equivalent to the first, which eliminates both from consideration as principles.

The ambiguity of this later concern should be analyzed by Aristotle’s proclamation that, “…it is impossible for the primary contrarieties to be more.” We have reason to suspect that such a consideration was latent in his rejection of more than one contrariety a few sentences earlier. Perhaps Aristotle is just refocusing attention on what his attack really is upon, not the mere proliferation of opposites, but primary opposites. Aristotle ends the discussion of this point by bringing up his earlier position that there is one primary opposition in each genus. Not as obscure as the earlier passage, this section specifies that we are concerned with primary oppositions here, not all oppositions. This is the second time that Aristotle has brought up the topic of one set of contraries in a genus in conjunction with the (established) idea that the principles are oppositions. A first pass would give a reader the impression that Aristotle introduces this concept lest we mistakenly multiply the number of contraries. On this view, Aristotle is simply trying to forestall such a move. He may very well be attempting to and actually accomplishing this goal. But as I mentioned, this is the second time he has brought up the topic of contraries in a genus, and both times he has brought it up in the context of contraries without additionally mentioning a substrate. I propose that what Aristotle is really doing is making it known that every time there is a set of contraries it is in something, namely a genus. Since he has specified that the type of genus we are talking about, when we talk physics, is the genus of substance, Aristotle is pointing to the necessary inclusion of a substrate. That is to say, the idea of contraries within physics has to have a genus, one genus, and that genus is substance. This would give a much stronger force to the consideration in the middle of the chapter where Aristotle, as one of two arguments, wishes to preserve the idea of contraries existing. He is not applying an ad hoc solution in order to preserve the idea of contraries, but rather he is saying to even make sense of contraries in the world of physics, the logic of physics requires a substrate.

The last pronouncement of the chapter is that it is clear that there is neither one element nor more than three, but making the choice between two and three contains some difficulty. The initial impulse is to say that
the alternatives of two and three are, respectively, the choice of two contraries or two contraries with a substrate. However, it seems, in light of what I have said about Aristotelian physics, especially with the necessary inclusion, from the Categories, of a substrate/genus, that two contraries naked by themselves were never and could never be a serious consideration for the principles. The perplexity we face is in whether we are to further explanatorily reduce the principles to concepts of activity and passivity. One verbal reflection of this dilemma is that sometimes the contraries (τάναντία) are spoken of, while alternatively, to use an equally valid Aristotelian formulation, one contrariety (ἐναντιώσις) is described.\(^4\)

In conclusion, in chapter six Aristotle has already brought to the table with him from chapter five a conviction that the principles are oppositional. This “oppositionality” guides the discussion, limiting the possibilities so that we must “count by twos [of oppositions]” in any consideration of which things are the principles. The discussion of whether there are two or three principles is complicated by Aristotle’s introduction of the distinction between two contraries and a substrate on the one hand, and an active and passive element on the other, involved whenever we discuss the opposites. Before he introduced this distinction, Aristotle was presumably discussing whether we ought to include the opposites alone as principle, but after the distinction has been introduced, what Aristotle means by the aporia of two or three principles at the end of the chapter is a dispute about whether to use active and passive terminology, or not. One of the most persuasive reasons to adopt this view is Aristotle’s double insistence, bookending the start and finish of this chapter, that every genus has one contrariety. The necessity concomitance of a genus when there are contraries requires that we were always and only considering two contraries and a substrate. All along Aristotle was only seriously entertaining candidates which included a substrate, that is, a genus. The remaining problem of the chapter, where we leave the discussion thus far, is whether we ought to deem them active and passive principles, or not.

**Notes**

1 ἀρχαί: It does little good here to define what the principles are, for this is a constituent of what the inquiry for Aristotle, and for this paper, means. Nevertheless, for the sake of some clarity, it the might be helpful to state what a principle is. *What we are looking for*, to paraphrase a philosophical guide found in the *Posterior Analytics*, while also incorporating the opening sentence of the *Physics*, *are those things which are*...
the most basic causes of the things found in nature (A.Po. 71b9-12, Ph. 184a10-16).

2 See p. 2 for an account of what I mean by this term, “Thus the commitment to “opposites” should be construed broadly…”

3 By the term genus I understand the genus of substance.

4 e.g. (1) It is obvious that everyone makes the opposites principles **in some way** (πως) (188a26-27).

(2) [Those who unwittingly posit the opposites as principles] say the same thing **in some way** (πως), while differing from each other. For they are different in so far as they seem even to most people, but the same by **analogy**. (188b36-189a1).

5 Simplicius acutely observes, after noting the manner of the philosophers’ homologous convergence on the truth of contraries, that, “…not even those persons simply declared that contraries qua contraries are principles, but the things they actually mentioned were contraries, such as light and dark and Strife and Love…” (188.1, p.26)

6 Πάντες δὴ τἀναντία ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν… (188a19).

7 All translations of Aristotle of mine.

8 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τἀναντία πως πάντες ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχὰς, δήλον (188a26-27).

9 πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχὰς, καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες, οἷος τἀναντία λέγουσι… (188b27-29).

10 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐναντίας δεὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, φανερῶν (189a9-10).

11 The three previous instances in this chapter were the substantively described, ‘τἀναντία;’ here the principles are adjectively described as ‘ἐναντίας.’ One possibility this allows, and I hold, is that the conclusion of the chapter can be phrased as, “the principles are oppositional,” which is a looser kind of commitment than, “the principles are opposites.” This take will also be corroborated by my understanding and explanation of I.6, where Aristotle begins the task of narrowing down the broader commitment of I.5.

12 “Contrariety” will be synonymous in my vocabulary with “set of contraries.” Depending on whether economy or clarity is warranted, I will use them interchangeably.

13 e.g. “Since knowing and understanding in the case of all inquiries comes about from gaining knowledge of those things, of which there are principles or causes or elements…” (184a10-12) “When principles are unlimited both according to number and form, it is impossible to know the things composed from them” (187b10-11).

14 As Philoponus notes, in picking up a passage (undisclosed by the translator) from Generation and Corruption, “…it will follow (as Aristotle says in De Generatione et Corruptione) that infinity is thereby multiplied by two” (71).

15 “For there is always one opposition in every kind, and every opposition seems to be lead back into one.”

16 I understand Aristotle here as merely clearing space for the possibility of hylomorphism, or perhaps “greasing the skids” for it as the optimal candidate, which he will set out in the next chapter.

17 Not unlike the analogous problems involved for proponents of mind-body dualism.

18 I take, “ἐνίοι δὲ καὶ πλεῖον λαμβάνουσι εξ ὧν κατασκευάζουσι τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν” as referring to the number of “sets” of two contrarieties with a third thing. That is, Aristotle is pointing out that as far as necessity and sufficiency touch upon the issue of contraries, even his often confused predecessors recognized the implication of a third thing when positing two contraries.

19 It is tempting to suppose that Aristotle here could mean ‘nature’ broadly, as in our sense of the natural world, but there is not enough context to determine such a reading.

20 I think I can briefly sketch out a defense justifying calling the contraries principles, **even if** something else underlies them. (Although also see footnote 17 for an alternative.) In the fifth chapter of the Categories (2a ff.), Aristotle lays out his Primary and Secondary Substances, of which the former is the more fundamental and most properly called substance (ἡ κυριώτατα τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη), while the latter is applied to species and genera of the first. Nevertheless they are both substances. In the same way, although the opposites are dependent in some sense on the substrate, i.e. they are “secondary principles,” they are nevertheless principles all the same and need to be included.
in any account of principles in the same way that Secondary Substance needs to be given in an account of substance. If this account is true, an additional manner in which we can understand the role of principles is that, for Aristotle, they serve a primary heuristic role but a secondary ontological role to that of the substrate.

21 The force of this objection is inert, however, if the conceptual coherence of opposites necessitates that they have a substrate upon which to work as opposites. See p. 20 where I explain this idea in more detail.

22 Ph. 184b25 ff.

23 Cat. 4a10. In fact Aristotle says it most distinctive of [primary] substance that it is able to admit of contraries. He adds that no other single entity is even able to receive contraries. Μάλιστα δὲ ἰδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταύτων καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὃν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὸν• οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀλλῶν οὐδενὸς ἄν ἔχοι τὰς προενεγκεῖν τὸν μὴ ἐστὶν οὐσίαν, ὃ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὃν τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικὸν ἐστιν (Categories 4a10-13).

24 Physics I.5 and 6 thus far.

25 Cat. 3b24 ff.

26 189a10

27 189a27

28 Without drawing attention to this term, Philoponus seems to think that Aristotle has anticipated here his own “material” and “formal principles.” Incidentally, this particular signification of the term provides some intriguing overlap with our current usage of the word, “Nature.”

29 Moreover, even if the antecedents in mind are not the contraries, but rather the four elements recently named, these elements themselves implicate the contraries, as Aristotle has quite literally just mentioned. [ταῦτα] μετ’ ἐναντιοτήτων συμπεπλεγμένα ἐστίν (189b4-5).

30 ήκιστα ἔχει τῶν ἄλλων διαφορὰς αἰσθητάς…(189b7)

31 σχηματίζουσιν

32 187a16

33 It would be difficult to imagine, in relation to what thing, either black or white would be an excess or deficiency of. Philoponus attempts to force black and white into categories of absorption and reflection of light, but his argumentation is opaque, scientifically obsolete and escapes even the partial apprehension of his English translator, “The basis for this claim is not explained…” (p. 137, n. 25).

34 See 189a13-14 and 189b23-27 for the idea that substance is a genus containing one ultimate contrariety.

35 189b8

36 I will return to the issue of active and passive when I discuss it in that section.

37 πλὴν οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον…

38 I will return to this topic shortly in the next section.

39 It is important, and necessary for my interpretation that Aristotle says “no more than three,” τὸ δὲ πλεῖον τριῶν οὐκέτι. By this wording, of course, he does not preclude there being two principles (although the idea that there is one principle was eliminated at the beginning).

40 Aristotle, at 190b29-191a14, makes an explicit appeal to the fact that one can characterize form, matter and privation as either two or three principles, depending on which perspective one wishes to take. One clue to this distinction can be found at 190b32-33, where Aristotle explains one reason why the principles can be considered two instead of three: “…for they (sc. principles) are not opposites [in this way]: It is impossible for opposites to undergo anything because of each other. This [concern] is also alleviated owing to the subject being another thing [than an opposite]. For this[ὑποκείμενον] is not an opposite.” ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὔ• ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων γὰρ πάσχει τὰναντία ἀδύνατον. λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ ἄλλο εἶναι τὸ ὑποκείμενον τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἐναντίον. The idea brought out here is that the opposites cannot work on each other, one active and one passive element, there is a need for the subject to fulfill this role. Thus there are two principles: active and passive.

41 εἰ δὲ τεττάρων ὄντων δύο ἔσονται ἐναντιώσεις(189b19-20).
42 189a30 ff.
43 This understanding of the objection would still trade on the notion that a principle must underlie or it is not a principle.
44 The conditions for a primary contrariety are set out at 189a28 ff. Two contraries cannot depend on other things, nor can the two contraries of a contrariety depend on each other. Returning to the situation stipulated in 189b21, where one contrariety generates another, we can see that this scenario would violate the first condition, i.e. one contrariety would depend on another, making it a non-principle.
45 Thus one could point to the theoretical space Aristotle is carving out for privation and form, not to mention the stronger claim that he perhaps already has them in mind here, but wishes to plump for them by clues and careful advances.
46 Not unimportantly, at the beginning and end of this “section,” since we should remain noncommittal on the originality of the chapter divisions.
47 Not coincidentally, this terminological distinction between τἀναντία and ἐναντιώσις parallels the kind of distinction I make between the two characterizations in general.

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